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ABSTRACT
The present study investigated the naturalistic use of consis­
tency, distinctiveness and consensus information, which are the three 
information variables in Kelley's (1967) covariation model of attribu­
tion. Newspaper advice columns were used as a naturalistic source of 
social data.
The first question addressed in this study was whether or not 
Kelley's (1967) three information variables are ecologically valid.
If perceivers in the "real world" actually use covariation information 
to support or defend their attributions, then it should be possible 
to reliably locate these pieces of information. If the information is 
used, it would be possible to examine whether perceivers prefer indi­
vidual items of information or combinations, as well as which combina­
tions are most commonly used. Student raters were trained in the use 
of coding manuals which helped standardize their advice column searches 
for attributions and the three information types.
The second question addressed in this study concerned per- 
ceiver's relative preferences for the three information types. A con­
troversy in the literature regarding the use of consensus information 
began with several findings that consensus information is underutilized 
(Kassin 1979a). Researchers have demonstrated that under certain 
laboratory conditions consensus will be utilized. Up to now, the 
question of the underutilization of consensus has not been approached 
naturalistically. For the present study, consensus information was
I X
defined as both implicit (e.g., norms, stereotypes) and explicit (e.g., 
base rates, observed covariation across actors). It was hypothesized 
that consensus may not be underutilized when such a broad definition is 
used.
The third area of concern to the present study was an attempt 
to demonstrate that consensus information, defined as both implicit and 
explicit, is associated with internal-external attribution in the way 
that previous theory and research would predict. High consensus should 
be associated with external attribution and low consensus should be 
associated with internal attribution.
The results of this study indicate that Kelley's (1967) three 
information variables may be ecologically valid because at least one of 
them was used with over half of all attributions examined. The informa­
tion types were used significantly more often alone than in combination 
form (p = 0.0004). No one combination was used more than any other. 
Consensus information was found to be significantly underutilized in 
terms of perceiver preference, for overall use (p = 0.0005) as well 
as for individual use (p = 0.0074). A marginally significant result 
(p = 0.0578) was obtained for the predicted relationship between level 
of consensus and the direction of attribution. Implicit and explicit 
forms of consensus contributed equally to the overall use of consensus 
information, but it was found that consensus was overwhelmingly used 
in high (e.g., much covariation across actors) as opposed to low (e.g., 
little covariation across actors) form (p = 0.000002). These results 
were discussed and various interpretations were offered.
x
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
If someone acts aggressively in a particular setting, is this 
because he/she is an aggressive individual or because he/she is respond­
ing to situational pressures? The way people formulate an answer to 
a question like this is the concern of the area of cognitive social 
psychology called attribution theory (Schneider, Hastorf & Ellsworth 
1979). Attribution theory deals with how people perceive the causes 
of their own and other people's behavior. The origin of attribution 
theory as well as a continuing source of new ideas is Fritz Heider's 
(1958) seminal work, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations.
Heider's (1958) Theory of Naive Psychology
Heider (1958) believed that scientific psychology has much to 
learn from studying naive or common-sense psychology. This is perhaps 
particularly true in studying social cognition and interpersonal rela­
tions. By understanding the psychology of naive social perception we 
may be able to make explicit some of the common-sense assumptions that 
underlie scientific thinking in this area.
According to Heider, naive social perceivers are like intui­
tive or implicit scientists. They are motivated to predict and con­
trol their environment. It is undoubtedly adaptive to be able to 
anticipate the causes and effects of one's own and other people's
1
2behavior. People accomplish this by organizing and structuring their 
perceptions in causal terms. This was demonstrated in one study 
(Heider & Simmel 1944) in which subjects were shown a film depicting 
geometric objects moving around a rectangular area. Subjects tended to 
perceive causality in these events. One larger geometric figure was 
seen as "chasing" some smaller ones. Some subjects even said that the 
larger object was a "bully" and therefore caused the smaller ones to 
run away.
One of Heider1s basic notions is that people perceive the 
causal locus of a behavior as either internal to the person performing 
the behavior (e.g., some disposition, trait or attitude) or external to 
the person performing the behavior (e.g., some environmental or situa­
tional factor). Perceivers tend to attribute the cause of a behavior 
to that factor which seems to be invariant.
To explain this idea, Heider drew an analogy between person per­
ception and object perception. When someone perceives a door, for 
example, they see it as invariantly rectangular no matter what perspec­
tive they might observe it from. Even though various shapes actually 
impinge on the retina from different viewing angles (e.g., rectangular, 
trapezoidal), the door is still perceived as rectangular. Perceivers 
attribute the property "rectangular" to the door. This phenomenon is 
known as shape constancy (Coren, Porac & Ward 1979). Similarly, if a 
person is perceived as behaving aggressively in a number of different 
situations, perceivers will attribute the cause of the behavior to 
that factor which appears to be invariant. In this case, the person 
who behaves aggressively across situations would appear to be the
3invariant factor. Perceivers are willing to attribute the property 
"aggressive" to the person just as they are willing to attribute the 
property "rectangular" to the door.
In social perception it is sometimes difficult to tell where the 
locus of causality lies. For example, if Ruth is arguing, is the cause 
of the behavior internal to her (e.g., Ruth has an argumentative per­
sonality) or external to her (e.g., the person Ruth is arguing with is 
obnoxious)? Heider realized that in order for a perceiver to decide 
between internal and external causality, more information may be needed 
than is available from one observation of a person interacting with the 
environment.
. . . behavior can be ascribed primarily to the person or to 
the environment; that is, behavior can be accounted for by 
relatively stable traits of the personality or by factors 
within the environment. Failure, for instance, can be attri­
buted to lack of ability, a personal characteristics, or to 
the supposition that the task is very difficult, an environ­
mental condition. Whether attribution to one or the other 
source will occur depends on a number of factors, for in­
stance, on information concerning the success and failure 
of other people, and on the tendency to attribute the con­
sequences of actions to the person.
The problem of attribution also applies to thing percep­
tion. In the perceptual constancies, for example, the retinal 
color may be attributed in varying degrees to either the ob­
ject or to the illumination; the retinal shape may be as­
cribed to the shape of the object or to the position of the 
object with respect to the observer. In other words, even 
though the stimulus pattern impinging on the organism may 
provide some information about the interaction between two 
entities--the object and its illumination, the person and 
the environment--additiona1 data are required before one 
can determine which of the two poles of the relation is pri­
marily responsible for the interaction. The additional data 
may take the form of further observations or of beliefs based 
upon information transmitted through previous proximal stimu­
lus patterns (Heider 1958, p. 56).
4Harold Kelley (1967, 1973) developed a model of attribution that 
describes the systematic use of further behavioral observations in de­
ciding between internal and external causality.
Kelley's (1967) Covariation Model of Attribution
Starting with Heider's (1958) theory of naive psychology,
Kelley (1967) devised a covariation model of causal attribution, some­
times called "Kelley‘S Cube." This model deals with attributions for 
behavior that takes the form "person verb stimulus." The cause of an 
actor's behavior is believed to be attributed to that factor with which 
the behavior covaries. Perceivers presumably use three types of in­
formation in deciding whether the behavior in question was caused by 
factors that are internal or by factors that are external to the "per­
son" or actor. Consistency information refers to how often in the past 
the actor performed the behavior toward the stimulus. Distinctiveness 
information refers to the number of other "stimuli" or targets (be­
sides the target in question) toward which the person performs the be­
havior. Consensus information refers to how many other "persons" or 
actors also perform the behavior toward the given stimulus. Each of 
these information types can take high (i.e., much covariation) or low 
(i.e., little covariation) forms. The way the model works can be 
illustrated as follows:
Consider the following behavior: "Sue is afraid of the dog."
In this case the "person" is Sue, the "stimulus" is the dog and the 
"verb" or behavior is being afraid. High consensus information 
would indicate that many other people are also afraid of the dog.
5-the dog.afraid of-
In this case the dog would appear to be the cause of Sue's fear, and 
therefore an external attribution would be made for the behavior. The 
dog's ability to provoke fear seems to be the cause of Sue's behavior, 
and this ability is reflected in the fact that many others respond the 
same way as Sue does. On the other hand, if no one besides Sue 
responds with fear to the dog, there would be low consensus on the be­
havior.
Person A 
Person B 
Person C 
Sue
Person A 
Person B 
Person C 
Sue-
-afraid of- ■the dog.
In this case, Sue is distinguished from the rest of the actors by virtue 
of her fear of the dog. The cause of the fear would therefore appear 
to lie within Sue, and an internal attribution would be made.
Distinctiveness information refers to the covariation of the 
behavior across different stimuli. Using the same example as above, 
low distinctiveness information would indicate that Sue responds with 
fear to many different dogs.
Sue- ■afraid of
dog A 
dog B 
dog C
stimulus dog
In this case, the cause of Sue's fear would appear to lie within Sue 
(e.g., internal attribution) simply because Sue's fear is not very 
distinctive and she is inclined to respond fearfully to many different 
stimuli. On the other hand, high distinctiveness information would
6indicate that Sue is afraid of the specific stimulus dog but is not 
afraid of other dogs.
Sue' afraid of
dog A 
dog B 
dog C 
stimulus dog
In this case it would appear as if Sue's fear is caused by characteris­
tics of the one specific dog (e.g., external attribution), simply be­
cause she does not respond with fear to other dogs.
Consistency information refers to the covariation of the be­
havior across time and across situations. High consistency information 
on our example behavior might take this form: Sue has always been afraid 
of the dog in the past. In this case, because the relationship between 
Sue and the dog is highly consistent, perceivers will tend to believe 
that either Sue or the dog is the causal agent of the behavior. How­
ever, either consensus or distinctiveness information or both would be 
needed in order to decide between them, that is in order to make either 
an internal or an external attribution. Low consistency information 
might take this form: Sue has never been afraid of the dog in the 
past. In this case, because the relationship between Sue and the dog 
is very inconsistent (e.g., little covariation over time), perceivers 
would be directed to rule out both Sue and the dog as causal agents. 
Instead, they would be forced into making a circumstance attribution, 
which would indicate that the unique combination between Sue and the 
dog in the given setting was responsible for the behavior.
To summarize, Kelley (1967) suggests that perceivers attribute 
behavior internally, externally or to the circumstances, depending on
7the levels of consistency, distinctiveness or consensus information 
available. High consistency indicates that either the person or the 
stimulus is the causal agent, whereas low consistency indicates that 
the behavior is caused by the unique circumstances. High distinctive­
ness indicates that the stimulus is the causal agent (i.e., external 
attribution), whereas low distinctiveness indicates that the person is 
the causal agent (i.e., internal attribution). High consensus indi­
cates that the stimulus is the causal agent, whereas low consensus indi­
cates that the person is the causal agent.
The Consensus Controversy
The early tests of Kelley's (1967, 1973) model indicated that 
while consensus information is used in making causal attributions, it is 
underutilized relative to consistency and distinctiveness information 
(e.g., McArthur 1972). Other research involving category membership 
prediction or attribution indicated that consensus information is either 
greatly underutilized or that it is not used at all (Kahneman & Tversky 
1973; Nisbett & Borgida 1975). These findings stimulated a consensus 
controversy in the literature. Researchers attempted to find the con­
ditions under which consensus information is actually used by per- 
ceivers.
Contrary to the early findings, Kassin (1979a) cited several 
studies in his literature review which indicate that under certain con­
ditions perceivers will be strongly affected by consensus information.
Of particular relevance to the present study is the distinction 
Kassin (1979a) made between two types of consensus information that 
have appeared in previous research. Implicit consensus information
8refers to norms, stereotypes and expectations, while explicit consensus 
information refers to actual observed covariation across actors and 
base rate data. Since there are a variety of consensus variables that 
are being investigated for a variety of purposes (e.g., attribution, 
category membership prediction, trait ascription), it is difficult for 
researchers to arrive at a "consensus on consensus" (Kulik & Taylor 
1980). Perhaps the most neglected area of research has been the use 
of consensus and other attribution information variables in non­
laboratory settings.
The issue of whether or not consensus information is underuti­
lized remains a potentially important one. Central to Heider's (1958) 
notions about attribution is the idea that people perceive behavior as 
being caused by factors that are either internal or external to an 
actor. Consensus information, in theory, is one source of evidence 
by which perceivers can distinguish between internal and external at­
tributions. The underuse of consensus information, if there is such 
an underusage among perceivers, could conceivably be one factor in­
volved in biasing perceivers away from external attributions toward 
more internal attributions.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Types of Consensus Information 
Implicit Consensus
Implicit consensus is the type of information that perceivers 
tacitly hold regarding norms, stereotypes and social constraints. High 
implicit consensus information is the belief that the majority of 
people would behave in a certain way in a certain situation or that 
the majority of people belonging to some group or category possess 
certain characteristics. Low implicit consensus information is the 
belief that the minority of people would behave in a certain way in a 
certain situation or that the minority of people belonging to some 
group or category possess certain characteristics.
Jones and Davis (1965) use a "social desirability" variable in 
their theory of correspondent inferences. This variable partially de­
fines implicit consensus.
Society's norms provide implicit expectations for behavioral 
propriety. When an actor performs a socially desirable behavior, they 
are performing a behavior that everyone would be expected to perform. 
Such behavior is said to be high in implicit consensus. Someone per­
forming such a behavior is revealing little that is unique or personal 
because everyone would probably do the same thing. To a perceiver,
9
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the cause of this behavior would appear to lie in the demand character­
istics or constraints of the situation within which the actor is be­
having (i.e., external attribution). On the other hand, when an actor 
performs a behavior which is low in social desirability, he/she is per­
forming a behavior that few others would be expected to perform. Such 
behavior is said to be low in implicit consensus. A person performing 
such a behavior is revealing much that would distinguish himself/herself 
from others, because virtually no one else would be likely to do the 
same thing. To a perceiver, the cause of this behavior appears to be 
some factor unique to the actor (e.g., internal attribution).
According to Jones and Davis (1965) once an internal attribution 
is made, perceivers can determine the specific internal causal factor. 
This is accomplished through a non-common effects analysis, in which 
the effects of behavioral choices are compared in order to locate any 
that may be unique (e.g., non-common). For example, suppose Mil 1y was 
going to buy one of two dogs, a German shepherd or a beagle. If she 
chose the German shepherd she would get a dog that eats a lot, is 
friendly, and is big. If she chose the beagle she would also get a 
dog that eats a lot and is friendly, but in this case the dog is 
small. The only non-common effect between the two choices involves 
the size of the dog. Therefore, if the German shepherd were chosen, 
a perceiver could be sure that the cause of Milly's behavior was her 
preference for a big dog. If the beagle were chosen, a perceiver could 
be sure that the cause of Milly's behavior was her preference for a 
small dog.
In correspondent inference theory (Jones & Davis 1965) only the 
social desirability variable (e.g., implicit consensus) is used to
11
determine global external versus global internal attribution. If a 
global internal attribution is made, then a subsequent non-common ef­
fects analysis can be used to determine the specific internal factor.
In a later formulation of correspondent inference theory Jones 
and McGillis (1976) suggest that implicit consensus can also be gen­
erated from category-based expectancies. Here, perceivers implicitly as­
sociate modal characteristics with such factors as age, sex, and occupa­
tion. High and low implicit consensus information are based upon what 
characteristics the majority or the minority of people in a given cate­
gory possess, respectively.
Perceivers also hold implicit consensus information that takes 
the form of situation-based expectancies. In certain situations the 
majority of people (high implicit consensus) or the minority of people 
(low implicit consensus) are expected to behave in certain ways. It is 
this kind of implicit consensus information that makes so dramatic find­
ings like those in Milgram's (1963) classic obedience study. Sixty- 
five percent of Milgram's (1963) subjects willingly obeyed an experimen­
ter request to deliver severe sbock to a person who was ostensibly a 
helpless, protesting fellow participant (actually an experimental ac­
complice), People, in general, seem to underestimate obedience (rela­
tive to Milgram's (1963) original subjects) when predicting their own 
behavior in the same situation (Elms & Milgram 1966). In other words, 
people seem to hold high implicit consensus on non-obedience in the 
Milgram (1963) experimental situation.
For all types of implicit consensus, high consensus leads to 
external attributions and low consensus leads to internal attributions.
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Explicit Consensus
Whereas implicit consensus represents expectations about the be­
havior or characteristics of others, explicit consensus represents in­
formation about what others actually do or are.
Kelley's (1967) covariation model of attribution contains an ex­
plicit consensus variable. If it is known that many people perform a 
given behavior, then there is high explicit consensus information on 
that behavior. If few people are known to perform a given behavior, 
then there is low explicit consensus information on that behavior. Ex­
plicit consensus is believed to direct attributional activity in the 
same way as implicit consensus. If the majority of people behave in a 
certain way toward a given stimulus then perceivers feel they have 
gained some knowledge about the power of that stimulus to elicit be­
havior (e.g., external attribution). If almost no one else behaves to­
ward a stimulus the same way as a given actor, then perceivers feel 
they have gained some knowledge about the actor's inclinations (e.g., 
internal attribution).
The social judgment literature contains studies of base rate 
information, which is analogous to Kelley's (1967, 1973) consensus 
variable. Base rate information provides high or low consensus in the 
form of percentages or proportions of people behaving in a certain 
way or possessing certain characteristics. As with the other types of 
consensus information, high base rate leads to external attribution 
and low base rate leads to internal attribution.
13
Underutilization of Consensus Information
Tests of Kelley's (1967, 1973) Model
The predictions for attribution from Kelley's covariation model 
have generally been supported (McArthur 1972, 1976; Orvis, Cunningham 
& Kelley 1975; Karaz & Perlman 1975).
In the classic test of the model (McArthur 1972) perceivers were 
presented with behaviors of the form "person verb stimulus" (e.g., Sue 
is afraid of the dog). These behaviors were accompanied by supporting 
information in the form of high or low consistency (e.g., In the past, 
Sue has almost always/almost never been afraid of the dog), high or 
low distinctiveness (e.g., Sue is not afraid of almost any other dog/
Sue is also afraid of almost every other dog), and high or low consensus 
(e.g., almost everyone else/hardly anyone else is afraid of the dog). 
Subjects were required to make attributions for the behaviors to either 
the person, the stimulus, the circumstances, or to some combination of 
factors.
In terms of the amount of variance accounted for among attribu­
tions, consensus information (3%) affected attributional activity a 
great deal less than either consistency information (20%) or distinc­
tiveness information (10%). Kelley (1967) suggested that consistency 
should be more powerful than consensus because "physical reality 
takes precedence over social reality information." He further sug­
gested that consensus information may actually require further attribu­
tional tests regarding the trustworthiness of the information source. 
However, it remained unclear why consensus should be underutilized 
relative to distinctiveness.
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Consistent with Kelley's (1967) theory, McArthur (1972) tested 
behaviors of the form "person verb stimulus." In each case some per­
son performed some behavior (e.g., verb) toward some stimulus.
McArthur (1976) reported that in her earlier study (McArthur 1972) the 
stimulus was sometimes an inanimate object or thing and sometimes was 
an actual person. An inspection of the earlier data revealed that con­
sensus and distinctiveness information were equally powerful in direct­
ing attributions when both the "person" and the "stimulus" were persons 
(e.g., John laughs at the comedian). Distinctiveness information, how­
ever, was more powerful when the stimulus was a thing (e.g., George 
translates the sentence incorrectly).
McArthur (1976) hypothesized that people may be more likely to 
draw causal inferences when given information about things than when 
given information about persons. This could be due to the fact that 
inanimate things are perceived as relatively invariant entities, while 
people are perceived as highly variable entities. Psychologically, 
this hypothesis makes good common-sense, which would be consistent 
with Heider's (1958) orientation toward naive perception.
McArthur (1976) presented subjects with behaviors of the form 
"agent verb target" instead of "person verb stimulus." Half the time 
the agent was a person (e.g., The man protects the house) and half the 
time the agent was a thing (e.g., The tree protects the house). Also, 
half the time the target was a person (e.g., The girl holds the child) 
and half the time the target was a thing (e.g., The girl holds the 
flower). Subjects were presented with high or low consensus and high 
or low distinctiveness information. Consistency information was 
always presented in high form.
15
The results showed that consensus information is significantly 
stronger when it applies to persons rather than things. Distinctive­
ness information is significantly stronger when it applies to things 
rather than persons. Thus, McArthur's (1976) hypothesis was only par­
tially supported. Overall, however, the results indicated that distinc­
tiveness information had a significantly greater impact on attributions 
than did consensus information, even though the two information types 
pertained equally often to persons and things.
Orvis, Cunningham and Kelley (1975) looked at the way perceivers 
use consistency, distinctiveness and consensus in combinations. 
McArthur's (1972) findings indicated that three of the possible combina­
tions seemed to be basic patterns. High consensus, high distinctiveness 
and high consistency in combination (HHH) leads to the strongest stimu­
lus attributions. Low consensus, low distinctiveness and high consis­
tency in combination (LLH) leads to the strongest person attributions. 
Low consensus, high distinctiveness and low consistency in combination 
(LHL) leads to the strongest circumstance attributions.
Orvis et al. (1975) hypothesized that perceivers use the three 
basic combinations as templates or schemata when making attributions.
If a perceiver encounters partial information (e.g., just one or two of 
the information types) they will relate the partial information to that 
data pattern with which it is most consistent. Then the attribution 
which the basic pattern predicts is made.
Half of the subjects were given a set of behaviors (both inter­
personal and achievement) of the form "person verb stimulus." In 
addition, these subjects were given one or two pieces of information
16
consisting of high or low consensus, high or low distinctiveness, or 
high or low consistency. All possible combinations of partial informa­
tion were sampled. These subjects could attribute the cause of the be­
havior to the person, the stimulus, the circumstances, or to any pos­
sible combination of these factors. The other half of the subjects were 
given the set of behaviors and partial information combinations, but 
instead of making attributions they were required to estimate the level 
of the missing information dimension on a seven point scale.
The results strongly indicated that perceivers do approach the 
task of attribution with the person, stimulus and circumstance informa­
tion configurations in mind, and that they interpret partial information 
in terms of these basic patterns. Also, perceivers are quite willing 
to infer the level of missing information in terms of the pattern that 
the partial information approximates. One notable bias that per­
ceivers demonstrate, though, is a tendency toward making more person 
attributions in the presence of high consistency (even though high con­
sistency could lead to either person or stimulus attributions). Orvis 
et al. (1975) argued that this bias toward person attribution is not 
due to some special preference on the part of perceivers, but instead is 
due to the fact that high consistency may be more strongly related to 
the basic data pattern for person attribution (e.g., HHH).
Major (1980) studied perceiver acquisition preferences for 
Kelley's (1967) three information variables as well as the effects of 
the variables upon attributions. The procedure closely resembled 
McArthur's (1972). Subjects were presented with a target person's 
behavior and then were allowed to acquire up to 12 instances each of
17
consistency, distinctiveness and consensus information that related to 
the target's behavior. In each condition the 12 instances of informa­
tion from a given category were either all high or all low. After ac­
quiring as much information as they felt they needed to make an attribu­
tion for the behavior, subjects attributed the behavior to the person, 
the stimulus, the circumstances, or to some combination of factors.
Among the analyses performed, Major (1980) looked at the amount of in­
formation of each type acquired, the order of acquisition and the direc­
tion of attribution. Subjects acquired less than a third of all avail­
able instances of information. They acquired significantly more con­
sistency information than either distinctiveness or consensus. Distinc­
tiveness was acquired significantly more often than consensus. Consis­
tency was generally acquired first, followed by distinctiveness and then 
consensus. In the two experiments performed, the first showed signifi­
cant main effects for the information types in the predicted directions 
(with the exception of stimulus attributions with consistency). In the 
second experiment only main effects for distinctiveness were found.
These results indicate that consensus information seems to be under­
utilized relative to consistency and distinctiveness in terms of attri- 
butor's preference in acquisition.
Another study that addressed perceiver's relative preferences 
for consistency, distinctiveness and consensus information was performed 
by Garland, Hardy and Stephenson (1975). They argued that in natural 
situations, perceivers are often asked to make attributions to either 
the person or to the stimulus before reviewing any supporting informa­
tion. An example of such a situation would be where a professor is
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asked to evaluate the ability or initiative of a student. In this situa­
tion the professor is asked in advance to make various person attribu­
tions, and the professor would no doubt be expected to assemble support­
ing information for these attributions.
Garland et al. (1975) provided subjects with statements of be­
haviors that fell into four different categories based on pre-testing. 
These categories were accomplishments, opinions, emotions and actions. 
Each behavior was followed by a question. The question asked what 
further information would be required in order to make a specific attri­
bution. Half the time the attribution was to the person and the other 
half of the time it was to the stimulus. An example behavior that was 
used is "Mary got an A on the chemistry exam." An example of a person 
attribution question that was used is "What further information would 
you require in order to say that Mary is intelligent?". The subjects in 
the experiment provided the answers to such questions. These answers 
represented free-lance requests for specific information. The requests 
were coded into four categories: consistency, distinctiveness, con­
sensus or uncodable (93% inter-coder reliability was achieved using this 
coding scheme on pilot data).
The results indicated that requests for both consistency and dis­
tinctiveness information occurred significantly more often under person 
attribution than under stimulus attribution. Consensus information 
was requested significantly more often for stimulus attribution than 
for person attribution. Overall, however, only 23% of the information 
requests could be categorized as consistency, distinctiveness or con­
sensus. Seventy-seven percent of the data fell into the uncodable
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category. Consistency requests accounted for 3% of the total, distinc­
tiveness requests for 13%, and consensus requests for 7%.
Because so little of the data could be classified into consis­
tency, distinctiveness, or consensus, Garland et al. (1975) concluded 
that Kelley's (1967) three information categories do not adequate account 
for the types of information that perceivers would freely choose to use 
in a naturalistic attribution situation. They further stated that 
Kelley's (1967) model may represent a significant departure from Heider's 
(1958) notions about "naive psychology" and that the model itself may 
reflect rigorous scientific thinking more than it does "the psychology 
of the non-psychologist."
Base Rate Research
An interesting parallel to the underutilization of consensus 
(McArthur 1972, 1976; Major 1980) emerged in the social judgment litera­
ture. In Kahneman and Tversky's (1973) classic study, subjects were pre­
sented with base rate information on a fictitious sample of profes­
sionals. Specifically, one group was told that the sample was composed 
of 30% engineers and 70% lawyers. Another group was told the sample 
was composed of 70% engineers and 30% lawyers. Subjects were then given 
very short personality descriptions of a number of members of the 
sample. Half the descriptions were designed to be "lawyerlike" and 
half were written so as to appear "engineerlike." For each target 
case, subjects were required to rate the probability that the person was 
either a lawyer or an engineer. The results showed that subjects seri­
ously violated the normative statistical standards for prediction 
based on the given prior probabilities (e.g., 30%-70% or 70%-30%).
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They seemed to base their predictions upon the individuating information 
contained in the description of the target. However, even when totally 
non-diagnostic or neutral descriptions were given (only age, physical 
appearance, etc.) subjects still underutilized the base rate. Only 
when no descriptive information whatsoever was given did subjects make 
accurate use of the base rates in their predictions. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1973) argued that predictions are often governed by "represen­
tativeness." Subjects may predict category membership based upon the re­
semblance between the target case and the subject's implicit prototypes 
for various categories.
Kelley (1967) suggested that consensus information effects can 
be used to explain the results of cognitive dissonance studies (Aronson 
1973). In cognitive dissonance studies, a subject will typically be 
asked to do something that they do not really want to do or do not really 
believe in. If the subject complies with the request he/she is liable 
to infer that his/her true attitude is actually quite in line with his/ 
her behavior (e.g., "Since I'm doing this I must really like it.").
This will be true mainly when the subject is given little external in­
ducement (e.g., "I'm doing this without much reward so I must really 
like it."). Kelley (1967) argued that dissonance experiments always in­
volve the subtle manipulation of social cues that make the subjects 
believe that there is low consensus on their behavior. Kelley's (1967) 
theory predicts that low consensus should lead to an internal attribu­
tion (e.g., "I'm doing something that nobody else would do, therefore 
X  must really like it."). The greater attitude change of low justifica­
tion subjects reflects the internal attribution. High justification
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subjects do not undergo such attitude changes because there is much ex­
ternal inducement for them to behave the way they did (e.g., "I'm doing 
this because I'm getting a big reward."). If subjects were led to be­
lieve that most everyone would do the same thing in the same situation 
(i.e., high consensus) then they would be able to realize that their be­
havior was caused by something about the situation (i.e., external at­
tribution). It could be predicted that such subjects would not undergo 
the typical attitude change of low justification subjects.
Cooper, Jones and Tuller (1972) asked subjects to write a "pro" 
viewpoint essay on a subject about which their true attitude was "con." 
Subjects were offered either a large or small reward for doing this.
Each subject was led to believe that either 15-20% (low consensus) of 
the other subjects complied with the request or that 90% (high consensus) 
of the other subjects complied. After writing the essay, the subjects 
rated their personal attitude on the subject of the essay. This was com­
pared to a pre-essay attitude rating. The results indicated that sub­
jects did not differ in their attitude change as a function of how unique 
they felt in complying with the request. In other words, the consensus 
manipulation was ineffective.
Miller, Gillen, Schenker and Radlove (1974) gave subjects a 
description of Milgram's (1963) obedience study. Half the subjects were 
given the information that 65% of the original subjects delivered maxi­
mum shock to a helpless, protesting confederate. The other half of the 
subjects were given no such information. The base rate information did
r
have an effect upon predictions for the behavior of a fictitious sample 
of participants in the Mil gram study situation. However, it affected 
only one out of eleven trait ratings for people delivering shock.
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Subjects made trait ratings based almost exclusively upon the amount 
of shock delivered by an individual.
Nisbett and Borgida (1975) tested the effects of base rates by 
providing subjects with what amounted to the procedure sections of two 
previous studies. They were then given consensus information on the 
behavior of subjects in the original studies. The base rates for these 
original subjects were presented in percentage form. Subjects were 
then given information and descriptions of several target cases. The 
exposure to target cases took several forms: videotaped interviews, 
written descriptions, self-generated descriptions (subjects imagined and 
then described several "typical" cases), or no target case information. 
Subjects were then asked to predict how the target cases behaved in 
the experiments, to make situational versus dispositional attributions 
for the target's behavior, and to rate the targets on several person­
ality scales. None of the measures were affected by the consensus 
manipulations.
In another study Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall and Reed (1976) 
tried to use consensus manipulations to shift the locus of causality 
from internal to external for two types of mild depression. They used 
college students who experience the "Sunday blues" and new college 
faculty members who experience a type of letdown during their first 
academic year. In some conditions subjects were provided with base 
rate information which indicated that their feelings were widely shared 
(e.g., high consensus). This manipulation should, in theory, enable 
them to make external attributions for their feelings. Such external 
attributions could conceivably lessen any negative personal implica­
tions for the subject's condition and possibly improve functioning.
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However, neither mood measures nor behavioral measures were affected 
by the consensus manipulations.
In another experiment in the same study subjects were asked to 
taste a variety of crackers and then rate them on several dimensions. 
Subjects were allowed to drink a "neutralizing solution" between 
crackers in order to eliminate previous tastes as well as thirstiness.
At the end of the "experiment" subjects were asked to place their own 
container of solution on a shelf with the other bottles supposedly used 
by previous subjects. The amount of liquid in these other bottles 
was manipulated so that subjects would think they drank either more or 
less of the solution than all the other participants. This consensus 
manipulation had no effect upon subject's ratings of how much they 
liked the taste of the solution, how thirsty they felt prior to the ex­
periment, or how thirsty they felt the crackers had made them.
Effective Manipulations, of Implicit Consensus 
Actor-Based Expectancies
Jones, Davis and Gergen (1961) studied the effects of in-role 
and out-of-role behavior in a simulated job interview. In-role behavior 
was defined as acting consistently with the demand characteristics of 
the situation. Out-of-role behavior was defined as acting inconsis­
tently with such demand characteristics. When a person behaves in an 
in-role fashion, they reveal that they are responsive to the implicit 
normative requirements of the situation. Because the context of the 
behavior is a job interview, there would be high implicit consensus on 
in-role behavior and most people would be expected to be responsive
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to the requirements of the situation. With such in-role behavior a 
person reveals nothing about their true inclinations or dispositions 
and an external attribution (i.e., to the situation and its demands) 
would be made. When behavior is out-of-role, however, the person is 
behaving in a non-normative manner. There would be low implicit con­
sensus on such behavior and few people would be expected to violate 
the job interview demand characteristics. Out-of-role behavior would 
lead to internal attributions, that is, the person reveals his/her 
individuality.
Jones et al. (1961) tape recorded carefully scripted simulated 
job interviews. Two different jobs were represented, astronaut and sub­
mariner. Astronauts were expected to be inner directed (e.g., "When 
planning something, I like to work on my own."). Submariners were ex­
pected to be other directed (e.g., "I like to know how other people 
think I should behave."). An in-role and an out-of-role interview were 
recorded for each job type. Subjects were given detailed descriptions 
of in-role and out-of-role behavior appropriate for each job type.
This can be interpreted as an implicit consensus information manipula­
tion. The subjects then rated each job applicant on a 16-item bi­
polar adjective rating scale. Job applicants who were behaving out-of­
role were rated more extremely on traits (i.e., stronger internal at­
tributions) and were rated so more confidently by subjects. Therefore, 
the consensus manipulation was effective.
The Kahneman and Tversky (1973) study cited above was used as 
evidence for the underutilization of explicit consensus information. 
However, it is just as clearly a demonstration of the strength of
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implicit consensus information. The subjects who read the descriptions 
of target cases carried implicit consensus information on the charac­
teristics generally ascribed to lawyers and engineers. This implicit 
consensus information was ostensibly more powerful than the base rate 
information in terms of subject's predicting the probability of the 
target case being either a lawyer or an engineer.
In the Miller, Gillen, Schenker and Radlove (1974) study cited 
above it was found that explicit consensus information did not affect 
trait ratings for target persons in the Mil gram (1963) obedience study. 
Other results from the study showed, however, that sex and attractive­
ness (based on ratings of stimulus persons taken from yearbook photo­
graphs) of the target case did affect predictions about how much shock 
would be administered. Specifically, males and unattractive people 
were predicted to deliver greater amounts of shock. Also, there was a 
significant sex by explicit consensus interaction. Apparently per- 
ceivers carry implicit consensus information on the behavior of men, 
women and their relative attractiveness that can be related to the situa­
tion that was investigated.
Situation-Based Expectancies
The sex and attractiveness results in the Miller et al. (1974) 
study related to actor-based implicit consensus. On another level 
the whole obedience study paradigm (Milgram 1963) generates expecta­
tions that perceivers hold about how a typical person should behave in 
that situation. Some subjects in the Miller et al. (1974) study were 
told about a target case who went "all the way" to shocking a pro­
testing fellow participant with maximum shock. Even when exposed to
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this target case information, the subjects made non-obedience predic­
tions for their own behavior almost 90% of the time. Mil gram's (1963) 
subjects were actually obedient 65% of the time. Clearly, perceivers 
carry implicit consensus information about situation specific behavior.
In the Nisbett and Borgida (1975) study cited above, explicit 
consensus had virtually no effect upon subject's predictions about the 
behavior of original subjects in previous studies. One of these previ­
ous studies was Darley and Latane's (1968) bystander intervention ex­
periment. In that study, subjects communicated to each other from 
separate rooms over an intercom system. One subject at a time was 
"turned on" for two minutes and was required to talk about the problems 
of college life. One of the speakers was actually an experimental 
accomplice who faked a serious seizure and asked for help during his 
turn to talk. In the original study some 69% of the subjects (in 
groups of four subjects plus one accomplice) never moved to help the 
victim, even after 2-1/2 minutes had expired. Even when Nisbett and 
Borgida's (1975) subjects were given this base rate information, they 
still overwhelmingly predicted that a sizeable majority of people would 
have made some move to help the victim. Apparently the implicit con­
sensus information of these subjects regarding the helping behavior 
in that situation was much more optimistic than the actual behavior of 
participants justifies.
Lowe and Kassin (1977) also described an experimental situation 
to subjects that involved a form of helping behavior. In their 
description, subjects were supposedly asked to wait for participation 
in an unspecified experiment. Each subject was asked to wait for
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either a long, medium or short period of time. While waiting, each 
subject was asked by a confederate for help with stapling papers to­
gether. The conditions surrounding this request were varied in a man­
ner that generated high, medium and low implicit consensus information 
regarding compliance with the request. Almost everyone would be ex­
pected to help (i.e., high implicit consensus) when the confederate was 
well-dressed, polite, and expressed urgency and when the subject had a 
long wait anyway. Few people would be expected to help (i.e., low im­
plicit consensus) when the confederate was disheveled, rude and ap­
peared to be in no hurry. An intermediate number of people would be 
expected to help (i.e., medium implicit consensus) when the confederate 
was polite and in a hurry, but when the subject had little time to spare. 
Perceivers were given one of these three descriptions or they were 
given no such description (i.e., no implicit consensus control group). 
Each of these levels of implicit consensus was crossed with high, low 
or no explicit consensus information on the helping behavior. The re­
sults indicated that explicit consensus significantly affected predic­
tions for target case compliance. Implicit consensus only affected 
predictions in the absence of explicit consensus. However, only 
implicit consensus affected person versus stimulus attributions as well 
as trait rating and predicted future helping behavior. Overall, these 
findings suggest that implicit consensus may be more important than 
explicit consensus for making attributions and evaluations. In con­
trast to previous research (Nisbett & Borgida 1975), explicit consensus 
did affect behavioral predictions for the particular situation being 
investigated. Lowe and Kassin (1977) argued that situation-based
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expectancies do not necessarily interfere with perceiver's use of ex­
plicit consensus information.
Self-Based Consensus
Heider (1958) postulated that social actors are egocentrically 
biased toward seeing their own behavior as normative. Ross (1978) sug­
gested that if people are prone to see their own behavior as situa- 
tionally caused, as proposed by Jones and Nisbett (1971), then they 
must carry high implicit consensus information on their own behavior 
since it should theoretically lead to situation attributions.
Ross, Greene and House (1977) conducted a series of experiments 
on this so-called "false consensus effect." In one study they presented 
subjects with a series of stories depicting situations involving some 
behavioral choice. Subjects were required to indicate what their own 
choice would be as well as the percentage of people who would choose 
each of the two behavioral options. They rated both themselves and the 
typical person choosing each option on a number of bipolar trait 
scales. In a second experiment subjects rated themselves on a number 
of personal dimensions (e.g., traits, views, preferences, problems, 
activities) and then indicated the percentage of college students in 
general who share the particular trait, view, problem, etc. The third 
and fourth experiments in the study presented subjects with a hypo­
thetical conflict situation or with the same conflict situation in 
vivo, respectively. The conflict was whether or not to agree to an 
experimenter request to wear a sandwich sign for 30 minutes purportedly 
to collect data on other people's reactions to the sign. Subjects 
either agreed or refused to participate and then rated the percentage
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of other subjects who would also agree or refuse. In addition, sub­
jects rated a typical agreeing or refusing subject on a number of 
dimensions.
The results from all four experiments indicated a significant 
tendency for subjects to view their own choices or traits as being high 
in consensus.. This implicit consensus information apparently operated 
in the predicted manner. Persons behaving differently from the subject 
(low implicit consensus, internal attribution) were rated more ex­
tremely on the personality dimensions.
Two of the experiments conducted by Hansen and Donoghue (1977) 
dealt with a comparison between the effects of self-based consensus 
(implicit) and sample-based consensus (explicit). In one experiment 
they tested the hypothesis that perceivers generate inferences about 
population performance from their own behavior. Self-attributors 
sampled a beverage in what was supposedly a survey testing the market­
ability of a new snack drink. The consensus manipulation was similar 
to that of Nisbett et al. (1976). Self-attributors were asked to re­
place their own containers of liquid in a cabinet where they con­
fronted the containers of other "subjects." In one condition the other 
containers were filled to a level similar to the subject's (e.g., high 
consensus) and in another condition the containers were filled to a 
level much less than the subject's (e.g., low consensus). Other- 
attributor subjects did not drink the liquid. Instead they watched 
a videotape of a confederate playing the role of subject. The subjects 
in all conditions were able to accurately report the amount consumed 
compared to the simulated population amounts. This indicated that
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subjects did perceive the consensus manipulation. The results indi­
cated that explicit consensus (i.e., sample-based) had little impact 
on person versus environment attributions for the self-attributors. 
However, other-attributors significantly utilized explicit consensus 
in their attributions for the confederate's behavior. When predicting 
general population performance, self-attributors based their predictions 
upon their own behavior (i.e., implicit consensus) while other- 
attributors based their predictions upon what their own behavior would 
have been (i.e., also implicit consensus).
In a second experiment, Hansen and Donoghue (1977) provided 
both self-based and sample-based consensus information to subjects us­
ing a different procedure. Subjects were randomly assigned to high, 
low and no self-based consensus conditions. The high and low condition 
subjects were asked to choose which of two photographs represented the 
more "sincere" person. Subsequently, all subjects were shown a video­
tape of other subjects choosing either the same (e.g., high self-based 
consensus) or the other (e.g., low self-based consensus) photograph.
The no-self-based consensus subjects did not choose a photograph but 
only viewed the videotape. Sample based consensus was manipulated 
by providing subjects with high or low population performance in tabu­
lar form. The no-sample-based consensus subjects did not receive 
such data. It was predicted that congruent sample and self-based in­
formation would enhance the expected effects of consensus. Conflicting 
information was predicted to attenuate the effects of consensus. The 
results indicated that either sample-based or self-based consensus 
alone was sufficient to affect person and environment attributions for
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picture choosing as well as estimates of general population perfor­
mance. However, the effects of sample-based consensus were signifi­
cantly diminished in the presence of self-based consensus. Contrary 
to predictions, congruent self and sample-based information did not 
enhance consensus effects, nor did conflicting information attenuate 
it. Overall, the results indicate that self-based consensus (i.e., 
implicit) is more powerful than sample-based consensus (i.e., explicit)
Kulik and Taylor (1930) believed that the photograph preference 
procedure used by Hansen and Donoghue (1977) contributed to an arti­
ficially greater impact of self-based consensus. One problem with the 
procedure was that there might have been substantial consensus among 
subjects regarding which photograph depicted a more "sincere" person.
If one of the two pictures was clearly perceived as being more sincere, 
then high sample-based consensus for the less sincere picture would be 
viewed with suspicion by subjects and would therefore be discounted. 
Another problem is that Hansen and Donoghue (1977) had subjects watch 
a videotape of others either agreeing or disagreeing with the sub­
ject's own choice. This was supposedly the self-based consensus manipu 
lation. Technically, this is really sample-based or explicit con­
sensus. Self-based consensus is defined as the actor's normative in­
ferences based on his/her own behavior, and not based upon his/her own 
behavior plus the behavior of others. Also, the vividness of the 
videotaped information may have rendered less salient and less impor­
tant the subsequent sample-based tabular consensus information.
Kulik and Taylor (1980) had their subjects listen to a comedy 
audio-tape and then rate their own perceptions of the humorousness of
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the tapes. The subjects were divided into high and low groups based on 
how funny they thought the tape was. This would serve to generate 
self-based (implicit) consensus. A no-self-based consensus group did 
not listen to the tape. Subjects were randomly assigned to groups 
given tabular data indicating either high or low consensus information 
regarding how funny other subjects had found the tape. A no consensus 
information group was also used. Subjects were required to make gen­
eral population estimates on how funny the tape was to people, as well 
as trait ratings on target cases who supposedly listened to the tape. 
Similar to Hansen and Donoghue (1977), either self or sample-based 
consensus alone was sufficient to affect population estimates and trait 
inferences in the predicted directions. In contrast to Hansen and 
Donoghue (1977), congruent self and sample-based information did enhance 
the consensus effects and conflicting information did attenuate the ef­
fects. Kulik and Taylor (1980) concluded that any "consensus on con­
sensus" would be premature in terms of the relative effects of self- 
based (implicit) and sample-based (explicit) types.
Effective Manipulations of Explicit Consensus 
The original tests of Kelley’s (1967) model (e.g., McArthur 1972) 
reported main effects of consensus information, but consensus was found 
to be underutilized relative to distinctiveness and consistency infor­
mation. The base rate research indicated that consensus information 
may be underutilized in a statistical sense. The comparisons with 
self-based (implicit) consensus also show that explicit consensus may 
be underutilized. These results stimulated researchers to find
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conditions under which consensus information strongly affects predic­
tions or attributions.
Neutralization of Expectancies
Hansen and Lowe (1976) suggested that some previous attempts 
which failed to show consensus effects may have been unsuccessful be­
cause socially undesirable behaviors were used in predictions and at­
tributions. Miller et al. (1974) used Milgram's (1963) obedience para­
digm and Nisbett and Borgida (1975) used Darley and Latane's (1968) 
bystander failure to intervene situation. In these types of circum­
stances it is unlikely that observers would imagine themselves behaving 
negatively; therefore they would not hold high implicit consensus on 
the negative behavior and they may or may not hold high implicit con­
sensus on positive behavior in the situation. In order to study the 
effects of explicit consensus it would be important to neutralize 
these types of potentially interfering expectancies.
It is also possible that actors and observers have different 
preferences for consensus and distinctiveness information. Kelley 
(1967) suggested that actors typically have access to a great deal of 
historical data on their own behavior (i.e., distinctiveness) which 
should theoretically affect attributions. Observers, on the other 
hand, are not privy to such historical information about an actor's 
behavior and therefore should be more sensitive to consensus informa- 
ti on.
Hansen and Lowe (1976) studied the effects of high and low 
explicit consensus and distinctiveness on both actor's and observer's 
attributions. They attempted to neutralize the potentially biasing
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effects just described. They used a relatively neutral behavior, the 
rating of musical selections, in order to help control the generation 
of socially desirable implicit consensus. They also presented dis­
tinctiveness and consensus information on computer T.V. monitors in 
order to provide actors and observers the same access to information. 
Subjects were led to believe that their physiological responses to the 
music would be recorded because the experimenters attached equipment 
to them, such as galvanic skin response recorders. Each subject sat 
at his/her own computer monitor. Some subjects were told that they 
would view their own reactions to the music plus the reactions of 
several others (actor condition). Other subjects were told that they 
would view only the reactions of other subjects (observer condition). 
The information was presented to the subjects on the computer monitors 
in the form of numbered scales with lights indicating the strength of 
reactions to the music. Actually, all information in the presenta­
tions was set-up in advance by the experimenters. After listening to 
a musical presentation, subjects recorded the information from the 
monitor onto log sheets and then used this information to fill out a 
number of attribution measures. The results indicated that both con­
sensus and distinctiveness strongly affected person versus environ­
ment attributions in the predicted directions.
Zuckerman (1978a) suggested that Nisbett and Borgida (1975) 
failed to obtain consensus effects for two reasons. First, they 
used socially undesirable behaviors and second, they presented infor­
mative target case descriptions for use in making behavioral predic­
tions. Both of these factors could have contributed to the generation 
of implicit consensus information which could have interfered with
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subject's use of the explicit consensus. Like Hansen and Lowe (1976), 
Zuckerman (1978a) felt that if subjects learn that most people (i.e., 
high consensus) behave in a socially undesirable way, they may have 
difficulty in forming a meaningful "script" which accounts for the be­
havior. Subjects may fall back upon some "self script" which would 
be based upon how they themselves would behave. Zuckerman (1978a) also 
noted that Kahneman and Tversky (1973) reported strong base rate ef­
fects when no target case descriptions were presented. With target 
case information, people tend to rely on the diagnostic data in the 
descriptions to make predictions, rather than use the base rates.
Like Nisbett and Borgida (1975), Zuckerman (1978a) presented sub­
jects with the procedure of Darley and Latane's (1968) bystander inter­
vention study. Subjects were given either high or low base rate in­
formation for helping (i.e., either socially desirable or socially un­
desirable consensus) and they were either given target case descriptions 
or not. Subjects were required to predict the distribution of people's 
behavior in the bystander intervention situation. Those subjects with 
target case descriptions were required to predict the behavior of the 
target case. The results indicated that subjects who received so­
cially desirable consensus were significantly affected by such informa­
tion in their predictions. Socially undesirable consensus did not 
affect predictions. Subjects who did not receive target case descrip­
tions were more influenced by the consensus information, whether 
socially desirable or not, than the target case information subjects.
Feldman, Higgins, Karlovac and Ruble (1976) studied two vari­
ables that could potentially affect subject's use of consensus
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information. One of these variables was whether observers had direct 
information or not regarding the target of an actor's behavior.
Subjects viewed a series of videotapes showing people choosing 
from an array of pictures. One person in the videotape was designated 
as the actor. Subjects were required to make causal attributions re­
garding the actor's choice. In some cases the videotape was filmed in 
such a way as to allow full view of the potential choices. In other 
cases the subject watching the videotape could not see the actual items 
but was still fully able to see which item the actor signaled as 
his choice. High consensus information was operationalized by show­
ing all the other people in the tape making the same choice as the 
actor. Low consensus information was operationalized by showing all 
the other people in the tape choosing a different item from the actor. 
The results showed that subjects made the predicted use of consensus in 
their attributions only when they had'no direct visual information 
about the various pictures that could be chosen. This could possibly 
be the result of the neutralization of implicit self-based consensus. 
Subjects who could see the items could decide which one they themselves 
would choose. The no direct information subjects could not see the 
items and therefore would have no opportunity to generate implicit 
consensus based on their own preference.
Order Effects
The other variable investigated by Feldman et al. (1976) was 
the temporal presentation of consensus information. The videotapes 
showed consensus information being presented either simultaneously 
or sequentially. Simultaneous consensus was where all the other
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people in the tape besides the actor signaled their choice at the exact 
same time. If they all made the same choice as the actor, there was 
high consensus. If all the others chose differently from the actor, 
there was low consensus. In the sequential presentation tapes, the 
people signaled their choices one at a time. They all either agreed 
with the actor's choice (high consensus) or they all chose a different 
picture from the actor (low consensus).
The results indicated that the effects of consensus were signifi­
cantly greater with sequential presentation than with simultaneous 
presentation. The researchers suggested that the simultaneous con­
sensus was processed by perceivers in a single unit, whereas the se­
quential consensus involved several independent bits of information.
In the latter case there would seem to be "more" consensus information 
and therefore stronger causal attributions would be made.
In the early research on Kelley's (1967) model (e.g., McArthur 
1972) consensus information was found to account for significantly 
less of the variance in causal attributions than either consistency or 
distinctiveness information. However, consensus information was al­
ways presented to subjects first followed by distinctiveness, and 
then consistency.
Ruble and Feldman (1976) investigated the possible order effects 
in the use of consensus. They followed McArthur's (1972) procedure 
by presenting subjects with a series of behaviors, such as "Sue is 
afraid of the dog." For each such behavior, the three information 
types were also presented and varied along the high-low dimension. 
Subjects then attributed the behavior to the person, the stimulus,
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the circumstances or to a combination of factors. The results showed 
main effects for all three information variables. More importantly, 
when the order was fully counterbalanced, the three information types 
accounted for approximately the same percentage of variance among at­
tributions.
Kassin (1977) had subjects read a description of an aggression 
experiment in which participants delivered either severe, moderate or 
mild shock to a confederate. One of the participants was designated 
as the actor. The actor delivered shock either before or after all 
the other participants. Consensus was manipulated by having the other 
participants deliver the same shock level (high consensus) or deliver 
a different shock level (low consensus) than the actor. The actor 
always delivered the severe shock. Subjects were required to attribute 
the actor's behavior to the actor, to the confederate, or to the cir­
cumstances. There was a main effect for consensus and a main effect 
for order. However, the actor was seen as more personally responsible 
when he delivered shock before the other participants. Apparently, 
the behavior of others can be seen by perceivers as a situational in­
fluence independent of the focal stimulus.
Overall, these results on order effects suggest that the type of 
consensus information which actually affects attributions may be picked 
up gradually over many observations of others.
Trans!atabi1i ty of the Base Rate
It is conceivable that many perceivers might make use of base 
rate information if they only knew how to use it. If subjects are 
asked to predict category membership they may have difficulty
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translating the base rate percentages into numbers that are directly 
applicable to the sample they are predicting from. An example would 
be where 70% of the population belongs to one group, 30% belongs to a 
second group, and the perceivers must apply these base rates to a 
sample of five people. Subjects may simply see no way to separate the 
sample of five people along a 70%/30% division.
Carrol and Siegler (1977) investigated this issue. They gave 
subjects the base rate information on a sample of 20 people or on a 
sample of 400 people. This information indicated either that 70% were 
lawyers and 30% were engineers, or that 70% were engineers and 30% 
were lawyers. The subjects were asked to predict the category member­
ship of 20 target cases using the base rates as well as non-diagnostic 
personality descriptions. With the sample of 20 people, the number of 
target descriptions exhausted the sampled population (20/20 condition). 
With the sample of 400 people, the number of target descriptions did 
not exhaust the sampled population (20/400 condition). It was assumed 
that the base rates would be more directly translatable in the 20/20 
condition.
Base rates affected predictions in both the 20/20 and the 20/400 
conditions, but the effect was significantly greater in the 20/20 con­
dition. The combination of a small sample, exhaustive sampling and 
directly translatable base rates yielded substantial use of the base 
rate information.
In another experiment, Carrol and Siegler (1977) included in­
formativeness of the personality descriptions as one of the variables. 
Subjects were asked to categorize, as either a lawyer or an engineer,
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10 people taken from a population of 20. The translatable base rate 
was 70%-*30% and the non-translatable base rate was 75%-25%. Five of 
the descriptions were "lawyerlike" and five were "engineerlike" based 
on pre-testing. The presence of diagnostic personality descriptions 
eliminated any effect of translatability, but there was a main effect 
for description type. Overall, these findings indicate that trans­
latabil ity, exhaustive sampling, uninformative descriptions of target 
cases and small sample size are favorable circumstances for the use 
of base rate information.
Representativeness of the Sample
Wells and Harvey (1977) argued that according to Kelley's (1967) 
covariation model, consensus will be effective only insofar as it is 
informative regarding the covariation of some internal or external fac­
tor with a particular behavior. If a sample upon which consensus in­
formation is based is perceived as being biased in some way, it is pos­
sible that a behavior will be seen as covarying with the sample or 
with the sampling techniques, and not with some factor either internal 
or external to the actor.
Wells and Harvey (1977) replicated Nisbett and Borgida's (1975) 
procedure by giving subjects a description of the behavior in a shock 
taking study. High, medium and low consensus information were given 
to subjects on the behavior of participants in the original study.
Half of the subjects were told that the original sample of participants 
were selected using strictly random sampling techniques. The other 
half of the subjects were given no such information. Subjects were 
required to make population estimates, causal attributions and trait
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ratings for target cases. Consensus was significantly more effective 
for predictions and attributions in the knowledge of random sampling 
condition. There were no significant effects on trait ratings.
Hansen and Donoghue's (1977) study, reported above, manipulated 
self-based consensus by having subjects sample a beverage, after which 
they confronted the containers of beverage from other "subjects." This 
manipulation enabled actors to compare their amount sampled with that 
of others. Observer subjects did not sample the beverage but instead 
watched the actor's behavior and the consensus manipulation on video­
tape. All the subjects were given either high or low sample-based 
consensus in tabular form. Half of the subjects were told that the 
sample of people whose beverage containers were encountered were a 
representative, randomly sampled population. The other half of the 
subjects were given no such information. The results showed that the 
knowledge of random sampling influenced only observer's use of sample- 
based consensus in making attributions. Actors based their attribu­
tions on their own, self-based consensus, whether they were aware of 
the random sampling techniques or not.
Sample Size
Kassin (1979b) tested the hypothesis that the impact of explicit 
consensus should be enhanced when such information is based upon a 
large sample instead of a small sample. If the consensus information 
indicates that 30 out of 40 students failed an exam, this should be 
more influential than the knowledge that 3 out of 4 students failed 
the exam.
4Kassin (1979b) had subjects read the description of the helping 
behavior experiment that he used in his earlier study (Lowe & Kassin 
1977). The description indicated that students were asked to wait for 
participation in an undisclosed experiment. A confederate approached 
the waiting subject and asked for help with stapling papers together.
In the earlier study (Lowe & Kassin 1977) the description of the con­
federate was manipulated in order to generate high, medium and low im­
plicit consensus on the behavior of helping the confederate. In this 
study, only the medium implicit consensus description was used (e.g., 
the confederate was polite and in a hurry, but the participant had 
only a few minutes to spare).
Subjects were told that the experiment was conducted twice, and 
they were given the results from two sample sizes (e.g., 50 and 10).
Half the time the large sample was reported to have high consensus on 
the helping behavior while the small sample had low consensus. The 
other half of the time the large sample had low consensus and the small 
sample had high consensus. Four levels of base rate data (e.g., ex­
plicit consensus) were used. They varied from 60%/40% to 90%/l0%. Sub­
jects were required to predict the percentage of people who would help 
the confederate if the experiment was again replicated. They also 
predicted the behavior of a hypothetical target participant.
The results indicated that increasing levels of base rate did 
not significantly increase population or target predictions. However, 
the predictions were significantly higher when the high base rate 
was presented with the large sample instead of the small sample. In 
other words, subjects used the base rate of the large sample to guide 
their predictions.
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Actions vs. Occurrences
Zuckerman (1978b) tested the effects upon attribution of Kelley's 
(1967) three information variables, following McArthur's (1972) proce­
dure. Two types of behaviors were compared, actions and occurrences. 
Actions were defined as behavior under the actor's voluntary control, 
such as "Jerry attended the Sunday meeting." Occurrences were defined 
as behavior not completely under actor control, such as "Sue was afraid 
of the dog." Since actions are under voluntary control, they should 
automatically be internally caused, which would rule out external or 
stimulus attributions. Anderson (1974) has argued that consensus in­
formation provides data about other actors' reactions to a stimulus. 
This tells perceivers about the power of a stimulus to elicit behavior. 
Since actions, by definition, rule out stimulus attributions, consensus 
should be less important for actions than for occurrences. With occur­
rences, internal and external attributions are both possible.
Zuckerman (1978b) provided subjects with actions and occurrences 
followed by high or low consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency in­
formation in counterbalanced order. Some subjects received no informa­
tion. Subjects were required to attribute the behavior in question to 
the person, the stimulus, the circumstances or to some combination of 
factors. Consensus information accounted for significantly more vari­
ance among attributions for occurrences than for actions. In fact, 
consensus accounted for the greatest amount of variance among attribu­
tions to the stimulus for both actions and occurrences.
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The Present Study
An Integrated Consensus Information Variable
It is apparent from the literature survey that perceivers do use 
consensus information in making causal attributions and predictions.
It is also apparent that some conditions are more favorable than others 
for the use of consensus. In addition, there is evidence that consen­
sus may be less important to attributors than other information types, 
like consistency and distinctiveness (McArthur 1972, 1976; Kahneman & 
Tversky 1973; Major 1980).
Kassin's (1979a) division of consensus into explicit and implicit 
types provides one way of conceptualizing an integrated consensus vari­
able which may provide a common denominator for the research on norma­
tive expectancies, observed covariation and base rates. It would ap­
pear as if both implicit and explicit consensus yield the same predic­
tions for internal and external attribution. When an individual stands 
out from the group with his/her behavior (low consensus), the cause 
of that behavior is attributed by perceivers to forces internal to the 
individual. When an individual behaves the same way as most other 
people (high consensus), then perceivers locate the cause of the be­
havior in forces external to the individual. Evidence regarding the 
behavior of others can be based upon what others actually do (explicit) 
or upon what others are believed to do (implicit).
Jones and McGillis (1976) discussed some similarities and differ­
ences between correspondent inference theory (Jones & Davis 1965) and 
the covariation model of attribution (Kelley 1967). In describing 
the possibilities for integrating the two attribution models, Jones and
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McGillis (1976) suggested that Kelley's (1967) three information types 
represent prior probability variables within a correspondent inference 
framework.
One prior probability variable is target-based expectancies.
This refers to inferences about another person's behavior based upon 
the knowledge of that person's behavior at other times. Consistency 
and distinctiveness information could be seen as generating target- 
based expectancies. Consistency provides data regarding a person's be 
havior in past identical situations. Distinctiveness provides infor­
mation about a person's past behavior toward other entities or stimuli 
in similar situations. Expectancies for the person's behavior would 
be generated from such information.
The other prior probability variable in Jones and McGill is' 
(1976) formulation is category-based expectancies. This refers to in­
ferences about another person's behavior based upon that person's mem­
bership in a particular social class, age group, sex or occupation. 
Expectancies for the person's behavior would be generated from such 
category memberships. Category-based expectancies are quite similar 
to what Kassin (1979a) calls implicit consensus. Jones and McGillis 
(1976) do not make any provisions in their formulation for inferences 
derived from the actual, observed behavior of others. This, of course 
would be Kelley's (1967) explicit consensus variable. A fully inte­
grated consensus variable would have to include both implicit and ex­
plicit consensus. Such an integration would be theoretically valid 
insofar as implicit and explicit consensus, in their high and low 
forms, yield identical predictions for attribution.
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Laboratory vs. Naturalistic Study
Virtually all research in the areas of consensus information and 
Kelley's (1967) covariation model have been conducted using laboratory 
based techniques, such as questionnaires. One area that has been neg­
lected is the study of the ecological validity of Kelley's (1967) three 
information variables. Although main effects have been reported for 
all three types of information (e.g., McArthur 1972), it is not known 
whether perceivers freely choose to select the three information types 
(or whether they are of equal importance to perceivers) in order to 
derive attributions for behavior in non-laboratory settings.
Major's (1980) research is probably the only well-controlled 
study of attributor's acquisition preferences for the three information 
types. Major's (1980) experiments, like the other related research, 
used a laboratory based technique. Unlike the real world, attributors 
were allowed access only to information specified by Kelley's (1967) 
three information variables. In addition, the behaviors that were used 
were performed by people who were unseen strangers to the subjects.
The study by Garland et al. (1975), which attempted unsuccess­
fully to classify free-lance requests for information into consistency, 
distinctiveness and consensus categories was a step toward studying 
naturalistic perceiver preferences for the three information variables. 
However, the task they used must still be classified as a laboratory 
technique. The perceivers in their study were "force-fed" behaviors 
to-be-attributed. Despite the negative results, the coding format 
used by Garland et al. (1975) is the method of choice for studying data 
acquired in a free-lance or open-ended fashion. Other researchers 
have studied the attribution process using this technique.
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Elig and Frieze (1975) developed a coding scheme for categorizing 
causal attributions relating to success and failure. Following Heider's 
(1958) notions about success-failure attributions, Elig and Frieze 
(1975) divided attributions along three dimensions. The stability di­
mension divided attributions into those that are fixed and unchanging 
across situations (stable) and those that are situational and variable 
(unstable). The source dimension divided attributions into those that 
are internal to the actor, external to the actor, or mutual, in which 
causality is shared between the actor and external objects or other 
people. The intentionality dimension divided attributions into uninten­
tional (e.g., ability, task difficulty, mood, luck), intentional (e.g., 
effort) or mediate, in which there is a combination of intentional and 
unintentional factors.
Elig and Frieze (1975) applied this coding scheme to attributions 
for success or failure from open-ended questionnaire answers. Their 
test of validity of the coding scheme was to see whether attributions 
for different situations (e.g., academic or social) and outcomes (e.g., 
success or failure) do differ on the three dimensions. They reported 
significant differences using Chi-square analyses on frequency counts 
of attributions categorized according to the three dimensions.
Lau and Russell (1980) compared motivational and cognitive ex­
planations for success-failure attributions using archival data as 
their source. They developed their own coding format which divided 
attributions along two dimensions, stability (e.g., stable or unstable) 
and locus of causality (e.g., internal or external). They applied 
this coding scheme to 107 articles from the newspaper sports pages.
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The articles covered 33 major sporting events during 1977 including 
the baseball World Series. The two authors independently coded and 
categorized explanatory statements and then compared their results as 
a reliability check. They initially agreed 88% of the time. Any dis­
crepancies were discussed for one minute each in an attempt to come to 
an agreement on the proper categorization. If after one minute the 
coders still disagreed, the explanatory statement was discarded. The 
final pool of statements accounted for 96% of the original explanations. 
The percentage of attributions of each type were compared using Chi- 
square statistics. The results supported a motivational explanation 
for success-failure attributions.
The use of archival data from the sports pages is undoubtedly a 
more ecologically valid technique for studying attributions than the 
typical forced-choice, closed-ended laboratory procedure. The players, 
coaches and sportswriters who made the attributions had a much wider 
range of possible responses and were not constrained in their use of 
possible information variables.
The Newspaper Advice Columns
Another potentially ripe source for studying attributions in a 
natural setting is the newspaper advice columns. Advice columns have 
been in existence for over 75 years and may possibly be a very real 
source of help for those in need. One popular columnist is reported 
to receive over 1,000 letters daily and is estimated to have a reader- 
ship of over 54 million (Dibner 1974). In one analysis of letters 
to an advice columnist regarding old age issues, it was found that 
73% of the letters dealt with "problems" (e.g., loneliness, death,
49
rejection) and 27% dealt with "other aspects" (e.g., information re­
quests) (Gaitz & Scott 1975).
In another analysis (Dibner 1974), 77% of the letters dealt with 
"personal problems." In terms of the type of advice sought, 54% of 
the letters requested explicit instructions on how to act and 36% re­
quested general information about human behavior. Attributions are 
no doubt involved in an advice column's discussions of human behavior. 
Since the consequences and determinants of attribution processes based 
on laboratory findings may or may not be generalizable to real-world 
settings, the advice columns could possibly be one source for studying 
such attribution processes naturalistically.
Questions Addressed in the Present Study
The newspaper advice columns were used as a natural source of 
attributional activity. A coding manual was devised to enable raters 
or coders to go through a random sample of advice column letters and re­
liably find attributions. Another coding manual was devised for raters 
to identify Kelley's (1967) three information variables--consistency, 
distinctiveness and consensus--as they are used to support, defend, 
justify or explain the located attributions. Three questions were ad­
dressed in the present study.
The first question is: Do people freely use consistency, dis­
tinctiveness, and consensus information in their attributional activity 
in a natural setting? If these three variables are ecologically valid 
attribution information categories, then they can probably be detected 
in the context of attributions. Frequencies of attributions that use 
each of the three information types, either alone or in combinations,
50
can be compared to the frequency of attributions that are not accompanied 
by any of the three information variables. If Kelley's (1967) variables 
are actually used, then it will be possible to analyze which particular 
types or combinations perceivers prefer.
The second question is: Is consensus information in a natural 
setting underutilized relative to consistency and distinctiveness, as 
some previous research suggests? Utilization in this study will refer 
to the selection of a given information type to support, defend, justify 
or explain a given attribution, independent of the predicted direction 
of attribution (i.e., internal versus external based upon high or low 
form of the information type). It is conceivable that when consensus 
information is defined as both implicit and explicit (Kassin 1979a) it 
may not be underutilized. In other words, the underutilization findings 
may be due to the fact that consensus has been defined too narrowly. 
Frequency counts of the use of the three variables can be compared, 
which will be informative regarding attributor preferences.
The third question is: Does an integrated consensus information 
variable, defined as both implicit and explicit (Kassin 1979a), operate 
in a natural setting in the way that previous research and theory pre­
dicts? High consensus information should lead to external attribution 
(e.g., locating the cause of a behavior in forces external to the ac­
tor) whereas low consensus information should lead to internal attribu­
tion (e.g., locating the cause of a behavior in forces internal to 
the actor). Each piece of consensus information can be classified as 
either implicit or explicit. This will be informative regarding the 
relative importance to perceivers of the two types. Each piece of
51
consensus that is used alone (i.e., without consistency or distinctive­
ness) can be categorized as either high or low. Also, each attribution 
that is accompanied by consensus alone can be rated as either internal 
or external. These last two classifications can be used to test the 
predicted relationship between direction of attribution and consensus 
information.
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Overview
In order to study the use of Kelley's (1967) three information 
variables in the advice columns, it was first necessary to locate at­
tributions or explanatory statements. Next, it was necessary to iden­
tify instances of consistency, distinctiveness and consensus informa­
tion that were used in the context of the explanatory statements. 
Several steps were needed in order to accomplish this.
1) Find explanatory statements; simplify them to the form 
"Referent Because Explanation."
2) Identify the person who is performing the behavior in 
each referent.
3) Identify the referents of interest in the present study.
4) Simplify the referents to the form "person verb stimulus."
5) Construct test questions for use in a structured search 
of the advice columns for the three information variables.
6) Locate the three information types as they are used in 
the context of the explanatory statements.
7) Classify the instances of consensus information and 
the explanations to which they refer in order to test 
the predicted effects of consensus.
Detailed descriptions of the theory and procedure for each of these
steps are contained in two coding manuals. One manual, the Scoring
Manual: Explanatory Statements in the Advice Columns (ESAC) (see
Appendix A) was devised by Schoeneman and Rubanowitz (Note 1) for use
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in another advice column study. The other manual, the Scoring Manual: 
Consistency, Distinctiveness and Consensus Information in the Newspaper 
Advice Columns (CDCNAC) (see Appendix B), was prepared for the present 
study.
Step 1
The first step was to realiably locate explanatory statements in 
the advice columns. This was accomplished through the use of the scor­
ing manual ESAC (Appendix A). Teams of student raters were thoroughly 
trained in the use of the scoring manual, which contained numerous 
examples and a detailed procedure for locating explanatory statements. 
Then the raters were given a random sample of advice column letters to 
process. A large sample of explanatory statements was found by the 
raters. Only those explanatory statements that were agreed upon by at 
least two out of three teams of raters (including the main team, 
described below) were used in subsequent analyses. This insured that 
the final sample would be reliable.
Each explanatory statement was reduced or simplified to the form 
"Referent Because Explanation." The explanation part referred to the 
attribution or explanation for some behavior, thought, feeling, etc.
The referent part referred to that which was being explained in the 
statement, that is, it referred to the behavior, thought or feeling 
itself. The following explanatory statement can be used as an example:
Andrew said that Ruth laughed at the comedian because she
has a good sense of humor.
The explanatory statement can be simplified to the following form:
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REFERENT: Andrew said that Ruth laughed at the comedian
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: she has a good sense of humor.
Each of the reliably located explanatory statements was reduced or sim­
plified in this way.
Step 2
The second step in the procedure involved identifying whose be­
havior in the referent was being explained or attributed. This step was 
necessary because in some referents there is more than one person per­
forming a behavior. In order to analyze the attribution process it 
is necessary to establish whose behavior is being attributed in the ex­
planatory statement.
In the example above, there were two people (e.g., Andrew and 
Ruth) who were involved in the referent behavior. It is necessary to 
identify what the explanation refers to. In the example, the referent 
behavior could be what "Andrew said," or it could be the fact that 
"Ruth laughed." It is apparent from the explanation that Ruth's be­
havior of laughing at the comedian is what is being explained. There­
fore, Ruth is the referent subject, or the person whose behavior the 
explanation refers to. The correct referent then becomes "Ruth laughed 
at the comedian" while "Andrew said" is dropped.
The example just presented involved a referent in multi-subject 
form. If all referents began with the name or pronoun of a person 
performing a behavior, the task of identifying the "person" would be 
relatively easy. However, many referent subjects are not presented
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so simply. Some are presented in the passive voice (e.g., "They should 
not be blamed for his misdeed." The person performing a behavior here 
is "the blamer."), some in the imperative (e.g., "Tell me what to do." 
The person performing the behavior is the implicit "you," as in you 
tell me what to do.), some as a dangling particple or gerund (e.g., 
"Going to his house, this would be unfair to her." The person perform­
ing the behavior here is the person who is going to the house in ques­
tion.), and some as an indirect object (e.g., "The abortion issue 
burns me up." The person performing the behavior here is "me," as in 
2. am burned up by the abortion issue.). For each of these complicated 
referent types it was necessary to identify who is performing the be­
havior.
Part II.A. of the scoring manual ESAC (Appendix A) contains a 
detailed procedure along with numerous examples. Raters used this pro­
cedure to identify the referent subject in each of the reliably located 
explanatory statements. Identifying the referent subject or "person" 
amounted to establishing the correct referent behavior which was being 
explained.
Step 3
Once the correct referent was established for each explanatory 
statement, the referents themselves could be categorized. This step 
was necessary because not all referents are applicable to Kelley's 
(1967) covariation model of attribution. Those that are applicable 
needed to be identified.
The referents of interest were those which could be simplified 
to the form "person verb stimulus." Kelley (1967) stated that his
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model applies to referent behaviors which specifically take this form. 
Tests of Kelley's (1967) model (e.g., McArthur 1972) had subjects make 
attributions only for these types of statements. In these referents, 
the "person" refers to who is performing the behavior, the "verb" refers 
to the behavior itself, and the "stimulus" refers to the target, recipi­
ent or focus of the behavior. The example explanatory statement from 
above can be used to illustrate the three referent components. The re­
ferent in the example can be simplified to the following form:
PERSON: Ruth
VERB: laughed at
STIMULUS: the comedian
Part II.B. of the scoring manual ESAC (Appendix A) contains a detailed 
procedure for categorizing referents. There are three basic types of 
referents: enduring personal characteristics, transient personal char­
acteristics, and contextual characteristics.
Enduring personal characteristics include such things as social 
identities (e.g., He is a Mormon.), personal dispositions (e.g., She is 
an aggressive person.), and physical characteristics (e.g., You are 
muscular.). Transient personal characteristics include such things as 
behaviors (e.g., I fought with John.), affective states (e.g., We were 
happy about the election results.), and motivational states (e.g.,
He needs Sue's love.). Contextual characteristics include such things 
as interpersonal relations (e.g., Our marriage is poor.) and impersonal 
physical contexts (e.g., The day was stormy.).
Neither enduring personal characteristics nor contextual charac­
teristics could be simplified to the form "person verb stimulus" and 
therefore had to be excluded. Although these two referent types
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contain a "person" (except impersonal physical contexts) and a "verb," 
there frequently is no "stimulus" toward which the "person" is be­
having (e.g., With the example "He is a Mormon," "he" is the person,
"is a Mormon" is the verb or behavior, but there is no particular stimu­
lus toward which "He is a Mormon."). Moreover, impersonal physical 
contexts do not involve a person's behavior, so they would obviously be 
excluded.
Only transient personal characteristics can be simplified to the 
form "person verb stimulus" (e.g., With the example "I fought with 
John," "I" is the person, "fought with" is the verb or behavior, and 
"John" is the stimulus.).
Raters used Part II.B. of the scoring manual ESAC (Appendix A) 
to categorize the entire sample of referents from the explanatory 
statements. Only those with transient personal characteristic referents 
were selected for further analysis.
Step 4
Once the appropriate explanatory statements were identified, 
each of their referents could be simplified to the form "person verb 
stimulus." Identifying the referent components was important because 
Kelley's (1967) information variables (e.g., consistency, distinctive­
ness and consensus) are defined by them.
Consensus information provides data on the variance among people 
performing some behavior. For the present study, this refers spec­
ifically to the variance across the term "person." Consensus infor­
mation tells us about how many other "persons" perform the behavior in 
question:
Person A
Person B
Person C
Referent
Distinctiveness information provides data on the variation across 
the term "stimulus." Distinctiveness specifically tells us about how 
many other target objects or persons are the focus of the "person's" 
behavior:
us A 
us B 
us C
t Stimulus
Consistency information provides data on how frequently or how of­
ten a given "person" performed a given behavior toward a given "stimu­
lus," either in the past or across situations.
Part II of the scoring manual CDCNAC (Appendix B) contains a de­
tailed procedure for simplifying referents to the form "person verb 
stimulus." Raters used this procedure to simplify the explanatory state­
ment's referents. The simplified referent components were used to struc­
ture a search of the advice columns for Kelley's (1967) three attribu­
tion information variables, as described in the next step.
Step 5
The main purpose of the present study was to reliably locate in­
stances of Kelley's (1967) information variables (e.g., consistency, 
distinctiveness and consensus) that are used to support, defend, jus­
tify or clarify naturally occurring attributions. Locating these 
pieces of supporting information required a search of the advice columns 
from which the explanatory statements were taken. In order to insure
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that specific pieces of information were actually used to support a 
given attribution, and to insure that the located pieces of informa­
tion were reliable, a method of structuring a search of the advice 
columns was devised.
A set of three questions was constructed for each explanatory 
statement. The questions were designed to test for the presence of con­
sistency, distinctiveness, and consensus. The questions basically 
asked for the following:
How consistent is the behavior?
How distinctive is the behavior?
How much consensus is there on the behavior?
Raters searched the advice columns for answers to the questions. 
An answer represented an instance of the given information type.
As noted above, it was important to insure that the rater's 
search of the advice columns was both valid and reliable. To accomplish 
this, very detailed versions of the above three questions were con­
structed for each explanatory statement from the three simplified re- ( 
ferent components (person, verb, stimulus). Consensus referred to the 
information about the variation across the "person" of the referent 
(i.e., the number of other people who also perform the behavior). Dis­
tinctiveness referred to information about the variation across the 
"stimulus" of the referent (i.e., the number of other targets toward 
which the person performs the behavior). Consistency referred to the 
variation of the behavior across time or situations (i.e., the fre­
quency of the person's past behavior).
The example explanatory statement from above can be used as an
example.
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REFERENT: Andrew said that Ruth laughed at the comedian
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: she has a good sense of humor.
The referent was simplified to the following form:
PERSON: Ruth
VERB: laughed at
STIMULUS: the comedian
The three test questions would take the following form:
CONSISTENCY: How often in the past (or, in how many settings)
has Ruth laughed at the comedian?
DISTINCTIVENESS: How many different comedians does Ruth laugh at?
CONSENSUS: How many other people (do, would, should) laugh
at the comedian?
A rater would search the advice column for specific answers to these 
questions.
A standardized format for question construction is presented in 
Part III of the scoring manual CDCNAC (Appendix B). In addition to the 
referent components (person, verb, stimulus), three other terms were 
needed to construct test questions.
The Person Label referred to thecategory to which the "person" be­
longs. The person performing the behavior will always be a member of 
some group such as "men," "Republicans," "car owners," etc. If the 
"person" in the referent is just described as an individual, then they 
belong to the category "people." The Stimulus Label referred to the 
category to which the "stimulus" belongs. Since the "stimulus" can be 
a thing or a person, it can belong to any number of categories such 
as "dogs," "cities," "movies," "airplanes," or "people." The Verb
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Label referred to the general behavioral category to which the "verb" 
belongs. For example, "giving someone $100 for their birthday" belongs 
to the general category of "gift giving." Not all "verbs" will have a 
Verb Label because many "verbs" are already in general form.
The various referent components were inserted into "skeleton ques­
tions." This insured that each explanatory statement's test questions 
would be both customized and standardized. The actual skeleton ques­
tions were as follows:
CONSISTENCY: How often in the past (or, in how many settings)
has (would, should) Person Verb (or Verb Label) 
Stimulus (or Stimulus Label)?
DISTINCTIVENESS: Toward (at, to, with) how many different Stimulus 
Label does (would, should) Person Verb (or Verb 
LaBeT)?
CONSENSUS: How many other Person Label (did, would, should)
Verb (or Verb Label) Stimulus (or Stimulus Label)?
The consensus test question was designed to test for the presence of both 
implicit and explicit consensus information (Kassin 1979a). The label 
terms, "helper" verbs and prepositions provided enough flexibility to 
insure that each question was gramatically correct and made sense.
Step 6
Undergraduate psychology majors were thoroughly trained in the use 
of the scoring manual CDCNAC (Appendix B) which contains numerous ex­
amples and a detailed procedure for searching through the advice columns 
for Kelley's (1967) three information variables. The raters were pre­
sented with the set of explanatory statements along with three test 
questions for each. They searched individual letters to the advice
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columns for answers to the test questions. Answers to the test ques­
tions were instances of consistency, distinctiveness and consensus in­
formation which were used in the context of the naturally occurring at­
tributions. A total of three raters were used in this step and only 
those located pieces of information that were agreed upon by at least 
two out of three raters were considered reliable. Only the reliable 
pieces of information were used in the analyses.
Figure 1 displays a typical stimulus sheet presented to the 
raters. Each explanatory statement had its own stimulus sheet and each 
of the raters processed the entire sample of explanatory statements and 
test questions.
Step 7
The reliable instances of consensus information that were found 
by raters were analyzed further. Each piece of consensus information 
was classified as either implicit or explicit (Kassin 1979a). Those 
pieces of consensus information that were used alone (i.e., without 
either consistency or distinctiveness being used also) with a given 
explanatory statement were classified as either high (e.g., many other 
people performing the behavior) or low (e.g., few other people perform­
ing the behavior). The explanations which these lone pieces of con­
sensus referred to were classified as either internal or external to 
the person performing the behavior. These last two classifications 
allowed for a test of the predicted relationship between consensus in­
formation and the direction of attribution (e.g., high consensus is 
associated with external attribution and low consensus is associated 
with internal attribution).
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Figure 1
Example Stimulus Sheet
Name 13A-P2-1 3T
Andrew said that Ruth laughed at the comedian, because she has a good 
sense of humor.
REFERENT: Andrew said that Ruth laughed at the comedian 
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: she has a good sense of humor.
Person: Ruth
Verb: laughed at
Stimulus: the comedian
CONSISTENCY: How often in the past (or, in how many settings) 
has Ruth laughed at the comedian?
DISTINCTIVENESS: At how many different comedians does Ruth laugh?
CONSENSUS: How many other people (do, would, should) laugh 
at the comedian?
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Materials
A random sample of newspaper advice columns was obtained. Fif­
teen columns from 1980 were randomly selected from Ann Landers, a syn­
dicated column appearing in the Grand Forks Herald. Fifteen columns 
were also randomly selected from Dear Abby, a syndicated column appear­
ing in the Los Angeles Times. Each column contained approximately three 
letters to the advice columnist plus a reply to each. Letters that 
were devoted solely to poems, prayers, songs and other non-attributional 
activity were excluded. The final sample contained 61 letters. Each 
letter was typed onto a separate numbered sheet. Each paragraph was 
also numbered for easy identification.
A total of 537 explanatory statements were located by the raters 
using the scoring manual ESAC (Appendix A). Of these, 200 were con­
sidered reliable by virtue of the fact that they were agreed upon by 
at least two out of three teams of raters. Of the reliable explanatory 
statements, 178 were found to be applicable to Kelley's (1967) covaria­
tion model of attribution (e.g., transient personal characteristics).
For each of the 178 explanatory statements, an individual stimu­
lus sheet was prepared. Each sheet contained the following: letter 
and paragraph I.D. numbers, the statement excerpt, the simplified ex­
planatory statement (Referent Because Explanation), the simplified 
referent (person verb stimulus) and the three test questions. A typi­
cal stimulus sheet is presented in Figure 1 (p. 63).
When conducting their search for Kelley's (1967) information 
variables, each of the raters had available the following materials:
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a copy of the scoring manual CDCNAC, the set of 178 stimulus sheets, and 
the sample of 61 original advice column letters.
Raters
For the first step of finding explanatory statements, four teams 
of two raters each were used. The main team consisted of a Ph.D. in 
clinical psychology plus the present author. The other three teams 
consisted of upper division undergraduate volunteers. The main team 
applied the scoring manual ESAC (Appendix A) to the entire sample of ad­
vice column letters. The other teams each applied the coding manual 
to approximately two-thirds of the sample. In this way, each advice 
column letter was processed by three teams. Essentially, the under­
graduate teams served as a reliability check for the main team's find­
ings.
The second step involved identifying the referent subject or 
the "person" in each explanatory statement. The third step involved 
identifying the referents of interest in the present study (e.g., 
transient personal characteristics). The fourth step involved com­
pletely simplifying referents to the form "person verb stimulus."
Two raters were used for each of these steps. They were the main team, 
described above, consisting of a Ph.D. in clinical psychology and the 
present author.
The fifth step was to construct test questions for each explana­
tory statement. Since this was a relatively mechanical procedure 
involving the insertion of terms into skeleton questions, there was 
no need to assess reliability. Therefore, only one rater was used, the 
psychology graduate student from the main team.
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The sixth step involved searching the advice columns for reli­
able instances of Kelley's (1967) three information variables. Three 
upper division psychology undergraduates volunteered for this assignment. 
Each rater in this step worked independently.
The seventh and last step involved classifying instances of con­
sensus information as implicit or explicit and as high or low. Also, 
the explanations that the consensus information referred to were clas­
sified as either internal or external. The main team of raters, 
described above, accomplished this step.
Procedure
The first six steps of the study were outlined in the Overview 
section and are detailed in the scoring manuals (Appendices A and B). 
Therefore, these steps will only be briefly summarized here.
Finding Explanatory Statements
The six undergraduate raters used in this step were thoroughly 
trained in the use of Part I of the scoring manual ESAC (Appendix A). 
They were given a written quiz on the material contained in the manual. 
Two training sessions were also conducted during which the procedure 
was reviewed and numerous examples given. To ensure competence, each 
team of two raters was given a practice sample of letters on which to 
exercise the procedure under supervision. Then the experimental sample 
was tested. Each team conducted seven sessions in a private testing 
room for one hour each, during which time they processed five to seven 
letters. The procedure used is outlined as follows:
1) Each team member worked independently on the experimental 
sample, one paragraph at a time. Both team members worked 
on the same sample of letters.
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2) The located explanatory statements were recorded individu­
ally on a "finder's sheet." Space was provided for the 
letter and paragraph I.D. number, the rater's name, the 
statement excerpt and the components of the explanatory 
statement. Each explanatory statement was recorded in a 
simplified, two-part form (e.g., Referent Because Ex­
planation).
4) After completing their individual coding, the two members 
of the team compared their findings. If the two members 
agreed on both the referent and explanation of a given 
explanatory statement, they marked "agree" (A) on their 
respective finder's forms and then stapled them together.
If one team member found an explanatory statement that 
the other member did not find, or, if the two members 
identified different referents or explanations, then a 
one minute discussion period was implemented in an at­
tempt to resolve the discrepancy [following Lau and Rus­
sel's (1980) procedure]. If after one minute the two 
members had resolved their disagreement, they then marked 
either "agree to include" (AI) or "agree to exclude" (AE) 
on their finder's sheets. If after one minute there was 
no resolution, the raters marked "disagree" (D) on their 
finder's forms.
Five hundred and thirty-seven explanatory statements were found by all 
four teams combined. Two hundred of these statements were agreed upon 
by at least two out of three teams of raters (including the main team) 
Only this final sample of explanatory statements was used in the subse 
quent steps.
Identifying Referent Subjects
The "person" in each referent refers to who is performing the be 
havior being explained. The procedure contained in Part II.A. of the 
scoring manual ESAC (Appendix A) was used to identify the "person" in 
each referent.
The two raters for this step were the members of the main team. 
They worked independently and then compared their findings in order to 
assess reliability. The raters initially agreed upon 95% of the
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referent subjects. The items that the raters disagreed on were dis­
cussed and the discrepancies resolved. There was no time limit on the 
di scussions.
Classifying Referents
The three types of referents (enduring personal characteristics, 
transient personal characteristics and contextual characteristics) were 
defined in the Overview section. Only transient personal characteris­
tics were applicable to Kelley's (1967) model (i.e., they can be simpli­
fied to the form "person verb stimulus"), so these explanatory state­
ments needed to be identified.
The two raters for this step (i.e., the main team) each classi­
fied the entire set of referents using the procedure in Part II.B. of 
the scoring manual ESAC (Appendix A).
Each of the raters worked independently and then compared their 
findings in order to assess reliability. The raters initially agreed 
on 92% of the referents classified into the three types. Any disagree­
ments were discussed and resolved, with no time limit on the discus­
sions. The final sample of transient personal characteristics con­
sisted of 178 explanatory statements. Only this final sample was used 
in subsequent analyses.
Simplifying Referents
Following Kelley's (1967) theory and McArthur's (1972) procedure, 
all referents in the final sample were simplified to the form "person 
verb stimulus."
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A random sample of 50 of the referents were simplified according 
to the procedure in Part II of the scoring manual CDCNAC (Appendix B).
Each of the two raters worked independently on the sample of 50 
referents. The raters already had the "person" identified for each 
referent because these were coded in the earlier step, Identifying Refer­
ent Subjects. Therefore, only the "verb" and "stimulus" needed to be 
established for each referent. The raters were given the set of ex­
planatory statements, the list of referent subjects and the sample of 
original advice column letters. Each rater used the explanatory state­
ment and the context of the original letter to identify the correct 
"verb" and "stimulus."
The raters initially agreed on the simplification of 84% of the 
50 referents that were randomly sampled. Those simplifications that 
were not agreed upon were discussed and the discrepancies resolved, with 
no time limit on the discussions. A review of the discrepancies indi­
cated that all the disagreements occurred for referents that were in 
multi-subject form (see Overview).
The remaining 128 referents were simplified by one rater only.
In view of the disagreements just cited, this one rater was reminded 
to pay close attention to the context of the original letters to insure 
that the correct "verb" and "stimulus" would be identified.
Test Question Construction
One rater was used to construct the three test questions (one 
each for consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus) for each of the 
explanatory statements. There was no need to assess reliability for 
this step because no coding was involved and the task was a perfunctory
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placing of the referent components (e.g., person, verb and stimulus) 
into skeleton questions.
Part III of the scoring manual CDCNAC (Appendix B). contains a 
description of the skeleton questions and several examples. Also, in­
structions are presented for the use of Label terms (see Overview), 
"helper" verbs and prepositions which help insure that each question is 
grammatically correct and makes sense.
Locating Consistency, Distinctiveness and Consensus Information
Three undergraduate raters were used for this step. They were re­
quired to study Part IV of the scoring manual CDCNAC (Appendix B).
This scoring manual contains definitions and descriptions of explanatory 
statements and their components, referents and their components, the 
three information variables and the structured test questions. The 
raters were given a written quiz on this information to determine their 
level of mastery as well as to reveal any areas in which further train­
ing was indicated. Two training sessions were conducted during which 
the scoring manual was reviewed. Raters were given supervised prac­
tice in locating the three information variables in the context of ex­
planatory statements. Numerous trial runs were conducted using sample 
advice column letters and stimulus sheets like the one shown in 
Figure 1 (p. 63).
Part IV of the scoring manual CDCNAC (Appendix B) contains a de­
tailed procedure for locating the three information variables using 
the stimulus materials. This procedure, which was used by all the 
raters, can be summarized as follows:
71
1) Read the excerpt, the simplified explanatory statement 
(e.g., Referent Because Explanation), the simplified refer­
ent (e.g., person verb stimulus) and the three test ques­
tions.
2) Locate the correct letter and paragraph from the selection 
of original letters using the I.D. number at the top of 
each data sheet.
3) Read the entire original letter in order to become familiar 
with its contents.
4) Do one question at a time.
5) Start from the beginning of the letter (not just the be­
ginning of the paragraph) for each question.
6) If you find information that enables you to answer a ques­
tion, write in that information under the question that it 
refers to.
7) Write in the supporting information just as it appears in 
the original letter. If you feel you need to explain your 
choice of information, or show why it is correct, place your 
clarificatidn in parentheses next to the piece of informa­
tion.
8) If you find more than one piece of supporting information 
that answers a given question (e.g., two instances of Con­
sistency), then number your pieces of information (e.g.,
1, 2, 3, etc.). Present instances of information in the 
order in which they appear in the original letter.
9) If you are not able to locate a piece of information that 
will answer a question, write in the words "NO INFO" under 
the question.
Raters worked at their own pace on their own time. Emphasis was placed 
upon accuracy and thoroughness.
After completion, the stimulus sheets for each rater were col­
lected and the findings tabulated. Only those pieces of information 
that were found by at least two out of three raters were used in the 
analyses.
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Coding Consensus Information and Explanations
Those pieces of consensus information that were agreed upon by 
at least two out of three raters were considered reliable and were 
analyzed further. The main team of raters (e.g., a Ph.D. in clinical 
psychology and the present author) were used for these additional cod­
ing steps.
Each piece of consensus information was classified as either im­
plicit or explicit (Kassin 1979a). Explicit consensus refers to actual 
or observed covariation of the referent behavior across actors. It can 
take the form of base rate information (e.g., One out of six doctors 
endorse the drug), expert testimony (e.g., The professor also agreed 
with my point), or any other form of social or consensual support (e.g., 
Many of us enjoyed the movie). Implicit consensus refers to the expected 
covariation of the referent behavior across actors. It can take the 
form of norms (e.g., Children should learn to read at a young age), 
stereotypes (e.g., Men like to exert their dominance), or other types 
of behavioral expectations (e.g., Couples love to dance).
In coding the reliable pieces of consensus information as either 
implicit or explicit, the raters achieved 83% agreement (i.e., 25 out 
of 30). The discrepancies were discussed and resolved, with no time 
limit on the discussions.
The pieces of consensus information were also classified as. 
either high (e.g., many other people perform or would perform the be­
havior) or low (e.g., few other people perform or would perform the be­
havior). For this coding step, the raters achieved 93% agreement (i.e., 
28 out of 30). The discrepancies were discussed and resolved.
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Ten pieces of consensus information were used alone (i.e., with­
out either consistency or distinctiveness being used also). The ex­
planations with which the lone pieces of consensus were used were coded 
as either internal to the person performing the behavior or external 
to the person performing the behavior, according to the procedure con­
tained in Part II.B. of the scoring manual ESAC (Appendix A). This 
procedure actually contains three coding categories: internal, exter­
nal and interpersonal. Only the internal and external categories were 
of interest in the present study. For this coding step, the raters 
achieved 100% agreement (i.e., 10 out of 10).
Data Analysis
Ecological Validity of Kelley's (1967) Information Variables
If Kelley's (1967) model is generalizable to the "real world," 
then naturalistic attributions should be accompanied by the information 
variables a substantial portion of the time. The frequency of attribu­
tions supported by any of the variables, either alone or in combination, 
were compared to the frequency of attributions that were not accom­
panied by any of the variables. In the advice columns, if the fre­
quency of usage were significantly greater or equal to the frequency 
of non-usage, then there would be evidence for the ecological validity 
of the three variables. This type of evidence would indicate that per- 
ceivers use the variables with their attributions either half the 
time or more than half the time.
If the three variables are used significantly, then it would be 
of descriptive interest to see whether perceivers prefer to use them
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alone or in combinations. Previous research indicated that the vari­
ables actually do direct attributional activity whether their effects 
are analyzed individually (McArthur 1972) or whether particular con­
figurations are used (Orvis et al. 1975). The frequencies of usage of 
the information types, alone and in combinations, were tabulated and 
compared.
The Underutilization of Consensus
Previous theory (Kelley 1967) and research (McArthur 1972) has 
indicated that consistency may be a more valuable and informative vari­
able than either distinctiveness or consensus. It is still not com­
pletely clear why under some conditions consensus is so greatly under­
utilized relative to the other two types of information. It is pos­
sible that Kelley's (1967) definition of consensus as explicit or ob­
served covariation across actors may be too limited. Such a definition 
does not incorporate the implicit forms of consensus (e.g., norms, 
stereotypes or expectations) which may be quite influential in natural 
attribution situations. To investigate the possibility that consensus 
may not be underutilized when it is more broadly defined, the overall 
frequencies of usage of the three information variables were compared, 
with consensus defined as both implicit and explicit.
An Integrated Consensus Variable
If it is reasonable to define consensus information as both im­
plicit and explicit (Kassin 1979a), then each of these types should 
contribute to the overall use of consensus. Each piece of consensus 
that accompanied an advice column attribution was classified as either
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implicit or explicit, and the frequencies of the two types were com­
pared.
Previous research (Kassin 1979a) has indicated that implicit and 
explicit consensus similarly affect the direction of attribution.
Each piece of consensus that was used alone (i.e., without consistency 
or distinctiveness being used also) was classified as either high or 
low. Each attribution that was accompanied by one of these pieces of 
consensus was classified as either internal or external. These clas­
sifications yielded a 2 X 2 matrix. It is important to note that only 
the lone pieces of consensus had to be used in order to prevent the 
confounding effects of consistency and distinctiveness upon the direc­
tion of attribution.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Ecological Validity of Kelley's (1967) Information Variables 
Three raters were used to search the random sample of advice columns 
for instances of Kelley's (1967) three information variables. The over­
all performance of each rater is presented in Table 1. One rater (Rater 
A) located much more covariation information than either of the other 
two raters. It is possible that the extreme rater was too liberal in 
her coding of information. It is also possible that she may have been 
more sensitive than the other raters to subtle examples of the three in­
formation types. In either case, the reliability of the method used 
to locate covariation information cannot be determined from the perfor­
mance of the three raters used in this study. However, only those 
pieces of information that were agreed upon by at least two out of three 
of the raters were considered reliable. Only these reliable, unambigu­
ous pieces of information were used in the data analyses.
The frequency of attributions that were accompanied by at least 
one of Kelley's (1967) three information variables (e.g., something) 
was compared to the frequency of attributions that did not use any of 
the three information variables (e.g., nothing). The expected cell 
frequencies were 0.50. Although the frequency of at least something 
being used was greater than the frequency of nothing being used, this 
difference was not statistically significant (see Table 2). This
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Table 1
Overal1 Rater Agreement
Number of Pieces of Information Found
Rater Consi stency Distinctiveness Consensus
A 99 85 65
B 44 46 28
C 50 61 34
2 out of 3 
agreement 31 22 9
3 out of 3 
agreement 24 33 21
Total 55 55 30
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Table 2
Overall Use of Covariation Information
Information
Used
Number of 
Attri butions Chi-square Probabi1i ty
Something
Nothing
97
81
1.438 0.2300
Total 178
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result indicates that Kelley's (1967) information variables appeared 
with approximately one-half of all the attributions in the sample.
The attributions that were accompanied by Kelley's (1967) vari­
ables were divided into those that used an individual piece of infor­
mation and those that used information combinations. The results in­
dicate that perceivers significantly prefer to use the information vari­
ables individually (see Table 3). The expected cell frequencies were 
0.50.
No one information combination seemed to be used more than any 
other (see Table 4). The expected cell frequencies were 0.25. The 
results involving pieces of information that were used alone are re­
ported in the Underutilization of Consensus section.
The Underutilization of Consensus
The overall frequencies of usage of the three information vari­
ables indicate that consistency and distinctiveness information were 
used equally often, and that consensus information was significantly 
underutilized (see Table 5). The expected cell frequencies were 0.333.
Consensus information was also significantly underutilized rela­
tive to consistency and distinctiveness among those attributions that 
were accompanied by only one piece of information (see Table 6). The 
expected cell frequencies were 0.333. It is interesting to note that 
consistency and distinctiveness information were used equally often 
when used alone, which is the same result obtained with their overall 
use.
Consensus information was greatly underutilized relative to con­
sistency and distinctiveness information even though consensus was 
broadly defined as both implicit and explicit.
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Table 3
Alone Versus Combination Use of Information
Information
Used
Number of 
Attri butions3 Chi-square Probability
Alone
Combinations
66
31
12.629 0.0004
Total 97
a0ut of 178 attributions
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Table 4
Use of Information Combinations
Information
Combination
Number of
Times Used3 Chi-square Probability
Consistency + 
Distinctiveness 12
Consistency + 
Consensus 5
Distinctiveness + 
Consensus
3.710 0.2946
8
Consistency + 
Distinctiveness + 
Consensus 6
Total 31
Out of 178 attributions
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Table 5
Overall Use of Kelley's (1967) Variables
Information
Number of 
Times Used3 Chi-square Probabi 1 i ty
Consistency 55
Distinctiveness 55 15.135 0.0005
Consensus 30
a0ut of 178 attributions
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Table 6
Individual Use of Kelley's (1967) Variables
Information
Number of 
Times Used3 Chi-square Probability
Consistency 28
Distinctiveness 28 9.818 0.0074
Consensus 10
a0ut of 66 attributions
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An Integrated Consensus Variable
When consensus information appeared in the context of an attribu­
tion it was used significantly more often in high form as opposed to 
low form (expected cell frequencies were 0.50). Consensus information 
was used about equally often in its implicit and explicit forms (ex­
pected cell frequencies were 0.50). When the implicit/explicit clas­
sification was crossed with the high/low classification, the four cell 
frequencies were significantly different (expected cell frequencies 
were 0.25). However, there was no interaction. These results are dis­
played in Table 7.
Ten pieces of consensus information were used alone (e.g., with­
out consistency or distinctiveness being used also). The attributions 
that were accompanied by these items of consensus were classified as 
either internal or external to the actor. These attributions and the 
accompanying pieces of consensus were used to test the predicted rela­
tionship between consensus information and the direction of attribution. 
However, of the 10 pieces of consensus none were used in low form. 
Therefore, only the predicted relationship between high consensus and 
internal/external attribution could be tested. The results were in the 
predicted direction, that is, high consensus was associated more often 
with external attribution than with internal attribution. This differ­
ence achieved borderline significance (see Table 8).
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Table 7
Forms of Consensus Information
Explicit
High Low High
Implicit
Low
15 2 13 0
Compari son Chi-square Probability
Overal1 22.80 0.00004
Interaction 0 1.0
Explicit/Impl icit 0.5333 0.4652
High/Low 22.5333 0.000002
a30 pieces of consensus were used for these analyses.
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Table 8
Relationship Between Consensus and Attribution
High_ Consensus Low Consensus
Internal External Internal External
2 8 0 0
Comparison Chi-square Probability
Internal/Externalb 3.600 0.0578 *10
a
10 pieces of consensus were used in this analysis. 
bThis comparison was made only for high consensus.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
The Ecological Validity of Kelley's (1967) Variables 
The results of this project indicate that in a natural setting 
perceivers may make substantial use of social data corresponding to 
Kelley's (1967) three information variables. Over half of all the at­
tributions in the present sample were accompanied by at least one piece 
of covariation information.
The method used in this study insured that each piece of covaria­
tion information which accompanied an attribution related specifically 
to that attribution. The advice column raters were guided in their 
search for supporting information through the use of carefully con­
structed test questions. Consistent with Kelley's (1967) theory, these 
test questions were designed to focus the rater's search upon covaria­
tion information (i.e., consistency, distinctiveness and consensus) 
that related to the particular behavior in question (i.e., person verb 
stimulus). The supporting information in the advice columns some­
times appeared before the explanatory statement (i.e., Referent Be­
cause Explanation), sometimes after the explanatory statement and 
sometimes as part of the explanatory statement. Therefore, it cannot 
be determined whether the supporting information was used to direct 
attributional activity or whether it was a by-product of attributional 
activity. Undoubtedly, it was used in both ways. Some of the research
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reported earlier (McArthur 1972, 1976; Ruble & Feldman 1976; Major 
1980) indicated that perceivers use consistency, distinctiveness and 
consensus information in order to determine where the locus of causal­
ity lies. However, other research (Zuckerman & Mann 1979) has demon­
strated that once an attribution is made for a behavior, perceivers will 
make generalizations about the same behavior across actors (i.e., con­
sensus), across other stimuli (i.e., distinctiveness) and across cir­
cumstances (i.e., consistency). These generalizations corresponded to 
the high and low levels of the three information variables that are 
associated with particular attributions. This effect can be viewed as 
Kelley's (1967) model in reverse.
Although the present study supports the ecological validity of 
Kelley's (1967) three information variables, the results do not ad­
dress the ecological validity of the covariation model itself. In 
order to study this model in the advice columns it would be necessary 
to code all reliably located pieces of covariation information as 
either high or low. Each related attribution could be coded as either 
a person, stimulus or circumstance attribution. A prediction for 
attribution (e.g., person, stimulus or circumstance) could be derived 
from Kelley's (1967) theory for each individual item of information 
and for each combination of items. These predictions could be com­
pared to the actual attributions. If the actual attributions corres­
pond to a significant degree to the predicted attributions, then 
Kelley's (1967) model would be partially supported. The model would 
derive only partial support from such results because it could be 
argued that the procedure just outlined still fails to test the
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covariation model. It could not be stated with certainty that the lo­
cated pieces of information were directing attributions in the pre­
dicted manner. It could only be stated that the pieces of information 
accompanied the particular attributions. The method used in the present 
study (i.e., coding covariation information in the context of attribu­
tions) is limited to the extent that the cause/effect relationship be­
tween covariation information and attributional activity cannot be 
determined.
The subjects of this study were the people who wrote letters to 
the advice columns as well as the advice columnists themselves. These 
subjects were spontaneously making attributions and presenting support­
ing or clarifying information. In order to perform a full test of 
Kelley's (1967) model in this type of setting, it would probably be 
necessary to effect some type of control over the attributional activ­
ity or over the use of covariation information. However, once experi­
mental control of this kind is exercised, the data source can no longer 
be considered naturalistic.
In the present study, no particular combination of information 
was used significantly more than any other. However, perceivers used 
significantly more individual items of information than combinations 
of items (p = 0.0004). This last result may reflect a genuine prefer­
ence on the part of perceivers or it may reflect a physical limitation 
of the advice columns. Only a small space is allowed for each letter 
to the advice column. Therefore, it may be necessary for perceivers 
to be economical in their use of supporting covariation information. 
Future research might be devoted to developing an index of attributional
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activity as well as a measure of usage of covariation information. In 
their study of sports page attributions, Lau and Russell (1980) used 
the number of attributions per inch of newsprint as a measure of attri­
bution frequency. A comparable method for use in the advice columns 
might be an interesting complement to the present method of assessing 
the extent to which perceivers use Kelley's (1967) three information 
variables.
The pieces of consensus information that were included in the 
data analysis were considered reliable because they were agreed upon 
by at least two out of three of the raters. The raters were under­
graduate psychology majors and they were not familiar with attribution 
theory. It can be seen from Table 1 (p. 77) that one of the raters 
(Rater A) found more pieces of covariation information than either of 
the other two raters. If a large number of raters had been employed 
(e.g., 25) then the presence of one or two extreme raters could be at­
tributed to individual differences. However, since only three raters 
were used in the present study it is possible that the more produc­
tive rater was inclined to identify covariation information in ambigu­
ous advice column passages (i.e., the additional pieces of informa­
tion found by this rater were actually unreliable), or that this rater 
was simply more sensitive to subtle examples of the information types 
(i.e., the other two raters failed to find potentially reliable items). 
In either case, this situation highlights the importance of using more 
than one rater. Using a number of raters insures that the final 
sample of information items is highly reliable. Since the raters in 
the present study were naive regarding attribution theory and its
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predictions, it is conceivable that some subtle examples of covariation 
information were overlooked. If this were true, then Kelley's (1967) 
information variables are even more ecologically valid than the present 
results indicate. The alternative to using naive raters would be to 
use raters who are educated in the area of attribution theory. How­
ever, it is possible that using such informed raters would introduce 
biases into the advice column searches. For example, if a rater is 
aware that consensus information is believed to be underutilized, this 
knowledge may influence the salience of consensus-like information in 
the advice columns.
If consistency, distinctiveness or consensus information are 
naturalistically used about half the time, as the present results indi­
cate, then what factors are associated with attribution the other half 
of the time? It may be the case that Kelley's (1967) covariation model 
with its three information variables is reserved for particular attri­
bution situations. Kelley's (1967) model is quite logical in its form 
and it is based on the idea that the naive psychologist, or the man 
in the street, used a naive version of the scientific method. Kelley 
(1967) drew an analogy between the analysis of variance F-ratio and the 
procedure uses in common-sense attribution. The variability of a per­
son's behavior toward various entities (e.g., distinctiveness) is 
weighed against the stability of the person's behavior over time/situa- 
tions (e.g., consistency) and across other actors (e.g., consensus). 
Distinctiveness represents the numerator of the F-ratio while con­
sistency plus consensus represents the denominator. The attribution 
that an observer makes will depend upon his/her state of information
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regarding these sources of variability. The use of this model is con­
tingent upon the perceiver having access to information regarding the 
actor's behavior at other points in time, toward other entities or 
across other social agents.
It is conceivable that Kelley's (1967) model may be most appli­
cable when automatic attribution proves to be problematic (Taylor & 
Fiske 1978). There are probably times when attributors attempt to gen­
erate the sense that their perceptions and judgments are veridical.
In terms of knowing what caused an event, perceivers may want to "know 
that they know." Kelley (1973) suggested that the processes governing 
such "psychological epistomology" may be an important area related to 
attribution theory.
Although the covariation model may be intuitively appealing to 
the scientifically-minded perceiver, there are no doubt many attribu­
tion situations where the locus of causality is determined much more 
reflexly. For example, there is evidence that perceivers sometimes 
attribute causality to that factor which is simply the most salient 
(Taylor & Fiske 1978). In addition, the covariation model is not the 
only method available to attributors who are motivated to be rational 
in their perceptions.
For situations where only a single behavioral observation is 
available to perceivers, Kelley (1972, 1973) developed the causal 
schemata model. A causal schema is a plan or template which perceivers 
use in making causal attributions. The limited information available 
from a single behavioral observation is fitted into an appropriate 
schema. The schema provides a framework within which causes can be
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inferred from effects. Causal schemata presumably develop after much 
experience with everyday social situations involving cause and effect. 
Schemata enable a perceiver to construe and interpret a stable external 
world in the face of limited information.
One causal schema involves Multiple Sufficient Causes. This is 
where a number of potential causes are available for a given effect.
For example, if someone does well at their job, it may be due to their 
employer's pressure (i.e., external cause) or due to a high need to 
achieve (i.e., internal cause). There are two rules or principles that 
aid in determining how the causes will be perceived. The discounting 
principle states that if more than one plausible cause exists, the 
strength of any one cause will be reduced. In the example just cited, 
the employer's pressure may be perceived as the most plausible cause, 
but if it is known that the individual also has a high need to achieve, 
then the attribution to the employer's pressure will be made less 
confidently. On the other hand, if it is known that the individual 
does not have a high need to achieve, then a strong attribution to the 
employer's pressure can be made. The other principle is the augmenta­
tion principle, which involves situations in which there is both a 
facilitative cause and an inhibitory cause. If a person performs a 
behavior in the face of an inhibitory cause, then the strength of the 
attribution to the facilitative cause will increase. For example, 
suppose someone wants to succeed at a task (i.e., facilitative cause), 
and yet the task is extremely difficult (i.e., inhibitory cause). If 
the person succeeds, then this must have been due to a strong desire 
to succeed simply because the person had the difficulty of the task to
overcome.
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Another causal schema involves Multiple Necessary Causes. This 
schema refers to the situation where more than one cause is necessary 
for an effect to occur. If one or both of the causes are absent, the 
effect will not transpire. For example, in order to succeed at a task 
both effort (i.e., internal cause) and task easiness (i.e., external 
cause) may need to be present.
Another causal schema involves Compensatory Causes. This schema 
is similar to the Multiple Necessary Causes schema. The latter involves 
causes combined in an all-or-none fashion whereas the former involves 
causes combined in a graded fashion. Using the previous example, suc­
cess at a task may depend upon both effort and task easiness. A compen­
satory schema would indicate that an actor will be progressively more 
successful as effort increases or as task easiness increases. If the 
actor succeeds in the face of a difficult task (i.e., low task easi­
ness) then effort is inferred to be proportionally strong.
Kelley (1971, 1973) also suggested more complicated causal 
schemata for interpersonal and group effects.
Another procedure available to attributors would be Jones and 
Davis' (1965) correspondent inference model, which was discussed 
earlier in the section on Implicit Consensus. In this model perceivers 
use social desirability information and a non-common effects analysis 
to infer specific internal causes.
In summary, there are several attribution procedures available 
to perceivers. The fact that consistency, distinctiveness or con­
sensus was used over half the time in the present study indicates 
that covariation information may be relatively important to naturalistic
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attribution. In particular, Garland, Hardy and Stephenson's (1975) 
conclusion (discussed earlier) that Kelley's (1967) three information 
variables lack ecological validity may be incorrect.
It is important to remember that evidence for one model does not 
weaken the position of the other models. Kelley (1973) stated that 
future research must address when the various models are most applic­
able:
. . .  in the context of the last 15 years of thought within 
social psychology, the notion of a repertoire of thought 
models is rather radical in its implications. This period 
has been characterized by proposals that the layman has one 
model or another and by the attempt to demonstrate the opera­
tion of each model. . . . The present conception is, of 
course, that each and all of these models are reflected in 
the person's thinking--each at specific (and specifiable) 
times, and all, over a variety of occasions. . . . The re­
search implications are probably also clear. Our initial 
problem is not one of proving or disproving the operation 
of one model or another. Rather it is one of identifying 
the entire set of models that are commonly or importantly 
used. Then, we must determine the conditions under which 
each of the set is evoked and the implications and conse­
quences of its evocation. . . . These problems tend to be 
lacking in appeal because their answers depend on the spec­
ifics of time and place (pp. 118-19).
Naturalistic research may be the method of choice for determining these
"specifics of time and place" regarding the use of attribution models.
However, laboratory-based research may be the most effective way to study
the machinations of each particular model.
The Underutilization of Consensus Information 
Overall, consensus information was significantly (p = 0.0005) 
underutilized (in terms of perceiver preference) relative to consistency 
and distinctiveness information in the present sample of advice columns. 
Among the attributions that used the information types individually,
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consensus was also significantly (p = 0.0074) underutilized. These 
results support the findings of Major (1980), who found that consensus 
was the least requested of the three information types.
The underrepresentation of consensus occurred even though the 
definition of consensus was expanded to include both explicit and im­
plicit forms (Kassin 1979a), instead of just the explicit form pro­
posed by Kelley (1967). In view of the expanded definition, it is in­
teresting that consensus was the least preferred of the three informa­
tion types in the advice columns. The advice columns would seem to be 
a popular arena for the presentation of generalizations and stereo­
types as well as a barometer for current trends, styles and social 
norms. These types of social data would all seem to be best represented 
by consensus information.
However, if the advice columns are in fact a forum for the pre­
sentation of the values of popular culture, then this may provide an 
explanation for why consensus information was underrepresented rela­
tive to consistency and distinctiveness information. According to 
Gergen (1968), Western culture is characterized by a "consistency 
ethic" and there is much social value placed upon personal predictabil­
ity and consistency in behavior. Individuals are motivated to maintain 
a consistent self-concept and much importance is placed upon being 
"true to self." Personal inconsistencies are believed to produce dis­
comfort, and therefore people strive to eliminate such inconsistencies 
(Festinger 1954). Interpersonally, consistent behavior is reinforced 
with "trust" and positive evaluations from others.
Both consistency and distinctiveness information refer to the 
amount of consistency in an individual's behavior, that is, they refer
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to the consistency of an individual's behavior over time/situations 
and across entities, respectively. Consensus information, on the other 
hand, does not provide such personal consistency information since it 
does not offer data on an individual's previous behaviors. If there is 
a strong emphasis in our culture upon personal consistency, and if the 
advice columns are a domain in which behavioral information is pre­
sented, then it is conceivable that perceivers in the advice columns 
displayed a bias toward using personal consistency information (e.g., 
consistency and distinctiveness) as opposed to a bias aqainst using con­
sensus information (Schoeneman, Note 2). In addition, the relative im­
portance to attribution of the three information types as they were 
used in the advice columns cannot be determined, since the present 
method does not permit such an analysis. It cannot be concluded that 
consensus information was underutilized, only that it was underrepre­
sented relative to consistency and distinctiveness information.
«
Even before his model was tested empirically, Kelley (1967) sug­
gested that consistency may be more important than consensus. He 
cited theoretical work by Festinger (1950, 1954) in which it was postu­
lated that "physical reality tests take precedence over social reality 
information." The use of consensus may be mediated by "side" attribu­
tions regarding the expertness or trustworthiness of the information 
source. This could make consensus a somewhat cumbersome information 
type to use. Also, Kelley (1967) suggested that consensus may be most 
valuable when physical reality information (i.e., consistency) is ab­
sent. In the present study, however, the frequency of consensus used 
alone (i.e., without physical reality data) was still less than the 
frequency of each other information type.
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Some previous research has demonstrated that consistency infor­
mation is used more than distinctiveness information in terms of af­
fecting the direction of attribution (McArthur 1972; Zuckerman 1978b) 
and in terms of perceiver preference (Major 1980). It can be argued 
that consistency is the most economical of the three information vari­
ables. High consistency information tells us that either the "person" 
or the "stimulus" is the causal agent. Low consistency information 
rules out both the "person" and the "stimulus" as the causal agent 
simultaneously (i.e., circumstance attribution). Distinctiveness and 
consensus information, however, implicate only one causal factor at a 
time, either the "person" or the "stimulus."
The results of the present study do not support the preceding 
argument. Consistency and distinctiveness information were preferred 
equally by perceivers in the advice columns, overall and when used in­
dividually. It is conceivable that in the advice columns (and perhaps 
other naturalistic sources), consistency may be implied when distinc­
tiveness is presented. If it is indicated that a person performs a 
behavior toward many different stimuli, this may imply some consis­
tency in the behavior over time or across situations. Similarly, if 
a person is described as performing some behavior toward only a single 
stimulu-s, then this may imply that in other situations or at other 
times the person did not perform the behavior. In the advice columns, 
perceivers often report and attribute behavior in descriptive or every­
day language. Pieces of covariation information are sometimes implied 
or are buried in the verbiage of the advice column letter. Therefore, 
it is possible that some letters were written in such a way as to
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imply consistency information without ever actually reporting it.
This may explain why consistency was not used more than distinctiveness, 
as previous theory and research would predict.
An Integrated Consensus Variable
In the present sample of advice columns, explicit and implicit 
types of consensus contributed equally to the overall use of consensus 
information. This indicates that perceivers choose to present expec­
tations for covariation across actors as well as actual covariation in­
formation. In other words, implicit consensus appears to be used for 
the same purposes as explicit consensus in the advice columns.
To test the predicted relationship between direction of attribu­
tion and level of consensus, the pieces of consensus information that 
were used alone were coded as either high or low while the related 
attributions were coded as either internal or external. Because con­
sensus was greatly underutilized, only 10 pieces of consensus were 
available for this analysis. Six of these were explicit and four were 
implicit. All of these pieces of consensus were in high form and 
therefore should accompany external attribution. The results were in 
the predicted direction, although they were only marginally signifi­
cant (p = 0.0578). A more adequate test of an integrated consensus 
variable (i.e., both implicit and explicit combined) would require a 
larger sample as well as a number or pieces of consensus in low form.
In the present study, consensus information was overwhelmingly 
used in the high form (e.g., much covariation across actors, either 
expected or observed). Twenty-eight pieces of consensus were high 
while only two were low (p = 0.000002). Kelley's (1967) covariation
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model predicts that high consensus is associated with external or stimu­
lus attribution while low consensus is associated with internal or per­
son attribution.
One possible explanation for the prevalence of high consensus 
may involve the method used by raters to search for consensus informa­
tion. The raters were instructed to use the test questions that accom­
panied each explanatory statement as a guide for conducting an advice 
column search for the three information variables. The raters were 
alerted to the possibility that some subtle instances of information may 
not represent an exact answer to one of the test questions. The follow­
ing referent behavior can be used as an example:
Bruce enjoyed the movie.
The consensus test question for this behavior would be as follows:
CONSENSUS: How many other people (did, would, should) enjoy 
the movie?
An instance of consensus information in the advice column might be a 
direct answer to this question. For example:
HIGH: Many people enjoyed the movie.
LOW: Few people enjoyed the movie.
However, it could be argued that a valid instance of low consensus might 
not be a direct answer to the test question. For example:
LOW: Many people did not enjoy the movie.
This piece of low consensus tells us about how many people did not enjoy 
the movie, while the test question itself asks about how many people 
did enjoy the movie. If the raters were using the test questions
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literally to guide them in their search for information, it might be 
argued that they were biased against identifying low covariation pieces 
of information. This would be true for all three of the information 
variables.
There are several arguments against this line of reasoning. First, 
there is no reason why a particular piece of high consensus information 
should be a direct answer to the test question. In the example above, 
high consensus might take this form: "Few people did not enjoy the 
movie." In terms of training, the raters were instructed to use the 
test questions only as a guide for conducting their searches. As 
stated earlier, the raters were alerted to the possibility that some 
subtle examples of information may not directly answer a given test 
question. The raters were given numerous practice examples involving 
these types of information and they were trained to use the scoring 
manual CDCNAC (Appendix B) as a reference. Part IV of this scoring 
manual contains descriptions and examples of subtle pieces of informa­
tion that do not directly answer the test questions and yet are still 
valid and acceptable instances of the three information variables.
The raters were also trained to use as a guide the simplified referent 
components (person verb stimulus) and the definitions derived from 
them for the three information types. Finally, a review of the reli­
able pieces of consensus information revealed that two of the 30 
items located by the raters constitute valid instances of consensus 
even though these pieces of information did not directly answer 
their respective test questions, as described above. For both of 
these pieces of consensus, all three raters were in agreement.
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This indicates that all of the raters were aware of the correct pro­
cedure to follow when confronting such subtle instances of information.
Another explanation for the prevalence of high consensus informa­
tion involves perceiver preference. According to Anderson's (1974) 
multiplicative model, consensus information is used specifically to de­
termine the valence of a given stimulus, or in other words, the power 
of a stimulus to provoke or elicit behavior from actors. Garland,
Hardy and Stephenson (1975) found that when requests for consensus in­
formation were made by perceivers, they were made significantly more 
often under stimulus attribution as opposed to person attribution con­
ditions. Zuckerman (1973b) demonstrated that consensus information ac­
counted for the highest overall percentage of stimulus attributions 
relative to consistency and distinctiveness information.
DiVitto and McArthur (1978) conducted a developmental study of 
Kelley's (1967) covariation model, and their analysis provides a reason­
able explanation for why consensus information may have been used 
almost exclusively in high form in the advice columns. In agreement 
with Anderson (1974), DiVitto and McArthur (1978) argued that con­
sensus information provides evidence on the presence or absence of 
some causal factor within the target or stimulus of a behavior. High 
consensus tells us that the behavior covaries with the stimulus, 
which of course leads to a stimulus attribution:
Person 
Person 
Person 
Person
tow consensus tells us only that the behavior does not covary with the 
stimulus, and it leads to a person attribution:
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Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 ■Verb rStimulus
Person 4
High consensus provides direct covariation evidence for stimulus causal 
ity whereas low consensus requires a second inferential step for person 
causality. With low consensus both the covariation principle and the 
discounting principle (Kelley 1971) must be invoked in order to arrive 
at a person attribution. The covariation principle with low consensus 
indicates that the stimulus, although present, is not the likely cause 
of the behavior. Since there is another potential causal agent present 
(i.e., the person), the discounting principle is used to rule out the 
stimulus in favor of the person as the perceived locus of causality. 
Using consensus information to make a stimulus attribution (i.e., a one 
step analysis using covariation evidence) is a much simpler cognitive 
task than using consensus information to make a person attribution 
(i.e., a two-step analysis using covariation evidence plus the dis­
counting principle). A similar analysis of distinctiveness information 
can be performed to show why person attribution is a more simple task 
than stimulus attribution.
In view of the increasing cognitive complexity of covariation- 
based attribution as compared to discounting-based attribution,
DiVitto and McArthur (1978) hypothesized that there should be age 
related trends in the use of the latter. Various test behaviors along 
with consistency, distinctiveness and consensus information were pre­
sented in the form of stories and pictures. First, third and sixth 
graders as well as college students were the subjects. The results
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indicated that younger subjects did not use consensus and distinctive­
ness to make person and target attributions, respectively (i.e., dis­
counting), but older subjects were able to. Almost all the subjects 
were able to use the covariation principle to make attributions.
The overwhelming use of high as opposed to low consensus in the 
advice columns suggests that perceivers were using consensus information 
in its least ambiguous form. It is possible that perceivers prefer to 
support their attributions with information about what other people do 
or would do instead of what other people do not or would not do. Heider 
(1958) might argue that perceivers in the advice columns were attempting 
to make common-sense in the simplest and most straightforward manner.
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SCORING MANUAL: EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS IN THE. ADVICE COLUMNS
Introduction
The purpose of the study we are about to undertake is to describe 
people's explanations for their own and others' behaviors, characteris­
tics, and so on. More specifically, we are interested in "why" explana­
tions, notions about why someone acted in a certain way or why a person 
is the way he or she is. Advice columns will be our hunting ground, 
since they offer "naturally-occurring" data; when people write in to 
describe problems, and when the columnist gives advice, we may find 
explanations of behavior and persons embedded in these communications.
The advantage of such naturalistic data is that they are very general- 
izable to social reality, that is, they are usually more representative 
of the complexities of social behavior and less artificial than data 
that come from a psychological test or laboratory task.
Naturalistic sources also present some difficulties. It is not 
easy to derive usable data from them (compared to questionnaires and 
lab measures) because they are so complex. In order to reduce complex 
materials to a form that is more easily grasped and utilized, investiga­
tors devise coding formats. These are sets of instructions which guide 
two kinds of activity. First, it is necessary to separate the wheat 
from the chaff, that is, to separate the things you want.to study from 
the mass of irrelevant details. In our case, we need to find explanatory 
statements in advice columns. After the phenomena of interest have been 
isolated and identified, the investigator will want to characterize them 
further. He or she will devise a set of categories and ask a judge or 
rater to look at materials (such as a set of explanatory statements 
from advice columns) and make decisions about which categories they fit 
into most closely.
The coding formats will not be very useful, however, unless they 
are reliable. Reliability is an indication of the extent to which a 
measure (such as a coding scheme) yields the same result each time it is 
used. There are different types of realiability, but one of the most 
important for coding formats is interjudge or interrater reliability.
If we devise a method to find explanations in advice columns and to 
characterize them, and then ask three people to use the method on the 
same set of letters and replies, will they all end up with the same set 
of results? If they did, we would have good interrater reliability; 
we would be confident that when they use our instrument, different 
observers see the same things. If interrater reliability is poor, how­
ever, we could have any number of problems. Our coding scheme may not 
describe the naturalistic materials very well, or it may be hard to 
apply consistently because the instructions or categories are vague.
Or, our raters may not be familiar enough with the measure to use it 
well; they could be well-trained but fatigued; they may have particular 
idiosyncratic biases when they make ratings.
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The purpose of this scoring manual is to describe how to use a 
coding method for explanatory statements in advice columns as precisely 
as possible. This should help to reduce error due to the instrument 
itself. Error due to raters' usage of the instrument will be reduced 
by careful training and monitoring of observers. If we can reliably 
isolate and describe explanatory statements in advice columns, we will 
have a gold mine of information on the ways in which people account 
for important facets of their daily life.
Part I: Finding Explanatory Statements
Definitions
Our first job is to scour the advice columns for explanatory 
statements. People make explanatory statements when they mention a be­
havior (or set of behaviors) or a personal trait or a social role or 
a temporary personal state and then explain it in some way by citing a 
cause, purpose, reason, intention, source, determinant, and so on. In 
a sense, explanatory statements are some form of a "because" statement.
Here are some examples of explanatory statements. Some are fairly 
straightforward, but others are not so obvious.
EXAMPLE 1: "She wants to be pregnant again because she believes it will 
be a valuable 'learning experience' for her children."
EXAMPLE 2: "For business reasons I cannot be seen in public with my 
lover."
EXAMPLE 3: "This morning your column made me see red."
EXAMPLE 4: "Kathy's self-righteousness is beginning to get to me.
Components of explanatory statements. Explanatory statements 
contain two parts: an explanation and what is being explained. The 
former we will call an explanation and the latter a referent. No matter 
what they look like in raw or natural form, explanatory statements can 
be reduced to the form "referent because explanation" (for example, "I 
hit him because he hit me"). Now we will take a closer look at refer­
ents and explanations, and define them further.
What are referents? Another way of phrasing this question is 
to ask what kinds of things people try to explain in their daily lives. 
For our purposes, we can identify five types of referents:
1. Personal and interpersonal behaviors (actions, reactions, 
things people do)
2. Personal and interpersonal traits (enduring characteristics 
or dispositions; labels for behaviors which are very con­
sistent across time and situations; consistent behavior 
that is determined from within)
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3. Personal and interpersonal states (more-or-less temporary 
modes of being or conditions of existence)
4. Social (interpersonal) roles (patterns of behavior shaped by 
external social situations or influences, not by internal 
behaviors, states or traits)
5. Impersonal situations (the external world or environment; 
settings or external conditions)
Table 1 on the next page clarifies types of referents further by giving 
examples. Although the distinctions between types is sometime subtle, 
we will not really be concerned with them at this point; our job is to 
find explanatory statements, which will contain all sorts of referents. 
There is only one distinction which will concern us now, the distinction 
between situations and all other types of referents. We will not be 
looking for explanations of situations; we will be concerned only with 
personal and'interpersonal' referents (states, traits, roles and be^ ~ 
haviors)! An easy way to keep this distinction in mind is to usetwo 
memory aids: STROBE (for states, traits, roles and behaviors) and "Don't 
sit" (Don't worry about situational referents).
There are also different kinds of explanations. Again, we are 
concerned now only with finding explanations, not classifying them. I 
list types of explanations only to give you an idea of what to look 
for. There are two general kinds of explanations. The first is mechani­
cal or lawful cause-and-effect, the notion that a current event was 
caused by some preceding occurrence in a regularly-observable manner 
(for instance, the direction and speed of billiard ball B was caused 
by the way billiard ball A hit it). Some examples: He's a minister 
because of his upbringing; I hit you because I had a seizure; he is 
talkative because he is insecure. The second kind of explanation is 
purpose or justification, in which STROBEs are explained by referring 
to their purpose or intention (I hit you because I wanted to hurt you) 
or by citing some justification (He talks because he has good things to 
say; he is a minister because it was right for him).
To sum up, then, the explanatory statements we will be seeking 
will include something that is being explained (a referent) and an 
explanation. The referents we are interested in are behaviors, traits, 
roles and states. The explanations will cite cause-and-effect or pur­
poses and justifications.
Forms of explanatory statements. As we said above, explanatory 
statements contain referents and explanations, and they can be reduced 
to the form of "referent because explanation." However, not all ex­
planatory statements in their raw or natural forms will conform to 
this model to begin with. In this section we will consider various 
"raw types" of explanatory statement.
1. Straight "referent because explanation." This is the 
simplest and most obvious form of explanatory statement. Recall 
EXAMPLE 1: "She wants to be pregnant again because she believes it 
will be a valuable 'learning experience' for her children."
lable 1
Types of Referents
Behaviors Traits States Roles Situations
Definition Actions, reac­
tions, things 
people do.
Enduring charac- 
istics or dis­
positions; labels 
for behaviors 
which are very 
consistent 
across time and 
situations and 
which are deter­
mined from with­
in.
More-or-less 
temporary 
modes of being 
or conditions 
of existence.
Patterns of be­
havior shaped 
by external 
social situations 
or influences, 
not by internal 
behaviors, traits, 
or states.
The external 
world or environ­
ment; settings 
or external 
conditions.
Examples: I went to the 
store.
I am bashful. I am hungry. I am a Democrat. The world is a 
funny place.
You are writ­
ing a letter.
You have always 
been friendly.
You are not 
usually this 
anxious,
You were a stu­
dent.
The room was 
cold.
Jack fell down. Jill is a care­
ful person.
Jack is alive 
and wel1.
Jill is a wife. North Dakota is 
sunny.
We went to 
school.
We are a quar­
relsome pair.
We are married. We are Jaycees. The university is 
ivy-covered.
My office is 
small.
The glee club 
sang 10 songs.
The Senate is 
lazy.
The university 
is hurting 
financially.
Parents are 
teachers.
Oi
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2. The "because explanation referent" variant. Sometimes people 
put the cart before the horse in explanatory statements so that refer­
ents follow rather than precede explanations. EXAMPLE 1 could be re­
worded in this form: "Because she believes it would be a valuable learn­
ing experience for her children, she wants to be pregnant again."
3. "Because" variations. "Because" can be said in a number of 
ways, using alternative wordings or synonyms. For instance: I'll get 
it, since I'm up; he can't talk, for he is busy; I think, therefore I
am (that is, I am because I think); and EXAMPLE 2, "For business reasons 
I cannot be seen in public with my lover." Notice how subtle some of 
these examples compared to straight "because" statements. As we go 
down the list of explanatory statement forms, they become harder to de­
tect and less obvious.
4. Implicit "because" statements. Sometimes explanatory state­
ments are worded in such a way that "because" or its synonyms are left 
out or unnecessary. For instance, referents and explanations can be 
connected by the conjunction "and": It was cold out and I wore my heavy 
coat. The "and" could be dropped, too: It was cold out; I wore my 
heavy coat. Or, It was cold out. I wore my heavy coat. In addition, 
there are often "becauses" lurking in what appear to be simple state­
ments; consider EXAMPLE 3, "This morning your column made me see red," 
and EXAMPLE 4, "Kathy's self-righteousness is beginning to get to me."
All of these examples could be reworded in "referent because explana­
tion" form: I wore my heavy coat because it was cold out; I saw red 
this morning because of your column; I am beginning to be 'got to' 
(bugged) because Kathy is self-righteous.
5. Implicit referent plus explicit explanation. Occasionally 
you will find, if you look carefully, explanations that have no explicit 
referent STROBEs. When this happens, it means that the referent is part 
of the context of the letter or reply. Here is an example: A woman 
writes in complaining that she found dirty pictures in her husband's 
desk. She describes all the horrors she discovered, and states her 
negative feelings on pornography. She notes that her husband says it's 
fun and does nobody harm, and then asks the advice columnist who is 
right and what to do about it. End of example. Did you find the ex­
planation? It is "it's fun and does nobody harm." The referent, 
which is not explicitly stated, is "he collects dirty pictures" or "he 
thinks it is OK to have such filth." This referent is given in the 
context of the letter.
In summary, then, explanatory statements can be very obvious or 
quite obscure. In order to be able to find them reliably, you will 
need to know the following fairly well:
1. Definitions of referent, explanation and explanatory state­
ment.
2. Types of referents and explanations.
3. The five forms of explanatory statements.
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Thus, your first job is to study this "Definitions" section until you 
think you understand it.
Instructions for Finding Explanatory Statements
You will be given a number of typewritten letters and replies 
from advice columns. Each letter + reply will have an ID number; para­
graphs in each will be numbered in sequence (1, 2, 3, . . .). For each 
rating session, you will work on a packet of five letters and replies. 
Raters will work in pairs, at first independent of each other while lo­
cating explanatory statements, and then together in order to produce re­
liable statements. This section describes the work of finding explana­
tory statements.
Step 1. Take a letter + reply and read it through once for 
familiarity.
Step 2. Now start the letter again. Look at the first paragraph 
carefully; read it more than once; don't go on to the next paragraph un­
til you are satisfied that you have located all explanatory statements or 
that there are none contained in the paragraph.
General strategy: Look for explanations first. When you search 
a paragraph for explanatory statements, evaluate each sentence or phrase 
as a possible explanation, that is, as an implicit or explicit "because" 
statement having to do with cause-and-effect or purpose/justification 
(review the section on Components of explanatory statements above). If 
you think you've found an explanation, then look for its referent (STROBEs 
only; remember, "Don't sit"). You will use this strategy because, after 
much trial-and-error, we have found it to be the best way to locate ex­
planatory statements. There are other strategies, but they all have 
flaws: (1). You could search for the word "because." Unfortunately, 
this simple strategy will catch only the most obvious explanatory state­
ments and miss many others that have "because" variations or implicit 
"becauses" (review the section on Forms of explanatory statements above). 
(2). You could widen your search to include "because" variations (since, 
for, and therefore, etc.), but there are many synonyms for "because" and 
they frequently have more than one meaning (e.g., "since" also refers 
to a time period, as in "since last Thursday"); you would also miss 
implicit "becauses." (3). Finally, you could look for possible refer­
ents (that is, notice any time a behavior, trait, state or role is 
mentioned) and then look to see if they are explained. This is ineffici­
ent, since many STROBEs are not explained; this strategy would also 
miss those explanatory statements which have implicit referents and ex­
plicit explanations.
To repeat, then, the strategy of choice for locating explana­
tory statements is to look for explanations first, referents second.
Step 3. When you have located an explanatory statement, record 
it on a Finder's Sheet (see the next page).
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a. Put down the letter + reply ID number, the paragraph number, 
and your name.
b. Under Statement Excerpt, write down a direct quotation of 
the section from the paragraph that you have identified as an explana­
tory statement.
c. Under Statement Reformulation, interpret the explanation as 
you see it by rewording it into explicit "referent because explanation" 
form. Two examples are given on the sample Finder's Sheet on the next 
page.
Step 4. Go through each paragraph in the above fashion until the 
letter is completed.
Instructions for Rater Agreement
As mentioned above, raters will work in pairs. You and your part 
ner will receive an identical set of five letters in any one rating ses­
sion. You will each search for explanatory statements independently, as 
outlined in the previous section. Then, when you are both finished, you 
will get together to compare notes, so that the final set of explanatory 
statements that you hand in will be those that you both agreed on. This 
section describes the-procedure for rater agreement.
Step 1. Look at the first paragraph of the first letter + reply.
la. If you both agree that there was no explanatory state­
ment in this paragraph, go on to the next paragraph.
lb. If you both agree that there was an explanatory state­
ment (or more than one) in this paragraph, compare your Finder's Sheets.
1) . if you both put down the same (or very similar)
Statement Excerpts, and if your Statement Reformu­
lations are basically similar, circle the "A" next 
to Disposition at the bottom of each of your Finder' 
Sheets, staple or clip them together, and go on to 
the next paragraph.
2) . if there is a major disagreement (e.q., different
Statement Excerpts or Reformulations) proceed as 
in Step lc below.
lc. If you and your partner disagree (one of you finds an 
explanatory statement but the other doesn't, or you both found different 
Statement Excerpts, or you disagree about the Statement Reformulations), 
discuss the disagreement and try to resolve it within one minute.
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EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS IN THE ADVICE COLUMNS: FINDER'S DHEET 
Letter # 5 Paragraph # 1 Rater U. Judge______________
1. Statement Excerpt: "For business reasons I cannot be seen in
public with my lover."_____________________________________________
2. Statement Reformulation:
REFERENT_____ I can't be seen in public with my lover._________________
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION of business reasons______________________________________
Disposition (circle one): A AI AE D 
*********************************************************************
Letter # 5 Paragraph # 2 Rater U. Judge_____________
1. Statement Excerpt: "Kathy's self-righteousness is beginning
to get to me."___________________ ____________
2. Statement Reformulation:
REFERENT_____ I am beginning to be bugged (got to).____________________
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION Kathy is self-righteous._________ ________________________
Disposition (circle one): A AI AE D
115
1) . start timing a minute after you have located the
disagreement; don't include discussion of whether 
there is a disagreement in the minute.
2) . Note: when discussing disagreements, maintain an
open but skeptical outlook. Do not give in to your 
partner every time there is a disagreement. Do 
give in if you see your partner's argument as reason­
able and justified. Your job in this discussion of 
disagreements is to ensure that the final sample of 
explanatory statements is a good, reliable sample.
3) . by the time a minute is up: if you both agree to
include a statement that one of you missed, or if 
you agree that one of your Statement Excerpts or 
Reformulations should be revised, then take the 
correct Finder's Sheet (make up a new one if you 
need to) and circle "AI" under Disposition; take 
the incorrect Finder's Sheet(s), put a big "X" 
across it, and staple or clip it to the back of the 
correct sheet.
4) . by the time one minute is up: if you both agree
to exclude or drop an explanatory statement that 
one of you found, circle "AE" on the relevant 
Finder's Sheet.
5) . if you cannot resolve a disagreement by the time a
minute is up, circle "D" on the relevant Finder's 
Sheet(s).
5). Note: keep two piles of Finder's Sheets: one for 
those marked A or AI, one for those marked AE or D.
Step 2. Go through each letter + reply on a paragraph-by-para- 
graph basis until you have completed the packet.
Part II: Classifying Explanatory Statements
When you read this, Part I of this study (Finding Explanatory 
Statements) will be finished, providing us with a sample of statements 
of the form "REFERENT because EXPLANATION." Recall that the referent 
is some personal or interpersonal event which a perceiver might seek to 
explain (e.g., a behavior, trait, mood, interpersonal relationship, 
etc.), and that an explanation is the perceiver's notion about the cause, 
purpose, justification, or reason of the perceived event. In sum, we 
have a sample of explanatory statements that include what is being ex­
plained as well as how it is being accounted for.
What, then, do we do with such a sample? Part II of this study 
is concerned with classifying explanatory statements: Now that we 
have a number of explanatory statements, what are they like, how are 
they put together? Whose "personal events" are being explained? What 
kinds of explanations are being used? These are the kinds of questions 
we wish to ask.
In order to answer these questions, we will (as in Part I) de­
vise a coding format, train some people how to use it, and assess the 
reliability of our coding format by looking at agreement between raters.
A. Identifying and Categorizing Subject Persons in Referents
The first task is to answer a "Who?" question: Who is the per­
son (or persons) whose behavior, mood, personality or other characteris­
tic is being explained? Remember that explanatory statements are of the 
form "REFERENT because EXPLANATION." We are asking about the referent: 
Who is the subject in an explanatory statement's referent? Some personal 
or interpersonal event is being explained; whose is it?
First, let's discuss the ratings that need to be made and how 
to make them. Then we will consider the problem of interrater agreement.
Making Ratings
Identifying referent subjects. Each explanatory statement that 
you will examine for subject persons will be printed on a separate 
8-1/2 x 11" sheet of paper. Each explanatory statement has its own 
code number (e.g., 5A-P3-1 3T) which is printed in the top right corner 
of the sheet. An explanatory statement appears on each sheet first in 
"raw" form, as an excerpt from an advice column letter or reply: then 
it will be given in the "refined" form of "REFERENT because EXPLANA­
TION." So these are the materials you will be rating. An example 
is given on the next page.
You will make your ratings on the "Referent Subject Rating Sheet" 
(see the page after the next).
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REFERENT SUBJECT RATING SHEET
Statement Code: 
Referent Subject Self Other(s) Both
Statement Code: 
Referent Subject Self Other(s) , Both
Statement Code: 
Referent Subject Self Other(s) Both
Statement Code: 
Referent Subject Self Other(s) Both
Statement Code: 
Referent Subject Self Other(s) Both
Statement Code: 
Referent Subject Self Other(s) Both
Statement Code: 
Referent Subject Self Other(s) Both
Statement Code: 
Referent Subject Self Other(s) Both
Statement Code: 
Referent Subject Self Other(s) Both
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99A-P3-1 3T
She wants to be pregnant again because she believes it will be a valu­
able "learning experience" for her children.
REFERENT: She wants to be pregnant again
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: she believes it will be a valuable "learning experience" 
for her children.
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First, fill in the code number of the explanatory statement you 
are working on.
Next, fill in the blank after the words "Referent Subject."
Here's how to do this. Your job is to look at an explanatory statement 
(REFERENT because EXPLANATION) and decide whose personal or interper­
sonal events (in the referent) are being explained. Many of these re­
ferent subjects will be obvious; examples 1-7 in Table 2 are fairly 
obvious.
There are, however, some less obvious cases. Let's consider 
some of them.
1. Passive voice. Some referents are phrased in the passive rather
than the active voice. An example of passive phrasing is example 
8 (Table 2): "He should not be blamed for his misdeed." Is the 
referent subject "he," or is it the unnamed person or persons 
doing the blaming? As a rule of thumb, when you encounter the 
passive voice, translate it into some form of active phrasing 
(e.g., "The blamer/s should not blame him for his misdeed") and 
identify the grammatical subject (actor, doer) of the active 
sentence as the referent subject (thus, fill in "blamer/s" under 
Referent Subject).
2. Imperative mood. Referents may sometimes be requests or commands,
as in example 9 in Table 2: "Tell me what to do." The impera­
tive mood implies a "you": the example is short for "(You) tell 
me what to do." As another rule of thumb, with imperative forms, 
the implicit "you" is the referent subject (thus, fill in "you" 
for this example's Referent Subject).
3. Dangling participle. Whenever you encounter a construction like
example 10, Table 2 ("Going to his house would be unfair to his 
wife") you have a participle that has no clear connection to a 
word it supposedly modifies. You should immediately ask "Who 
would be going to his house?" Then you can consider who the re­
ferent subject is. 4
4. Direct and indirect objects as referent subjects. As you may have
noticed, referent subjects are quite often the grammatical sub­
jects of the sentence that is the referent (i.e., subject verb 
object). There will be some cases, however, where it will be 
more prudent to identify the direct or indirect object of a re­
ferent as the referent subject. Consider example 11 (Table 2): 
"The abortion issue burns me up (because . . .)." What is 
being explained here? Certainly not the behavior, personality 
or affect of an issue: it is more likely that "my" anger over 
the issue is being accounted for. Thus, the referent subject 
is "me." We can make this a little more complex: suppose I 
say, "Jane burns me up (because . . .) ." I could conceivably 
be trying to explain Jane's behavior ("Jane burns me up because
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Table 2
Examples of Referent Subjects
REFERENT REFERENT SUBJECT3 R.S. CATEGORY15
1 . She can't do a thing 
with her hair.
She Other(s)
2 . I'm at my wits' end. I Self
3. You should say no to 
her.
You Other(s)
4. Johnny is never on 
time.
Johnny Other(s)
5. We can't get alone. We Both
6. Several people called 
us.
Several people Other(s)
7. Our marriage is on the 
rocks.
Our marriage Both
8 . He should not be blamed 
for his misdeed.
Blamer/s 0ther(s)
9. Tell me what to do. You Other(s)
1 0 . Going to his house would 
be unfair to his wife.
★ *
1 1 . The abortion issue 
burns me up.
Me Self
1 2 . He said she is a snob. ★ Other(s)
aThe terms in this column are the ones you would write in after the 
words "Referent Subject" on your rating sheet.
^The terms in this column are the ones you would circle on your rat­
ing sheet. Remember that there are three possible choices: Self, 
Other(s), and Both.
★
These are ambiguous examples. See pages 119 and 121 for discussions 
of these problems.
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she likes to see me lose my cool") or I could be explaining my 
own emotions as caused by an external force ("Jane burns me up 
because she is so stuck-up"). This can get somewhat ambiguous 
and may depend, in part, on how you see the referent in relation 
to its context (the entire explanatory statement). As such, 
this case resembles the following type of nonobvious example.
5. Two or more possible subjects. Sometimes a referent will be worded 
in such a way as to have two or more plausible subjects, and it 
will not necessarily be clear which is the real subject. Look 
at the example 12 (Table 2): "He said she is a snob." Who is 
the subject? Is it the "he" who is saying something ("he said 
it because . . ."), or is it the "she" whose personality is in 
question ("she is a snob because . . .")? The answer may lie 
in the explanation. If the full explanatory statement is "He 
said she is a snob because he was upset," then "he" seems to be 
the correct subject. If it is, "He said she is a snob because 
she always ignores blue-collar workers," then "she" is appar­
ently the more appropriate subject. But if the statement is 
"He said she is a snob because she insulted him," the subject is 
still ambiguous and you have to make an educated guess.
Categorizing referent subjects. After you fill in the blank fol­
lowing "Referent Subject," the last rating task is to circle one of the 
three choices which describe the referent subject: self, other(s), or 
both (see the Referent Subject Rating Sheet).
Self is the appropriate choice if the referent subject is also 
the author of the explanatory statement. If the writer is explaining 
himself or herself, the referent subject will be "I" or "me" or some 
equivalent. You should therefore circle "Self" (see examples 2 and 11, 
Table 2).
Other(s) is the appropriate choice if the author is accounting 
for a referent subject who is another person or other persons. If the 
referent subject is a you, he, she, they or equivalent (Mr. Jones, the 
Smiths, Joe, etc.), circle "Other(s)" (see examples 1, 3, 4, 6, 8 , 9 
and 12 in Table 2).
The both category is for "we" and "us." Whenever the referent 
subject includes both the author/self and at least one other person, 
circle "Both" (see examples 5 and 7 in Table 2).
Interrater Agreement
Referent subjects will be identified by a pair of raters. When 
each individual rater has completed rating all of the explanatory 
statements, the two will compare their ratings.
The rating team should go through each explanatory statement and 
compare notes. Whenever there is disagreement about a referent subject
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of any kind (identity of subject, category, or both), raters should 
discuss it and resolve it one way or the other. For instance, consider 
"He said she is a snob": suppose one rater identifies "he" as the sub­
ject and the other rater identifies "she," but both circle "Other(s)." 
These two raters would discuss this until they reached agreement on 
whether "he" or "she" is the subject. Since they agree on the category 
of "Other(s)," this needs no discussion.
There is no time limit for discussion and resolution of disagree­
ments.
When there is a disagreement and a resolution is reached, use a 
red pen or marker to correct the incorrect rating. (Obviously, raters 
should not make their initial ratings in red.)
When all ratings are compared and completed, turn in both raters' 
Referent Subject Rating Sheets, with corrections noted in red.
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B. Components of Referents
What kinds of personal events do people seek to explain? In 
order to answer this question, we will look at referents and sort them 
into various categories. Our first job will be to define the kinds of 
components; then we will discuss how to use these definitions to cate­
gorize referents.
Definitions
Overview. Before defining the categories explicitly, let's take 
a look at the broad structure of the classification system (see Table 3 
on the following page). There three large categories which organize 
eight smaller categories: the three are (a) Enduring Personal Charac­
teristics, (b) Transient Personal Characteristics, and (c) Contextual 
Characteristics. Next, there are eight smaller categories distributed 
among the three larger categories (see Table 3). These smaller cate­
gories are the ones you will actually use in classifying referents. 
Finally, after a referent is assigned to one of the eight classifica­
tions, you will further characterize it as prescriptive or descriptive 
(see below).
Thus, there are three levels of classification, although you will 
actually use two. The first level of three large categories helps you 
to organize your thinking and narrow your search among smaller categories. 
The second involves selecting one of the eight smaller categories as 
best fitting the referent. The third level is an either-or choice: 
it's either descriptive or prescriptive.
Now, let's define the various categories more explicitly. Use 
Table 4 (page 125) as a guide.
1. The first large category is Enduring Personal Characteristics. 
As the title suggests, this large category deals with events which are 
(a) personal, that is, referring to individual persons (including one­
self) rather than to interpersonal relationships or personal situations, 
and (b) relatively long-term, enduring characteristics. We use the 
term "relatively" because there are few (if any) personal characteris­
tics that cannot change over the long run. Some are, however, more 
enduring than others. Social identities, personal dispositions and 
physical characteristics are generally more enduring than moods and 
emotions, single behaviors, and drives or motives. Let's look more 
closely at the small categories encompassed by Enduring Personal Charac­
teristics.
First, there are social identity elements. These are categories 
or groups to which a person is socially recognized as belonging, and 
cover behavior that is consistent and determined social1y , that is, by 
forces external to the person. These include such universal social
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Table 3
Classification System for Referents
Enduring Personal Characteristics 
Social Identity Elements 
Personal Dispositions 
Physical Characteristics 
Transient Personal Characteristics
Behavi ors Descri pti ve/Prescri pti ve
Affective States 
Motivational States 
Contextual Characteristics
Interpersonal Relationships 
Personal Situations9
aThis category was added after raters had used the previous seven cate­
gories to classify referents. Its addition is due to our finding that 
a number of referents did not fit any of the previous categories, but 
all seemed to refer to a person's current, past or future situation.
We have added it here and in our manual for future users of this clas­
sification system.
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Table 4
Examples of Categories of Referents
Descriptive Prescriptive
Social
Identity
He is a Mormon be­
cause . . .
He ought to be a 
Jaycee because . . .
Personal
Disposition
She is aggressive 
because . . .
Be patient because . . .
Physical
Characteristic
You are muscular 
because . . .
He should be thin 
because . . .
Behavior I was fighting 
because . . .
You should have kept 
trying because . . .
Affective
State
We were ecstatic 
because . . .
Stop being depressed 
because . . .
Motivational
State
I want your advice 
because . . .
She shouldn't be thirsty 
because . . .
Interpersonal
Relationship
Our marriage is very 
good because . . .
The party should have 
been a success be­
cause . . .
Personal
Situation
I live in Oregon 
because . . .
I shouldn't come in for 
such abuse because . . .
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statuses as sex, age, occupation, social class, and so on; membership 
groups, including ethnic, religious, political, racial, and interest 
groups; and social labels, like alcoholic (used as a noun), thief, 
philanthropist, doctor, lawyer and Indian chief. There may be some 
overlap between social identity elements and personal dispositions (see 
below) that are social in nature (e.g., "martyr" vs. "self-sacrificing"), 
so be alert.
Second, there are personal dispositions, traits or behavioral 
tendencies. These are abstract labels for behaviors which are consis­
tent over time and across situations, and which are determined from 
within the person, i.e., by an inferred personality structure or pro­
cess. Dispositions often take the form of adjectives (e.g., outgoing, 
friendly, sneaky) and nouns (e.g., Don Juan, snake, extrovert). We have 
already noted that there is a fine line between trait nouns and social 
identities; you will have to use your judgment and the definitions of 
the two categories when you make your rating. Be careful not to con­
fuse less enduring characteristics (like affects, behaviors and motiva­
tional states) with enduring dispositions. Examples: "she's depressed" 
(affect) vs. "she's depressive" (disposition); "he was outgoing at the 
party" (behavior) vs. "he's an outgoing guy" (disposition); "he was 
hungry" (motivational state) vs. "he's a hungry type" (disposition).
Finally, there are physical characteristics, which include rela­
tively long-term aspects of physique, appearance and so on (e.g., muscu­
lar, fat, handsome). Do not include short-term physical aspects like 
manifestations of mood ("he blushed"), behavior ("she was out of breath 
from running") or motives ("his stomach was growling"); note that this 
and the previous two examples would all be classified as behaviors; 
see below.
2. The large category of Transient Personal Characteristics is 
like the first large category in that it deals with events that refer 
to individual persons and not to interpersonal or impersonal situa­
tions. It is unlike the first large category in that it deals with 
relatively short-term characteristics, personal events which have a 
perceivable beginning and end (or at least an inferrable beginning and 
a foreseeable finish). Transient events have a kind of on/off quality 
that enduring events don't seem to have. Let us consider the three 
kinds of Transient Personal Characteristics.
First, there are behaviors. Behaviors are actions and personal 
occurrences, things people do. There are many modalities of be­
haviors, including perceptual ("He saw the sign"), cognitive/ideational 
("He thought . . .", "She imagined . . ."), motoric ("She ran";
"She picked the book up"), reflexive/involuntary ("her stomach growled"; 
"He tripped and fell"), verbal ("He said . . ."; "She yelled") and 
interpersonal ("They danced"). We are looking for accounts of past, 
present or future behaviors that do not make a leap into abstraction 
and infer enduring statuses and dispositions ("He runs" vs. "He is a 
runner"; "She was friendly to me" vs. "She is friendly"). Note that
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qualifiers like "always" and "never" do not a disposition make. "He 
always runs" is still a behavior, but "He is a mover" comments on the 
person himself.
Next we have affective states. These are moods, emotions and 
feelings ("I felt good"; "She was mad"; "You'll be sorry"). Note that 
we are talking about mood and emotional states and not behaviors that 
accompany them. If I say "He was sad and he cried," the first part is 
an affective state and the second is a behavior. Also, affective states 
are more or less transient; anything that sounds like an emotion or 
has emotional overtones but refers to a stable disposition is either a 
social identity or a personal disposition (compare "She is depressed" 
with "She is a mental case of psychotic depression" or "She is depres­
sive" ).
Finally, there are motivational states. These are needs, drives, 
motives and intentions, all of which are states which are terminated 
or alleviated, at least temporarily or partially, upon attaining some 
goal or end. Motivations can be physiological ("he is hungry"), psycho­
logical ("He wants to be effective"), or interpersonal ("She needed a 
hug"). Motviations can be chronic, as in the hunger of a starving man, 
but they always have some potential finish that could alleviate or 
terminate the state. Again, if motives are described as enduring, not 
in the sense of chronic, but as a social identity ("She's a beggar") or 
personal disposition ("She's dependent"), then they are not really mo­
tives.
3. The last of the three large categories is Contextual Charac­
teristics. These are events that refer to contexts or situations, which 
may be interpersonal (a marriage, a date, a crowd) or personal (a life 
situation, a personal space). There are two smaller categories of Con­
textual Characteristics.
First, we have interpersonal relationships. This refers to a 
situation involving more than one person in some kind of relationship.
It does not refer to identities, dispositions, behaviors, motives, etc., 
of individuals in a group. In other words, a "we" does not automat­
ically signify an interpersonal relationship. Consider this: "We are 
married. Our relationship is on the rocks. We fight all the time.
We are both sad a lot." The first two sentences refer to interpersonal 
relationships, the third to behaviors (of two people) and the last to 
their affect states.
Second, there are personal situations. These involve a person's 
context or existence in a particular setting, environment or place.
The emphasis is not on someone doing, feeling, having a role, etc., in 
a particular situation, but on the situation itself. Consider this:
"The university is my home." You could conceivably rate this as a 
behavior ("being at" a place, making a home), but the person is 
really describing his or her situation. Contrast this example with 
the following: "I am a student at the university" (social identity;
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"I attend classes at the university" (behavior); and "I feel at home 
at the university" (affective state).
OK, we have now defined two of the three levels of categories 
of referents: the three large categories and the eight smaller cate­
gories. Let's look at the third level.
A referent can be presented in two ways, regardless of whether 
it is a social identity, personal disposition, physical characteristic, 
behavior, affective state, motivational state, interpersonal relation­
ship or personal situation. The first is the descriptive mode: a be­
havior, mood, situation, disposition, etc., is described, characterized, 
portrayed, interpreted. The second mode is prescriptive: events are 
accompanied by shoulds, oughts and their equivalents. Thus: "He saw a 
doctor" vs. "He should have seen a doctor"; "She will never consent to 
it" vs. "She must never consent to it"; "I am running" vs. "I ought to 
be running." Note that occasionally a "should" is implied or unstated: 
"See a doctor" is equivalent to "You should see a doctor."
One last note before we consider how to classify referents. The 
eight smaller categories and the descriptive/prescriptive distinction 
refer equally to past, present and future events. Thus, it makes no 
difference if he ran, he is running, he will run, he should have run, 
he should be running, or he ought to run tomorrow. They are all in 
the category of behaviors; some are descriptive, some are prescriptive. 
The verb tense is irrelevant.
Instructions for Classifying Components
Two raters will work on the task of classifying referents. The 
first part of the job is to make individual ratings. The second is to 
compare notes, and come to an agreement in cases where the two raters 
di sagree.
Making ratings. Individual raters should, of course, be very 
familiar with the categories that they will use. So this is a rater's 
first responsibility.
Raters will receive a set of explanatory statements from advice 
columns, each one on a separate sheet. Each sheet will contain the 
following information: (a) an excerpt from the advice column which 
contains an explanatory statement; (b) a reformulation of the explana­
tory statement into "REFERENT because EXPLANATION" form; and (c) an 
indication of whose behavior, mood, etc. is contained in the referent.
Ratings will be marked on the 'Referents Rating Sheet." This 
form contains (a) a blank for the code number of the explanatory state­
ment being rated; (b) a listing of the eight smaller categories to be 
used to classify the referent; and (c) a choice between "descriptive" 
and "prescriptive" for the referent.
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The first step is to write down the code number of the explana­
tory statement you are working on. Now look at the referent. Decide 
which of the eight categories it best fits, and circle the appropriate 
choice. If a referent is compound, that is, if it covers two categories 
or more (e.g., "He is a friendly Democrat"; "She was happy and did an 
impromptu dance"), circle the appropriate choices.
Next decide whether the referent is in the descriptive or prescrip­
tive mode. Circle the D or P located beneath the category (or cate­
gories) you selected above.
Comparing notes. After the raters have completed all excerpts, 
they will go through their "Referents Rating Sheets" and compare notes. 
Whenever there is a disagreement of any kind, raters should discuss it 
and resolve it one way or the other. There is no time limit for this 
discussion and resolution.
When there is disagreement and resolution, use a red pen or 
marker to correct the incorrect rating. (Do not make your initial rat­
ings in red.) When all ratings are compared and completed, turn in both 
raters' "Referents Rating Sheets," with corrections noted in red.
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C. Components of Explanations: Locus and Stability
In the preceding section we sorted referents into various cate­
gories. Now we will turn our attention to the other half of an ex­
planatory statement: the explanation.
We are interested in two characteristics of explanations. First, 
when a cause is cited, is it located internal to the actor, in some ex­
ternal circumstances, or in some relationship the actor has with another 
person? Second, is the cause stable (enduring) or unstable (variable)? 
The first part of this section is concerned with locus of causation, 
and the second with stability of causes.
1. Locus of causation
This study is interested in the causes people give for what we 
have termed personal events. The referents of all of our explanatory 
statements 'are personal events, and in the previous section of this 
manual we said that there were eight categories of referents: social 
identities, personal dispositions, physical characteristics, behaviors, 
affective states, motivational states, interpersonal relationships, 
and personal situations. Thus, we are looking at explanations of a 
person's (or persons') behaviors, moods, etc. We will call this person 
the actor. (Note that we are not concerned, at this point, about the 
identity of the person who is offering the explanation; we are inter­
ested in the person who is being explained.)
One way of categorizing explanations refers to locus of causa­
tion. This is illustrated in Table 5. Let's look at each type of 
causal explanation more closely.
Explanations can focus on some process or characteristic internal 
to the actor. That is, the actor's personal events are seen as due to 
something which is inseparable from the actor, something about the ac­
tor, something inherent in the actor. All of the following could be 
cited as internal causes: abilities and capacities, efforts, motiva­
tions, enduring personal characteristics (including traits, roles, 
physique,temperament, etc.), and transient psychological states (in­
cluding behaviors and affects). Examples are given in Table 5.
Explanations can, alternatively, emphasize events external to 
the actor. Personal events can be seen as caused not by the actor but 
by the situation or circumstances or other people. The following are 
examples of external explanations: task difficulty, characteristics 
of the physical setting, coercion, social influence, outside interven­
tion, accident, chance, luck, and so on.
There is a third kind of explanation which involves interper­
sonal factors. The reason or cause for some personal event can be
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Table 5
Examples of Three Types of Locus of Causation
INTERNAL EXTERNAL INTERPERSONAL
..because he has a 
tremendous capacity 
for work.
..because the job was 
so simple.
..because my wife 
doesn't love me any 
more
..because she is 
intelligent.
..because her mother 
made her work hard.
..because we cooper­
ated.
..because she tried 
the hardest.
..because of sheer 
luck.
..because you and I 
see eye-to-eye.
..because I wanted to. ..because the path was 
quite rough.
..because they are in 
love.
..because you are too 
heavy.
..because it was so 
warm in there.
..because they have a 
rotten marriage.
..because he is a 
lucky guy.
..because of an 
accident.
..because I can't make 
it without her.
..because I am shy. ..because people 
intimidate me.
..because we didn't hit 
it off.
..because he was 
hopping mad.
..because she insulted 
him.
..because she and her 
dad always fight.
..because he lifted it 
too high.
..because it was God's 
will.
..because we al1 
refused to go.
Note: for internal examples, assume the person cited as a cause is the 
person who is being explained;
for external examples involving persons, assume that the caus­
al person is not the person who is being explained; 
for interpersonal causes, assume that at least one of the per­
sons involved is the person who is being explained.
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attributed to an actor's involvement with another person, to a relation­
ship. Thus, the explanation is not internal, because another person is 
involved; nor is it external, because the actor cannot be left out or 
excluded. The explanation encompasses a "we." Note that there are 
certain kinds of internal and external explanations which look interper­
sonal but which really aren't. On the internal side, if I say that 
person A did such-and-such because he is friendly, I am referring to a 
trait that directs his behavior when he is around other people. I am 
not referring, however, to his relationship to a particular person or 
group. Social traits are internal causes. On the external side, I can 
say that person A did such-and-such because person B had a gun on A or 
because B jostled A. In this case, person A's behavior is a result of 
person B as an external force, and not to some relationship in which 
the contributions of A and B are intertwined. Again, refer to Table 5 
for examples of these types of explanations.
Rating task. Raters will first categorize explanations as inter­
nal, external or interpersonal. This classification will be done by 
raters individually. Next, raters will compare notes and compute a per­
cent agreement. Finally, disagreements will be discussed and resolved, 
with no time limit.
The actual rating is fairly simple. The rating sheet will require 
judges to circle the appropriate choice (internal, external, interper­
sonal) for each explanatory statement. In cases of compound explana­
tions involving more than one kind of locus (example: I went to the 
party because I was invited and also because I'm naturally outgoing), 
circle more than one choice.
2. Stability of Causes
Causes of personal events can vary in their stability. Some causes 
will involve stable, enduring characteristics of the actor, the situa­
tion, or a relationship; other causes will be relatively unstable and 
variable. There will also be causes of uncertain stability, for which 
it is difficult to make a determination of stability or instability.
As we shall see, the task in this section is to rate explanations 
as stable or unstable. Cases of uncertain stability will require some 
thinking through, but they should, in the end, be categorizable. Table 
6 takes the examples from Table 5 and classifies them according to 
their stability. Now, let's define more explicitly the terms stable 
and unstable.
Stable causes are those that are relatively long-term and endur­
ing. A stable cause is one you would expect to see operating in the 
future in the same way that it is operating now or has operated in the 
past. Stable causes can be internal to the actor; they can be features 
of the situation or context; and they can involve interpersonal re­
lationships. Examples of stable causes include all enduring personal
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Table 6
Examples of Two Types of Stability of Causes
STABLE UNSTABLE
..because he has a tremendous 
capacity for work.
..because she tried the hardest.
..because she is intelligent. ..because I wanted to.
..because you are too heavy. ..because he was hopping mad.
..because he is a lucky guy. ..because he lifted it too high.
. .because I am shy. ..because of sheer luck.
..because the job was so simple. ..because it was so warm in there.
..because her mother made her 
work hard.
..because of an accident.
..because the path was so rough. ..because she insulted him.
..because people intimidate me. ..because we cooperated.
..because it was God's will. ..because we didn't hit it off.
..because my wife doesn't love 
me anymore.
..because you and I see eye- 
to-eye.
..because they are in love.
..because they have a rotten 
marriage.
..because I can't make it with­
out her.
..because she and her dad always 
fight.
..because we all refused to go.
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characteristics (abilities and capacities; most roles and social iden­
tities; personality traits; intelligence; physique and long-term physi­
cal characteristics; and motives that have an enduring, trait-like qual­
ity), all enduring aspects of social and physical situations (task 
difficulty; unvarying, long-term social influences; and relatively un­
changing aspects of the physical environment), and stable interpersonal 
relationships (past, present and future) or aspects thereof.
Unstable causes are those that are relatively changeable, vari­
able, or short-term. An unstable cause is one which you would expect to 
have changed or stopped operating in the future, which has been variable 
or inconsistent in the past, or which you believe would have a low-to- 
medium probability of operating in a stable fashion. Like stable causes, 
unstable causes can be internal, external, or interpersonal. Examples 
of unstable causes include transient personal characteristics (effort; 
moods and emotions; short-term motives; and isolated behaviors and be­
haviors that are not characteristic, nor part of a trait-like pattern), 
short-term or variable aspects of the social or physical context (luck, 
chance and accident; unexpected or unusual circumstances; short-term so­
cial influences; and changing or variable aspects of the physical world), 
and unstable personal relationships or any variable aspects of relation­
ships.
Many of the explanations that are to be rated will cite causes 
that are clearly stable or unstable. Others will be less obvious. In 
these latter cases, use two strategies to assist in your decision-making.
(a) Rather than think about stability/unstability in absolute, 
either-or fashion, consider this dimension in a relative, 
more-or-less way. That is, ask yourself, "Does this cause 
seem more stable than unstable?" and vice versa.
(b) Think in terms of the future. Would you expect a cited cause 
to be likely to be operating, unchanged, in the future? Or 
would you see this cause as having changed or ceased later 
on?
The answers to these two types of question may be implicit in the word­
ing of an explanatory statement. Look for clues. You may occasionally 
have to make an educated guess about stability, however.
Rating task. Raters will, individually, categorize explanations 
as stable or unstable. Next, raters will compare notes and compute a 
percent agreement. Finally, disagreements will be discussed and re­
solved, with no time limit.
The actual rating is fairly simple. The rating sheet requires 
judges to circle the appropriate choice (stable, unstable) for each 
explanatory statement. If a compound explanation should involve both 
stable and unstable causes (e.g., he won because he is very smart and 
he tried hard), circle both.
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D. Types of Explanations: Causes and Reasons
Philosophers and psychologists have pointed out that there are 
two types of explanations that people offer for personal events: causes 
and reasons. This section defines these terms and provides a set of in­
structions for rating explanations as causes or reasons.
Definitions
Causes. A cause involves explanation without justification: 
"behavior simply follows from its causes, whether justified or not."* 
Causes explain behavior as "the automatic or inevitable outcome of a cer­
tain complex of conditions." Thus, causal explanations are general, regu­
lar, and perhaps predictable antecedent-consequent relationships. This 
is the type of explanation favored by professional scientists, including 
psychologists. Naive or implicit psychologists can, too, cite causes in 
a quasi-scientific manner.
Reasons. A reason is an explanation via justification. "Reasons 
explain intentional behavior . . .  by showing it to be what any rational 
agent would do, given the relevant beliefs and desires." Justification 
is used in a broad sense; it includes not only justification based on 
moral or ethical principles, but also justification of a behavior as 
rational, that it, "correct, appropriate or sensible from the agent's 
point of view." Agents know the reasons for their behaviors, and these 
reasons may be idiosyncratic (they could also be general and normative, 
however).
Causes and reasons compared. Causes and reasons are similar in 
that they are both explanations; as such, they can refer to one's own 
behavior or to that of other Deople; they can be psychological (inter­
nal) or situational (external), and they can be stable or unstable.
We are more interested, however, in differences between causes 
and reasons, since we are setting out to categorize explanations as one 
or the other. Table 7 outlines the differences, and Table 8 supplies 
examples. The most basic and general distinction between causes and 
reasons revolves around the issue of justification. The clearest ways 
in which reasons are different from causes are twofold: reasons are 
always known (never unknown) to agents, and reasons explain only inten­
tional behaviorl"! (Note that causes may be known or unknown to the 
agent, and may refer to both intentional and unintentional behaviors.)
It follows, too, that if an explanation involves unintended behaviors
*A11 quotations are from D. Locke & D. Pennington, Reasons and other 
causes: Their role in attribution processes. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 1982, 42^ , 212-23. These authors' usage of the 
term behavior corresponds to this manual's personal events; acjervt cor­
responds to actor.
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Table 7
Different Characteristics of Causes and Behavior
CAUSES REASONS
Explanation without justifica­
tion.
Explanation via justification.
May be unknown to agent, dif­
ficult to uncover.
Always known to agent.
Explain accidents and occur­
rences as well as intentional 
behaviors.
Explain only intentional behaviors 
(actions)..
General and regular causal 
connections.
May be idiosyncratic to agent.
Automatic, inevitable, often 
predictable result of ante­
cedent condition(s).
Based on rationality (what any ra­
tional agent would, could or 
might do); a rational, sensible 
or appropriate act from the 
agent's point of view.
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Table 8
Examples of Causes and Reasons
CAUSE REASON
He knocked her down 
because
the bus suddenly 
stopped.
she insulted his man­
hood.
I went to the store 
because
I was kidnapped. we needed milk.
He is a thief 
because
he had a twisted 
childhood.
he doesn't care for 
hard work.
I choose to walk 
because
I have a driving 
phobia.
it is good exercise.
They always fail 
because
society is against 
them.
they prefer to be 
taken care of.
We need your advice 
because
nothing else has 
helped.
we want to do the 
right thing.
He became president 
because
he was driven by a 
lust for power.
it was his life's 
ambition.
I am happy because my wife just had a 
baby.
I don't let little 
things bother me.
and/or cites causal conditions unknown to the agent, it must be a cause 
and not a reason.
Making Ratings
The rating sheet for causes and reasons (see p. 139) structures 
your decision about whether explanatory statements contain causes or 
reasons by asking four questions. You will answer these questions prior 
to making your final decision; your answers will help to determine the 
choice that you make. Let us briefly look at each of these guiding 
queries.
Justification? The full form of this question is as follows:
Does the explanation that is offered involve some kind of justification?
Remember that we are using the term justification in a broad sense. 
It is not restricted to moral or ethical correctness; it includes jus­
tification of a behavior as correct, appropriate or rational from the 
agent's point of view. Note, too, that the question is not "Do you think 
the agent's behavior was justified, correct, what you would do?" You 
have to take the role of the agent and decide whether the act was jus­
tified in his/her view.
If you answer "No" to this question, it would suggest that the 
explanation is a cause.
If you answer "Yes" to this question, it would suggest that the 
explanation is a reason.
If the explanation is ambiguous, if you are very unsure or cannot 
decide whether justification is involved, you should circle the ? option.
Agent's awareness? Full form: Is the agent aware of the fac­
tors that are being cited to explain his/her behavior?
Your answer to this question will be your estimate about whether 
or not the agent consciously knows about the particular factors cited, 
in the explanation, as influencing his/her behavior. Remember to check 
ratings of the Referent Subject (made previously) to be sure you have 
the correct agent in mind.
If your answer to this question is "No," it would suggest that 
the explanation is a cause.
If your answer to this question is "Yes," it could suggest either 
a cause or a reason, although a reason is probably favored.
Use the ? option for ambiguous cases.
Intentional referent? Full form: Is the personal event described 
in the referent of the explanatory statement an intentional action?
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RATING SHEET: CAUSES AND REASONS
Statement code: Justification? No 
Agent's awareness? No 
Intentional referent? No 
General/regular/normative? Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
?
?
?
?
CAUSE
REASON
I
P
E
S
Statement code: Justification? No Yes 7 CAUSE I E
Agent's awareness? No Yes 7
Intentional referent? No Yes 7 REASON P S
General/regular/normative? Yes No 7
Statement code: Justification? No Yes 7 CAUSE I E
Agent's awareness? No Yes 7
Intentional referent? No Yes ? REASON P S
General/regular/normative? Yes No 7
Statement code: Justi fication? No Yes 7 CAUSE I E
Agent's awareness? No Yes ?
Intentional referent? No Yes 7 REASON P S
General/regular/normative? Yes No 7
Statement code: Justification? No Yes 7 CAUSE I E
Agent's awareness? No Yes 7
Intentional referent? No Yes ? REASON P S
General/regular/normative? Yes No 7
Statement code: Justification? No Yes 7 CAUSE I E
Agent's awareness? No Yes ?
Intentional referent? No Yes 7 REASON P S
General/regular/normative? Yes No ?
Statement code: Justification? No Yes ? CAUSE I E
Agent's awareness? No Yes ?
Intentional referent? No Yes 7 REASON P S
General/regular/normative? Yes No 7
Statement code: Justi fication? No Yes 7 CAUSE I E
Agent's awareness? No Yes 7
Intentional referent? No Yes ? REASON P S
General/regular/normative? Yes No 7
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This question asks whether the referent involves an action over 
which the agent has volitional control, as opposed to an occurrence in­
volving no intent or control by the agent.
If you answer "No" to this question, it would suggest that the ex­
planation involves a cause.
If your answer is "Yes," it could suggest either a cause or a 
reason, although a reason is probably favored.
A choice of ? denotes a large amount of uncertainty.
General/regular/normative? Full form: Are the factors cited in 
the explanation general and regular, of the type you would expect to see 
operating in a similar fashion and with similar effects across agents, 
situations, or particular agent x situation interactions?
In this question you are asked to make a statement about the 
nomothetic or idiographic nature of the factors cited in the explanation. 
Does it seem "lawful" in a deterministic way? Or is the explanatory fac­
tor idiosyncratic to the agent?
If you answer "Yes" to the question about generality/regularity/ 
normativeness, then either a cause or a reason is suggested, although a 
cause is probably favored.
If you answer "No" to this question, a reason is suggested.
A ? suggests an uncertain or ambiguous state of affair^.
Putting the answers together. The four preliminary questions and 
their response choices (yes, no, ?) are arrayed in a column for each ex­
planatory statement. The pattern of responses to these queries will be 
an aid to your decision between a rating of "cause" or "reason." Note 
that the left column of responses is suggestive of causes and the middle 
column suggests reasons. In some cases, all responses may suggest a 
cause or a reason unequivocally. In other cases, there will be a mix 
or some missing information (? responses). In the latter eventuality, 
you will have to make your decision based on the evidence and your intui­
tion.
Rating procedure. Two judges will each, individually, rate all 
explanations as causes or reasons. Then they will compare notes, cal­
culate percent agreement, and resolve discrepancies via discussion.'
APPENDIX B
SCORING MANUAL: CONSISTENCY, DISTINCTIVENESS AND CONSENSUS 
INFORMATION IN THE NEWSPAPER ADVICE COLUMNS
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PART I. INTRODUCTION
A. OVERVIEW
The purpose of the present study is to see how people use support 
ing information to justify or clarify their explanations for their own 
or other people's behavior. This is actually a study which is part of 
an ongoing research project studying the newspaper advice columns. Last 
semester, student "raters" or "coders" went through a set of letters to 
the advice columns. Their job was to search for explanations of be­
havior. This semester student raters will be searching for certain 
pieces of information that support or clarify explanations.
Sometimes, pieces of information in the advice columns are vague 
or unclear. For this reason, we decided to use several raters or coders 
We can be relatively confident that we have located the correct pieces 
of information if several independent raters all locate the same items. 
This procedure will help us to insure that our data is clear and unam­
biguous.
If several raters all end up with the same data using this par­
ticular coding manual, then the manual is said to be Reliable. The par­
ticular type of reliability involved is called interrater reliability.
If the independent raters end up with different data, then the coding 
manual is not reliable, and we may have problems with the definitions of 
our terms or with the procedure we outline.
Although the raters who will be using this manual will be search­
ing the advice columns for information that supports explanatory state­
ments, it will be helpful for them first to understand what explanatory 
statements are:
B. EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS
People write into the newspaper advice columns with descriptions 
and explanations of their own and other people's problems and be­
haviors. A system for reliably identifying advice column explanations 
was developed by Thomas Schoeneman and Daniel Rubanowitz. This system 
is contained in the Scoring Manual: Explanatory Statements in the Ad­
vice Columns. The definitions and classifications for explanatory 
statements and their components which were used in this scoring manual 
will be presented in this section.
Let us first begin with some examples of explanatory statements:
1) She wants to be pregnant again because she believes it will 
be a valuable "learning experience" for her children.
2) For business reasons I cannot be seen in public with my lover.
143
3) Kathy's self-righteousness is beginning to bug me.
Explanatory statements contain two parts: an explanation and 
what is being explained. The explanation part is naturally called an 
explanation. That which is being explained is called a referent. Using 
the three examples from above, we can see how explanatory statements can 
be reduced or simplified to the form "referent because explanation."
1) REFERENT: She wants to be pregnant.
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: she believes it will be a valuable "learning 
experience" for her children.
2) REFERENT: I cannot be seen in public with my lover
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: of business reasons.
3) REFERENT: I'm beginning to be bugged
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: of Kathy's self-righteousness.
C. TYPES OF REFERENTS
There are three general types of referents: enduring personal 
characteristics, transient personal characteristics and contextual 
characteristics.
Enduring personal characteristics refer to relatively long-term, 
unchanging aspects of people. Referents in this category include social 
identity elements (e.g., He is a Mormon), personal dispositions (e.g., 
Joe is an aggressive person) and physical characteristics (e.g., Bill is 
tall).
Transient personal characteristics refer to relatively short term 
personal events. Referents in this category include behaviors (e.g.,
I was fighting with John), affective states (e.g., Bob was happy about 
the election results) and motivational states (e.g., Ed needs Sue's 
love).
Contextual characteristics refer to events that are not personal, 
but that are contextual, physical or impersonal. Referents in this cate­
gory include interpersonal relationships (e.g., We are happily married) 
or impersonal/physical contexts (e.g., The day was stormy).
D. TRANSIENT PERSONAL CHARACTERISTIC REFERENTS
Transient personal characteristic referents will be the focus 
of the present study because they possess one special property. They 
can be reduced or simplified in a certain way that makes them compatible 
with certain theories of social cognition.
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Specifically, this type of referent can be broken down into three 
components: the person, the verb and the stimulus. The person refers 
to who is performing or experiencing the behavior, affect or motivation 
in the referent. The verb refers to the behavior, affect or motivation 
itself. This term should be differentiated from the grammatical com­
ponent of a sentence referred to by the same name. The referent com­
ponent verb refers to al1 the words in the sentence that are necessary 
to specify the complete behavior, thought or feeling in the referent.
The stimulus refers to the target, recipient or focus of the verb. Here 
are a few examples:
1) John laughed at the comedian.
PERSON: John
VERB: laughed at
STIMULUS: the comedian
2) She was ecstatic about the movie.
PERSON: She
VERB: was ecstatic about
STIMULUS: the movie
3) I need to get some sleep.
PERSON: I
VERB: need to get
STIMULUS: some sleep
It is important to note that only transient personal characteris­
tics can be simplified to the form "person verb stimulus." The referent 
"Bill is very tall" (classified as an enduring personal characteristic) 
cannot be simplified in this way. "Bill" is the person and "is very 
tall" would be the verb. But, there really is no stimulus or target 
toward which Bill is behaving.
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PART 11. FORMING FULLY SIMPLIFIED REFERENTS
A. EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS OF INTEREST TO THE PRESENT STUDY
A set of explanatory statements was generated from a random sample 
of advice columns using the Scoring Manual: Explanatory Statements in 
the Advice Columns. Each explanatory statement was simplified to the 
form "referent because explanation." The referent refers to the be­
havior, thought, feeling, etc., which is being explained. The explana­
tion refers to the attribution, or "why" the behavior, thought, feeling, 
etc. occurred. This section of the present scoring manual is concerned 
only with the processing of referents.
Only certain types of referents are of interest in the present 
study. Part II.B. of the Scoring Manual: Explanatory Statements in the 
Advice Columns contains a procedure for classifying referents into one 
of three general categories: enduring personal characteristics, transi­
ent personal characteristics or contextual characteristics. This sec­
tion of the present scoring manual is concerned only with the processing 
of referents categorized as transient personal characteristics.
B. REFERENT COMPONENTS
The referents that were categorized as transient personal charac­
teristics can be simplified or reduced to the form "person verb stimu­
lus."
The "person" refers to who is performing the behavior in question.
The "verb" refers to the complete behavior being performed, such 
as thinking, feeling, acting, etc.
The "stimulus" refers to the target, recipient or focus of the 
behavior, and it could be a person, an object, or an event.
Here are two example referents and their components:
1) REFERENT: John laughed at the comedian.
PERSON: John
VERB: laughed at
STIMULUS: the comedian
2) REFERENT: Sue is afraid of the dog.
PERSON: Sue
VERB: is afraid of
STIMULUS: the dog
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C. VARIATIONS ON THE "PERSON"
Our two above examples illustrate referents that are relatively 
simple. In the advice columns many referents are quite complex and 
represent a variety of grammatical forms. Consider the following ex­
ample:
REFERENT: He said that she is a snob
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: he is quick to call people names.
This referent is in multi-subject form. Either "he" or "she" could be 
the referent subject or person. When the explanation is examined, how­
ever, it becomes apparent that "he" is the person. "He" is the person 
because it is his behavior that is being explained.
Part II.A. of the Scoring Manual: Explanatory Statements in the 
Advice Columns wi11 be used to locate the "person" in each referent. Tn 
addition to the multi-subject form just described, Part II.A. of the 
Scoring Manual: Explanatory Statements in the Advice Columns describes 
four other types of unusual referent subject forms. The person can be 
presented in the passive voice, as in "They should not be blamed for 
his misdeed." The person performing a behavior here is "the blamer."
The person can also be presented in the imperative, as in "Tell me what 
to do." The person performing the behavior is the implicit "you" as in 
"You tell me what to do." Sometimes the person occurs as part of a 
dangling participle, as in "Going to his house would be unfair to her." 
The person performing the behavior is that person who is going to the 
house in question. Finally, the referent person can show up an indirect 
object, as in "The abortion issue burns me up." Here, the person per­
forming the behavior is "me," as in "I" am burned up by the abortion 
issue."
D. VARIATIONS ON THE "STIMULUS"
1) IMPLICIT "STIMULUS" TYPES: Sometimes the stimulus is simply 
not presented in the referent. For example, consider the referent 
"John swims." "John" is the person, "swims" is the verb, but no 
stimulus is given. Obviously, John must swim somewhere. In order to 
determine the stimulus it will be necessary to examine the original 
advice column letter in which the referent appeared.
2) EVENTS AND GERUNDS
The focus or target of a behavior can sometimes be a verb (gram­
matical) or a verb form. For example, in the referent, "I enjoy jog­
ging alone," "I" is the person, "enjoy" is the verb, and the gerund 
"jogging" is the stimulus.
An example referent that has an event as its stimulus would be, 
"I am happy that you arrived." "I" is the person, "am happy that" is 
the verb and "you arrived" is the stimulus.
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3) MORE THAN ONE "STIMULUS":
Occasionally there is more than one target, recipient or focus 
of a person's behavior. For example, consider the following referent,
"I am cleaning the house for my mother." "I" is definitely the person. 
"Cleaning" could be the verb with "the house" as the stimulus. However 
"cleaning the house for" could be the verb with "my mother" as the 
stimulus. In order to determine the correct verb and stimulus it may 
be necessary to examine the original letter. If the particular letter 
is a discussion of various activities that are performed for one's 
mother, then the stimulus may be "the house," But if the letter dis­
cusses helping various people with their chores, errands or housework, 
then "my mother" may be the correct stimulus, problems in determining 
the correct stimulus can be dealt with by using the explanation, the 
statement excerpt or the original letter as a reference.
E. PROCEDURE
Before fully simplifying referents it is necessary to identify 
those referents that are relevant (e.g., transient personal characteris­
tics). Two steps will be involved in this process. First, the referent 
subject or the person will be identified in each referent. Second, 
transient personal characteristic referents will be identified. These 
two steps will be accomplished using Part II.A. and Part II.B., respec­
tively, of the Scoring Manual: Explanatory Statements in the Advice 
Columns. Once the appropriate set of referents have been located, a 
sample of fully simplified referents can be generated.
One team of two raters will fully simplify a random sample of 50 
referents in order to assess the reliability of the procedure. One 
rater only will fully simplify the remaining referents in the total 
sample. All raters will use the following procedure for simplifying 
referents:
1) Record the person obtained for each referent obtained from 
Part II.A. of the Scoring Manual: Explanatory Statements in 
the Advice Columns. This person will refer to who is per­
forming the behavior.
2) Locate an answer to the two following questions:
What is the complete behavior? (verb)
Who or what is the target, recipient or focus of the behavior? 
(stimulus)
These two questions must be entertained simultaneously because 
postential variations in the stimulus will result in varia­
tions of the verb.
3) If there is more than one answer to one or both of the ques­
tions in #2 , then refer to the explanation, statement ex­
cerpt and/or the original letter in order to determine the 
correct stimulus and verb.
4) The results of the two raters will be compared and the per­
centages of agreement (e.g., reliability) will be calculated
5) If there are any discrepancies between the two rater's re­
sults, then the discrepancies will be discussed and resolved 
one referent at a time. There will be no time limit on the 
discussions.
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PART III: TEST QUESTION FORMATION: CONSISTENCY, DISTINCTIVENESS AND 
CONSENSUS
In order to help ensure that raters will be searching for in­
stances of supporting information in a systematic manner, it will be 
necessary to provide them with a structured format. This manual will 
describe the procedure for formulating three questions, one for Consis- 
tency information, one for Pistinctiveness information and one for 
Consensus information. The raters will use these questions to test for 
the presence of each kind of supporting information as it relates to 
an explanatory statement in the advice columns.
A. REVIEW OF EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS:
Teams of student raters scanned the advice columns for explana­
tory statements using the Scoring Manual: Explanatory Statements in the 
Advice Columns. Using this manual, a reliable set of explanatory state- 
ments was generated. Each explanatory statement was reduced or sim­
plified to the following form:
REFERENT BECAUSE EXPLANATION
Referents can be categorized into three general types: enduring 
personal characteristics, transient personal characteristics and con­
textual characteristics (see Part II.B. of the Scoring Manual: Explana­
tory Statements in the Advice Columns). Only referents that are transi- 
ent personal characteristics are of interest in the present study.
B. REVIEW OF REFERENT COMPONENTS
Each referent of interest can be simplified to the form "person 
verb stimulus." The "person" refers to who is performing the behavior 
in the referent. The "verb" refers to the complete behavior being per­
formed. The "stimulus" refers to the target, recipient or focus of the 
behavior.
C. INFORMATION TYPES
The simplified referent components can be used to define three 
types of information.
Consensus information provides data on the variance of the term 
person. Consensus tells us about how many persons perform the same be­
havior as the referent person toward a given stimulus. Consensus infor­
mation can be outlined this way:
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PERSON A? 
PERSON B?
PERSON C? 
REFERENT PERSON
VERB' STIMULUS
A concrete example can be illustrated as follows:
REFERENT: Andrew is afraid of the dog.
PERSON: Andrew
VERB: is afraid of
STIMULUS: the dog
CONSENSUS INFORMATION: Ruth, Monica and Bruce are also (or, are
not also) afraid of the dog.
ANDREW 
RUTH? 
MONICA? 
BRUCE?
AFRAID OF- •THE DOG
Distinctiveness information provides data on the variance of the 
term stimulus. Distinctiveness tells us about how many target objects 
or persons are the focus of the given persons behavior (e.g., verb). 
Distinctiveness information can be outlined this way:
A 
B 
C
STIMULUS
PERSON- •VERB
?STIMULUS
?STIMULUS
?STIMULUS
REFERENT
Our example from above can be illustrated as follows:
REFERENT: Andrew is afraid of the dog.
DISTINCTIVENESS INFORMATION: Andrew is also afraid of (or, is
not also afraid of) beagles, ter­
riers, huskies and dachshunds.
ANDREW- -AFRAID OF
?BEAGLES
?TERRIERS
?HUSKIES
?DACHSHUNDS
Consistency information provides data on how frequently or how 
often the given person performed a given behavior (e.g., verb) toward 
the given stimulus, either in the past or across situations. Consistency 
information often involves the use of a modifier of the verb, such as 
"always," "sometimes" or "never." When there is variance of a behavior 
across situations, the various situations are usually listed. Our ex­
ample from above can be described as follows:
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REFERENT: Andrew is afraid of the dog,
CONSISTENCY INFORMATION: Andrew has always/never been afraid of
the dog in the past.
or
Andrew has always/never been afraid of 
the dog, either indoors, outdoors, or 
riding in the truck.
D. QUESTION FORMATION 
1. DEFINITIONS
In addition to person, verb and stimulus, three other terms need 
to be defined for question construction:
PERSON LABEL: Every person is a member of some category. If
the person is described in the referent just as 
an individual, then they belong to the category 
"people" or "others." If the person is described 
as belonging to some specific group then that 
group name can be invoked (e.g., men, Republicans, 
car owners, etc.). Since we are concerned here 
only with the behavior of organisms, there are 
no categories for objects or things under person 
label.
STIMULUS LABEL: Every stimulus also belongs to some category.
Unlike the person, the stimulus can be a thing 
or a human being. Things will belong to cate­
gories such as dogs, cats, movies, cities, air­
planes, etc. A human being will belong to cate­
gories in the same way as the person did (see 
PERSON LABEL).
VERB LABEL: Some, but not all verbs are behaviors which be­
long to a general behavioral category. For 
example, "giving someone $100 for their birthday" 
is part of the general category of "gift giving."
1) REFERENT COMPONENTS AND RAW FORM QUESTIONS
Once we have the three components of each referent identified, 
it is possible to construct questions which test for the presence of 
Consistency, Distinctiveness and Consensus information.
The "raw" forms for each of these questions are as follows:
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CONSISTENCY: How often in the past (or, in how many settings),
has (would, should) Person Verb (or Verb label) 
Stimulus (or Stimulus label)?
DISTINCTIVENESS: Toward (to, with) how many different Stimulus
Label does (would, should) Person Verb (or Verb 
label)?
CONSENSUS: How many other Person label (did, would, should)
Verb or (Verb label) Stimulus (or Stimulus label)?
E. EXAMPLES
The referent components obtained from the rater's use of Part II 
of this coding manual can be placed in the appropriate slot to form each 
question. The use of the "helper" verbs "did," "would" and "should" 
will ensure that each question is grammatically correct. The use of the 
Person label and the Stimulus label will enable questions to be formed 
which will address the variance across the person and the stimulus, 
respectively, since these are the definitions of Consensus and Distinctive­
ness, respectively. The Verb label will be used to help make sure each 
question makes sense and is consistent with the Person and Stimulus 
labels. Here are several examples:
1) REFERENT: Bill gave Ed fifty dollars for his graduation. 
AGENT: Bill
VERB: gave fifty dollars (e.g., gave a gift)
STIMULUS: Ed
CONSISTENCY: How often in the past (or, in how many set­
tings) has Bill given such a gift to Ed?
DISTINCTIVENESS: Toward how many different people does Bill 
give gifts?
CONSENSUS: How many other people (do, would) give such 
a gift to Ed?
2) REFERENT: My boyfriend liked my hair.
AGENT: My boyfriend
VERB: liked
STIMULUS: my hair
CONSISTENCY: How often in the past (or, in how many set­
tings) has my boyfriend liked my hair?
DISTINCTIVENESS: Toward how many different physical features 
of mine does my boyfriend express liking?
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CONSENSUS: How many other people (do, would) like my 
hair?
3) REFERENT: Mom said the movie was a rip-off.
AGENT: Mom
VERB: said was a rip-off
STIMULUS: the movie
CONSISTENCY: How often in the past (or, in how many set­
tings) has Mom said "it was a rip-off" about 
a movie?
DISTINCTIVENESS: Toward how many different movies does Mom 
say "it was a rip-off"?
CONSENSUS: How many other people (do, would) say "it 
was a rip-off" about the movie?
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PART IV: FINDING CONSISTENCY, DISTINCTIVENESS AND CONSENSUS
According to Harold Kelley's (1967) theory of attribution (e.g., 
how people attribute or explain the causes of behavior), people use 
three types of information along with explanatory statements: consis­
tency, distinctiveness, and consensus. The job of the raters in this 
part of the study is to find instances of these information types that 
are used to support, justify, defend or clarify explanatory statements. 
Before learning how to locate these information types in the advice 
columns, it will be necessary for the raters to be thoroughly familiar 
with them.
A. CONSISTENCY INFORMATION
This information type tells us about how frequent or repeatable 
a behavior has been in the past or in other settings. In general, it 
tells us how consistent the behavior has been. Behavior that a person 
has performed most of the time is said to have HIGH CONSISTENCY. Be­
havior that a person has performed relatively infrequently is said to 
have LOW CONSISTENCY.
Consider the following behavior (remember that a behavior is 
called a referent when it appears in an explanatory statement):
JOHN LAUGHED AT THE COMEDIAN.
If John laughed at the comedian most of the time in the past, his behavior 
would be high in consistency. In this case, consistency information 
might take this form:
JOHN HAS ALWAYS LAUGHED AT THE COMEDIAN.
If John laughed at the comedian relatively infrequently, then his be­
havior would be low in consistency. In this case, consistency informa­
tion might take this form:
JOHN HAS NEVER LAUGHED AT THE COMEDIAN.
The key words in the last two examples were "always" and "never," re­
spectively. Key words like these "clue us in" that we are being given 
information about the consistency of the behavior. Other key words 
that usually indicate consistency information are "rarely," "usually," 
"frequently," "occasionally," "sometimes," "habitually," "chronically," 
etc. Notice that some of these key words indicate high consistency 
(e.g., frequently), some indicate low consistency (e.g., rarely) and 
some are unclear (e.g., sometimes). Even if you cannot tell whether 
the information is high or low in form, it would still be consistency 
information if it tells you about the frequency of past behavior.
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The consistency of a behavior is sometimes revealed in the number 
of ways the behavior presents itself, or in the number of different set­
tings in which the behavior occurs. This type of consistency informa­
tion can be illustrated using our example "John laughed at the comedian. 
High consistency might be:
JOHN HAS LAUGHED AT THE COMEDIAN, WHETHER HE SAW HIM 
ON T.V., IN THE MOVIES, OR IN PERSON.
Low consistency might take this form:
JOHN DOES NOT LAUGH AT THE COMEDIAN, WHETHER HE SEES 
HIM ON T.V., IN THE MOVIES, OR IN PERSON.
Just for the sake of completeness, here is a list of instances of 
high consistency on John's behavior:
JOHN OFTEN LAUGHS AT THE COMEDIAN.
JOHN GENERALLY LAUGHS AT THE COMEDIAN.
JOHN USUALLY LAUGHS AT THE COMEDIAN.
JOHN LAUGHS AT THE COMEDIAN IN CLUBS, ON STAGE, OR AT 
THE MOVIES.
Here is a list of instances of low consistency on John's behavior:
JOHN RARELY LAUGHS AT THE COMEDIAN.
JOHN SELDOM LAUGHS AT THE COMEDIAN.
JOHN LAUGHS AT THE COMEDIAN ONLY ONCE IN A WHILE.
JOHN LAUGHS AT THE COMEDIAN IN PERSON, BUT NEVER WHEN 
HE'S ON STAGE OR IN THE MOVIES,
Finally, here is a list of general examples of consistency information 
as you might encounter them in the advice columns:
(high) - I ALWAYS KEEP MY CAR WELL POLISHED.
- EVERYTIME I WANT TO GO SOMEWHERE, SOMEONE IS 
SURE TO WANT TO RIDE ALONG.
- I ALWAYS FOLLOW THE YANKEES, WHETHER I HEAR ABOUT 
THEM ON THE NEWS, READ ABOUT THEM IN THE PAPER,
OR LISTEN TO THE GUYS AT WORK TALK ABOUT THEM.
(low) - YOUR WIFE RARELY PUTS UP WITH THIS.
- MY BOSS ENJOYS A BIG DINNER WHEN HE EATS OUT 
BUT AT HOME HE NEVER COOKS VERY MUCH.
- BILL HAS NOT ACCEPTED AN INVITATION FROM ME 
EVER SINCE MY DIVORCE.
The raters will not be required to tell the difference between high and 
low consistency when finding it in the advice columms, but being aware 
of the differences may be helpful.
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B. DISTINCTIVENESS INFORMATION
You will remember from before that the behaviors we are interested 
in can all be simplified to the form "person verb stimulus." Distinc­
tiveness information tells us about the number of different stimuli toward 
which a person performs a behavior (e.g., verb). LOW DISTINCTIVENESS 
information tells us that a behavior occurs for many different "stimuli."
PERSON •VERB
STIMULUS
STIMULUS
STIMULUS
STIMULUS
A
B
C
D
This can be illustrated with our example referent "John laughed at 
the comedian." Low distinctiveness might take this form:
JOHN LAUGHS AT MANY DIFFERENT COMEDIANS.
JOHN LAUGHS
COMEDIAN
COMEDIAN
COMEDIAN
COMEDIAN
A
B
C
D
John's behavior is low in distinctiveness because it occurs for many dif­
ferent stimuli.
HIGH DISTINCTIVENESS information tells us that a behavior occurs 
only for a specific stimulus.
PERSON VERB'
-STIMULUS A 
STIMULUS B 
STIMULUS C 
STIMULUS D
With the referent "John laughed at the comedian," high distinctiveness 
might take this form:
JOHN LAUGHS ONLY AT HIS FAVORITE COMEDIAN.
FAVORITE COMEDIAN 
COMEDIAN A
---  ------ COMEDIAN B
COMEDIAN C
Sometimes distinctiveness information is presented by simply listing 
the different stimulus toward which the behavior occurs. If the behavior 
occurs for the majority of the stimuli, then it is low in distinctiveness, 
as in:
At the party, John laughed at Bill's, Ruth's, Steve's and George's 
jokes.
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'S JOKES 
'S JOKES 
E'S JOKES 
GE'S JOKES
If the behavior occurs for the minority of the stimuli then it is high 
in distinctiveness, as in:
John laughed at Bill's jokes, but not at Ruth's, Steve's or George's 
jokes.
JOHN LAUGHED
BILL'S JOKES 
RUTH'S JOKES 
STEVE'S JOKES 
GEORGE'S JOKES
Using our example, "John laughed at the comedian," here are some 
general examples of distinctiveness information:
(low) - JOHN LAUGHED AT MANY COMEDIANS,
- JOHN LAUGHED AT VARIOUS COMEDIANS.
- JOHN LAUGHED AT ALL KINDS OF COMEDIANS,
(high) - JOHN LAUGHED AT NO OTHER COMEDIAN.
- JOHN LAUGHED AT ONE OF THE COMEDIANS.
- JOHN LAUGHED ONLY AT POLITICAL COMEDIANS.
Here are some examples of distinctiveness information as you might 
encounter them in the advice columns:
(Low) Someone is sure to call and invite me to play golf, 
go fishing, to a ball game, wrestling match or to 
play poker.
SOMEONE1 CALL AND INVITE
PLAY GOLF 
GO FISHING 
BALL GAME 
WRESTLING MATCH 
POKER GAME
(Low) I urge all mothers to listen to their children.
I
MOTHER A 
MOTHER B 
MOTHER C 
MOTHER D 
Etc.
All
mothers
(Low) Your kindness brightened not only the boy's life 
yours and your husband's as well.
but
YOU BRIGHTENED
BOY'S LIFE 
‘YOUR LIFE 
HUSBAND'S LIFE
(High) I guess I'm marching to the "union drummer" because it's 
the only drummer I have ever heard.
I AM MARCHING
UNION DRUMMER 
DRUMMER B 
DRUMMER C 
Etc.
All
other
drummers
(High) Bill changed his last name but kept his first and middle 
names the same.
BILL CHANGED
FIRST NAME 
MIDDLE NAME 
LAST NAME
(High) Sue is particularly afraid of big dogs, especially dober- 
man pinschers.
SUE AFRAID OF
DOBERMAN PINSCHERS 
BIG DOGS 
TYPE OF DOG C 
TYPE OF DOG D 
TYPE OF DOG E
All
other
kinds
of
dogs
Raters will not be required to identify whether the distinctiveness 
information is hign or low. But we are interested in locating all applic­
able instances of distinctiveness, so it may be helpful to understand the 
difference between high and low types.
There are times when it will not be easy to tell whether the dis­
tinctiveness information is high or low. For example:
I LIKE A NUMBER OF STRANGE FOODS.
In this case we do not know whether the distinctiveness is high or low. 
If the person had said, "I like all strange foods," the distinctiveness 
would be low. If the person had said, "I like few strange foods," the 
distinctiveness would be high. In any event, the words "a number of" 
in the above example do tell us something about the number of stimuli 
toward which the person performs the behavior (e.g., "liking"). 
Therefore, this example would count as distinctiveness information.
C. CONSENSUS INFORMATION
This type of information tells us about the number of other 
people, besides the referent person, who perform the same behavior.
It can also refer to the number of other people who would be expected
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to perform the same behavior. Just like consistency and distinctive­
ness, consensus information can be high or low. HIGH CONSENSUS would 
indicate that most other people perform (or would be expected to perform) 
the same behavior toward the stimulus:
PERSON 
PERSON 
PERSON 
PERSON
With our example, "John laughed at the comedian," high consensus infor­
mation might take this form:
EVERYONE LAUGHED AT THE COMEDIAN.
JOHN 
PERSON & 
PERSON C 
PERSON D
LAUGHED COMEDIAN
LOW CONSENSUS would indicate that few other people perform (or 
would be expected to perform) the same behavior:
PERSON A 
PERSON B 
PERSON C 
PERSON D
VERB •STIMULUS
With our example, "John laughed at the comedian," low consensus infor­
mation might take this form:
NO ONE ELSE BESIDES JOHN LAUGHED AT THE COMEDIAN.
LAUGHED----------- -— COMEDIAN
PERSON D
Sometimes the number of different persons performing the behavior are 
simply listed, as in:
JOHN- 
PERSON B 
PERSON C
JOHN, RUTH, STEVE AND GEORGE ALL LAUGHED AT THE 
COMEDIAN.
High
Consensus
JOHN 
RUTH 
STEVE 
GEORGE
LAUGHED COMEDIAN
Or,
JOHN LAUGHED AT THE COMEDIAN, BUT RUTH, STEVE AND 
GEORGE DID NOT.
LAUGHED COMEDIANLow RUTHConsensus STEVE 
GEORGE
Sometimes, the forms of consensus that involve expectations for 
others or for groups of others can be somewhat subtle. Again consider 
our example, "John laughed at the comedian":
PEOPLE GENERALLY LAUGH AT THE COMEDIAN.
People 
in
General
In this case, there is high consensus on John's behavior. Sup­
pose the information was:
ALTHOUGH PEOPLE GENERALLY DO NOT LAUGH AT THE 
COMEDIAN, JOHN DID.
JOHN 
PERSON A
PERSON B 
PERSON C
LAUGH* •COMEDIAN
JOHN- 
PERSON A 
PERSON B 
PERSON C
•LAUGH COMEDIAN
We know that "John laughed at the comedian" but the "People generally do 
not laugh at the comedian," therefore there is low consensus on John's 
behavior.
An even more subtle example might be:
HIGH CONSENSUS: Women are known to laugh at the comedian. 
LOW CONSENSUS: Women usually do not laugh at the comedian. 
Sometimes consensus information is not so subtle, as in:
HIGH CONSENSUS: Eighty-eight percent of the audience laughed 
at the comedian.
LOW CONSENSUS: Twenty-two percent of the audience laughed at 
the comedian.
One familiar type of consensus information that you have no doubt 
encountered in commercial advertising involves rates of "expert" testi­
mony, as in:
HIGH CONSENSUS: Four out of five critics laughed at the 
comedian.
LOW CONSENSUS: One out of five critics laughed at the comedian.
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Here are a number of general examples of consensus information 
as you might encounter them in the advice columns:
(High) Men shake hands as a matter of custom.
Men
in
General
MAN A 
MAN B 
MAN C 
MAN D
SHAKE HANDS WITH
Etc.
OTHERS
(High) I'm sure many people write to you to say how grateful 
they are:
PERSON 
Many PERSON
People PERSON
PERSON
(High) All four gynecologists who examined me said there is 
nothing physically wrong.
GYNECOLOGIST 1 
GYNECOLOGIST 2 
GYNECOLOGIST 3 
GYNECOLOGIST 4
SAID- •NOTHING IS PHYSICALLY WRONG
(Low) No one in Iowa has your accent.
IOWA RESIDENT A 
IOWA RESIDENT B 
IOWA RESIDENT C 
IOWA RESIDENT D
YOUR ACCENT
(Low) Few women share your dilemma.
Few
Women
WOMAN A 
WOMAN B 
WOMAN C 
WOMAN D 
WOMAN E
SHARE
Etc.
YOUR DILEMMA
(Low) Only 1l of children are known to lie.
99% OF CHILDREN 
1% OF CHILDREN- TELL LIES
As with Consistency and Distinctiveness, there will be times when 
it will be difficult to determine whether the consensus information is 
high or low. Since raters will not be required to identify whether the 
information is high or low, this difficulty is not crucial. Nonetheless,
162
it may be helpful to be aware of this difference between high and low 
types when trying to identify consensus in the advice columns. Here are 
some acceptable examples of consensus information that are not clearly 
high or low:
- Some of us simply believe in -doing things the hard way.
- There are definitely people in the world who like to do 
unkind things.
- Several participants rooted for the Twins.
- A certain percentage of people are afraid of public speaking.
D. FINDING SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS 
1. PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW
The purpose of the present study is to use a naturalistic source 
of social data, like the advice columns, in order to study how people 
use information (e.g., Consistency, Distinctiveness and Consensus) in 
order to support, clarify, defend or justify their explanations of be­
havior. Unfortunately, this type of information is very difficult to 
get at. There are many problems with wording, grammar and "figures of 
speech" that sometimes cause the explanations and the information types 
to become buried in the verbiage of the advice columns. Sometimes the 
explanatory statement and the information types are separated from the 
behavior by several sentences.
In order for the raters or coders to reliably locate (e.g., all 
raters finding the same thing) the correct data, they must first become 
totally familiar with the kinds of information types and how they relate 
to explanatory statements. In addition, the raters must be given suf­
ficient training and practice. This will help insure that all raters 
are competent and will help to catch potential problems before they can 
happen on the real experimental sample of advice columns. Some examples 
of the three information types in the advice columns are used for 
descriptive purposes only, and may or may not have anything to do with 
an explanatory statement. Since the reliability of this coding format 
is the "bottom line" of the present study, it is important for the 
raters to locate information types in a clear and unambiguous fashion. 
Also, it is important that each piece of supporting information be agreed 
upon by several independent raters. In view of these considerations, 
we have devised a structured procedure for finding information types.
The group of raters who will be using this coding manual will be 
working from a set of explanatory statements that were found by another 
group of raters. Each explanatory statement will be presented in its 
simplified form, "REFERENT BECAUSE EXPLANATION," as described earlier.
In addition, the excerpt from the advice column that contained the ex­
planatory statement will also be presented. The letter number and para­
graph number for each explanatory statement will also be presented. 
Finally, raters will be given the set of original advice column letters
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from which the explanatory statement was taken. The rater's job will 
be to re-locate the explanatory statement in the original letter, and 
then scour the letter for any pieces of supporting Consistency, Dis­
tinctiveness and Consensus information.
2) TEST QUESTIONS
To help structure the rater's search for supporting information, 
three specific questions will be presented with each explanatory state­
ment, one for each information type. Each question will be designed to 
test for the presence of the specific information type. The general 
form of the three questions will be as follows:
HOW CONSISTENT IS THE REFERENT BEHAVIOR?
HOW DISTINCTIVE IS THE REFERENT BEHAVIOR?
HOW MUCH CONSENSUS IS THERE ON THE REFERENT BEHAVIOR?
In the actual experimental sample, each question will be worded in ac­
cordance with the actual referent (e.g., "person verb stimulus") being 
explained. For instance, consider our previous example:
REFERENT: John laughed at the comedian.
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: he has a good sense of humor.
CONSISTENCY: How often in the past (or, in how many settings) has
John laughed at the comedian?
DISTINCTIVENESS: At how many different comedians does John laugh?
CONSENSUS: How many other people (do, would) laugh at the comedi­
an?
Here is another example:
REFERENT: Sue is afraid of the dog.
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: he's a vicious animal,
CONSISTENCY: How often in the past (or, in how many settings) has
Sue been afraid of the dog?
DISTINCTIVENESS: How many different dogs is Sue afraid of?
CONSENSUS: How many other people (are, would be) afraid of the
dog?
The rater's job will be to search the original advice column 
letter for answers to the three questions. In some cases, the same ex­
cerpt will contain several explanatory statements (and therefore several 
referents), each with its own set of questions. Each set will be
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presented on its own data sheet. Sometimes, the questions for two dif­
ferent explanatory statements will sound quite similar. It is impor­
tant that the rater search for answers to questions that relate to the 
specific referent. It is possible to get confused and search for an 
answer while holding a previous referent in mind. This is why the ques­
tions and explanatory statements will be presented on separate data 
sheets. This potential confusion also highlights the importance of 
carefully reading each excerpt, referent and explanation before begin­
ning to search for answers to the questions. Also, when searching 
through the original letter it will be helpful to re-read the referent 
and the question several times.
3. USING THE THREE TEST QUESTIONS
As stated earlier, some pieces of information are vague or im­
plied. It will be necessary for the rater to carefully consider each 
sentence in the letter to see if it is usable as an answer to one of the 
test questions. The three test questions are designed to be used only 
as a guide to help organize and structure a search for the three infor­
mation types. It will be helpful for each rater to be aware of how vari­
able the information types will be presented in actual advice column 
letters. Sometimes an instance of information will not be an exact 
answer to one of the questions. For this reason it is important for the 
raters to understand, in theory, what consistency, distinctiveness and 
consensus information are.
In the advice columns, the three types of supporting information 
are presented in various locations and frequencies. The information 
can show up before the explanation or referent, or it can show up after 
the explanation or referent, or it can even show up as part of the ex­
planation or referent. Supporting information types are frequently 
separated from the explanation or referent by several sentences. At 
times, several information types may be used to support a single explana­
tory statement (e.g., both Consistency and Distinctiveness may be used). 
Occasionally, the same information type may be used more than once 
(e.g., two instances of Consensus) for a single explanatory statement. 
Also, the same piece of information may be used to answer questions for 
different explanatory statements (e.g., one instance of Consistency in­
formation may be used to answer the consistency test questions for two 
or more explanatory statements. We are interested in collecting al1 
of these available pieces of supporting information. Finally, it is 
important to note that there are times when jto supporting information 
is used with an explanatory statement.
Since some collectible pieces of information are not exact 
answers to the test questions, it will be important for raters to be 
aware of the following variations.
a. REFERENT PLURALS
As noted above, a piece of supporting information may be part of 
the actual referent. Anytime a rater sees that the person in the referent
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is presented in plural form (e.g., People, Men, Teachers, Parents, 
Couples, They and I, Thousands of children, etc.) they should automat­
ically consider the possibility that this is an instance of consensus 
information. Here are two examples:
REFERENT: People get upset about the police
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: they are often incompetent.
REFERENT: Many of us uphold these principles
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: it says so in the Bible.
Similarly, any time a rater sees that the stimulus in the referent is pre­
sented in plural (e.g., others, people, mom and dad, a therapist or coun­
selor, these three items, etc.) they should automatically consider the 
possibility that this is an instance of distinctiveness information.
Here are two examples:
REFERENT: I have married my share of couples
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: I am a justice of the peace.
REFERENT: She is bothered by barking dogs
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: she has trouble concentrating.
Sometimes both the person and the stimulus in the referent are presented 
in plural form, so both consensus and distinctiveness should be con­
sidered. Here are two examples:
REFERENT: Men use women
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: they were raised to be that way.
REFERENT: Children must cope with frustrations
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: it is part of life.
A more subtle type of plural involves generalizations or norms. For ex­
ample:
REFERENT: The man should be the boss
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: it is expected.
In this case the man refers to men in general, so this would be consensus 
information. Here is another example:
REFERENT: I always thank the host
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: I feel better about myself when I do.
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In this case, the host refers to any host, so this would be distinctive­
ness information.
One exception to these rules about plurals involves the use of 
words like "we" or "them." For example:
REFERENT: We enjoy being married
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: it is right for us as a couple.
In this case, even though the person is in plural form, consensus would 
be present only if there was information about the number of other 
couples who also enjoy being married.
b. CONSISTENCY IN THE REFERENT
Consistency information can also be presented as part of the re­
ferent. This is usually signaled by the presence of some key word 
which reveals the variation of the referent behavior over time. Here 
are several examples:
- He continues to be aggravated by his boss.
- It is unusual for us to argue over money.
- Mi 11y rarely speaks for herself.
- Sue will never read your letter again.
- I always dress nicely.
- Since I turned 21, I have consumed alcohol excessively.
Sometimes, consistency information is presented in the referent when the 
behavior is described as occurring in various situations. Here are a 
couple of examples:
- People discuss politics at school, at work, and at home.
- She is a messy eater, whether it is at breakfast, luncF 
or dinner.
c. NEGATIVES AND OPPOSITES
As noted above, the test questions are to be used only as a guide 
for conducting the information type search. There are times when an in­
stance of one of the information types does not answer a test question 
exactly, and yet it will still be an acceptable piece of consistency, 
distinctiveness or consensus. Consider this example:
REFERENT: People should not resort to welfare
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: they should work for their keep.
Person: 
Verb: 
Stimulus:
People
should not resort to 
welfare
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The consensus test question would be:
CONSENSUS: How many people (do, would, should) not resort to 
welfare?
The first noticeable piece of consensus lies in the referent itself, be­
cause the person is presented in plural form (e.g., people in general 
should not resort to welfare). Suppose that the following piece of in­
formation also appeared somewhere in the original advice column letter:
Many folks survive entirely on welfare.
Notice that the consensus information question asked about how many people 
do not resort to welfare. The above piece of information tells us about 
how many people do resort to welfare. Even though that piece of infor­
mation does not answer the test question exactly, it would still be an 
acceptable piece of consensus. It is acceptable because it does give us 
information about the variation of the person.
Here is another example:
REFERENT: Bernard will not come to our party
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: he knows Beth will be there.
Person: 
Verb: 
Stimulus:
Bernard
will not come to 
our party
The consistency test question would be:
CONSISTENCY: How often in the past (or, in how many settings) 
has Bernard not come to our party?
Suppose the following piece of information appeared somewhere in the 
original advice column letter:
Bernard always loved to come to our parties.
Notice that the consistency information question asked about how often 
in the past Bernard would not come to our parties. Even though the 
above piece of information does not answer the test question exactly, 
it would still be an acceptable piece of consistency. The information 
that "Bernard has always come to the parties in the past" tells us 
something about how consistent his not coming is.
For the sake of completeness, here is an example involving dis­
tinctiveness:
REFERENT: Henry thinks a lot about adopting a child
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: he knows his wife would love it.
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Person: Henry
Verb: thinks about
Stimulus: adopting a child
First note that thinks a lot reveals consistency information. Here is 
the distinctiveness test question:
DISTINCTIVENESS: About how many different aspects of adopting 
a child does Henry think?
Suppose the following piece of information appeared somewhere in the 
original advice column letter:
Henry tries not to think about all the paperwork, 
the legal hassles, and the long delay involved.
Notice that the distinctiveness information question asked about how 
many different aspects of adopting a child that Henry does think about. 
The above piece of information tells us about how many different aspects 
he does not think about. This is still an acceptable piece of distinc­
tiveness information because it provides data on the variation of the 
stimulus.
When processing the experimental sample, the raters should re­
member that the test questions are to serve only as a guide. It is im­
portant to be alert for both positive and negative variations of the 
person (consensus), the stimulus (distinctiveness) and time/situations 
(consistency).
E. PROCEDURE
The following procedure should be used by all raters:
1) Read the excerpt, the simplified explanatory statement (e.g., 
REFERENT BECAUSE EXPLANATION), the simplified referent (e.g., 
person verb stimulus) and the three test questions.
2) Locate the correct letter and paragraph from the selection 
of original letters using the I.D. number at the top of 
each data sheet.
3) Read the entire original letter in order to become familiar 
with its content.
4) Do one question at a time.
5) Start from the beginning of the letter (not just the beginning 
of the paragraph) for each question.
6) If you find information that enables you to answer a question, 
write in that information under the question that it refers 
to.
169
7) Write in the supporting information just as it appears in 
the original letter. If you feel you need to explain your 
choice of information, or show why it is correct, place 
your clarification in parentheses next to the piece of 
information.
8 ) If you find more than one piece of supporting informa­
tion that answers a given question (e.g., two instances of 
Consistency), then number your pieces of information (e.g.,
1, 2, 3, etc.). Present instances of information in the 
order in which they appear in the original letter.
9) If you are not able to locate a piece of information that 
will answer the question, write in the words "NO INFO" 
under the question.
10) Complete one question before going on to the next.
11) Complete all three questions for one explanatory statement 
before going on to the next data sheet.
F. TIPS AND SUGGESTIONS
As stated before, reliability is the "bottom line" of the experi­
ment. It is essential that those information types that are found be 
agreed upon by the majority of our raters.
There is a very real tendency to "read into" the advice columns.
A rater may sometimes get "the feeling" that a particular information 
type is being presented but they can find no clear proof of it. We are 
interested in finding all available pieces of information that can be 
agreed upon by several independent raters. There are two "rules of thumb" 
that may be helpful. First, if a rater finds himself/herself thinking 
too much, or twisting words around too much, chances are he/she has lo­
cated an unreliable piece of supporting information. However, it is im­
portant for us to find all available pieces of information, and this may 
involve "playing" with the sentences in one's mind to see if they can 
be used as an answer to one of the questions. There will no doubt be 
times when a rater must make a "judgment call." This brings us to the 
second rule of thumb which is simply to use common sense.
G. SAMPLE INFORMATION TYPE SEARCHES
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EXCERPT: About eight months ago she launched into one of her 
middle-of-the-night screaming fits. I belted her in the 
mouth. From that day on she never had another nightmare
Now she is trying to make me feel gui1ty--claims I am 
a wife beater. Actually, it's the only time I ever laid 
a hand on her.
REFERENT:
BECAUSE
I belted her
EXPLANATION: she launched into one of her middle-of-the-night scream­
ing fits.
Person: 
Verb: 
Stimulus:
I
belted 
her
CONSISTENCY: How often in the past (or, in how many settings) has 
he belted her?
Actually, it's the only time I laid a hand on her.
DISTINCTIVENESS: How many different people does he belt?
NO INFO
CONSENSUS: How many other people (do, would, should) belt her?
NO INFO
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EXCERPT: About eight months ago she launched into one of her 
middle-of-the-night screaming fits. I belted her in the 
mouth. From that day on she never had another nightmare.
Now she is trying to make me feel guilty--claims I am a 
wife beater. Actually, it's the only time I laid a hand 
on her.
REFERENT:
BECAUSE
She never had another nightmare
EXPLANATION: I belted her.
Person:
Verb:
Stimulus:
She
had not 
nightmare
CONSISTENCY: How often in the past (or, in how many settings) has 
she not had nightmares?
She never had another nightmare.
DISTINCTIVENESS: How many different types of nightmares does she no
longer have?
. . . she launched into one of the middle-of-the-night 
screaming fits . . . she never had another nightmare.
CONSENSUS: How many other people (do, would, should) not have 
ni ghtmares?
NO INFO
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EXCERPT: You need psychiatric help to get over your phobia which 
is uncommon but not unheard of.
REFERENT: You need psychiatric help
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION: of your phobia.
Person: You
Verb: need
Stimulus: psychiatric help
CONSISTENCY: How often in the past (or, in how many settings) have
you needed psychiatric help?
NO INFO
DISTINCiIVENESS: How many different types of professional help have you 
needed?
NO INFO
CONSENSUS: How many other people (do, would, should) need such
psychiatric help?
. . uncommon but not unheard of.
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EXCERPT: The little boy is five years old. I'm sure he has never 
heard the words, "I love you" from his parents. The 
father's idea of attention is constant criticism, bark­
ing commands and threats of physical violence. What's 
unfortunate is that the boy's other relatives also fail 
to express any love for him.
REFERENT:
BECAUSE
He has never heard the words "I love you" from his parents.
EXPLANATION: The father's idea of attention is constant criticism, 
barking commands and threats of physical violence.
Person: 
Verb: 
Stimulus:
He
has not heard the words "I love you" from 
his parents
CONSISTENCY: How often in the past (or, in how many settings) has 
he not heard the words "I love you" from his parents?
I'm sure he has never heard the words "I love you" from 
his parents.
DISTINCTIVENESS: From how many others does he not hear the words "I
love you"?
The boy's other relatives also fail to express any 
love for him.
CONSENSUS: How many other people (do, would, should) fail to hear 
the words "I love you" from their parents?
NO INFO
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EXCERPT: When I am introduced to a new person, I extend my hand. 
Most people reciprocate, but too many appear uncomfortable. 
Either they will not put out their hand, or when they do, 
you get a dead fish.
REFERENT:
BECAUSE
I extend my hand
EXPLANATION: I am introduced to a new person.
Person:
Verb:
Stimulus:
I
extend my hand to 
others
CONSISTENCY: How often in the past (or, in how many settings) do I 
extend my hand to others?
When I am introduced to a new person, I extend my hand 
(e.q., Whenever I meet a new person I consistently 
extend my hand).
DISTINCTIVENESS: Toward how many different people do I extend my hand?
NO INFO
CONSENSUS: How many other people (do, would, should) extend their 
hand to others?
Most people reciprocate (e.g., most people also extend 
their hands).
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